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The doctrine of divine providence was considered fundamental to understanding the nature of reality in
medieval Christian orthodoxy. One of our greatest modern impediments to proper understanding of this law
are the radically different ontologies that flourished in the Latin West through the recuperation of Ancient
thought, most notably in the divisions between the Platonists and the Aristotelians. Whereas Biblical exegesis
owed more to Augustine's Platonism, the rise of Aristotelian thought in the university curriculum entailed a
serious threat to the doctrine of providence. The translation and dissemination of Islamic Aristotelians
revealed an almost identical challenge to Islamic orthodoxy on the same matter. Philosophical, and especially
ontological, speculation on the nature of substance (ontology) was therefore fertile ground for heresy. The
main works under examination are the anonymous Queste del Saint Graal and the continuation of the Roman
de la Rose by Jean de Meun. Deeply imbued with Augustinian figuralism and Biblical history, the Queste
strongly distinguishes itself from the rest of the Lancelot en Prose, most notably La Mort le Roi Artu, in its
theological purpose. It also shows a clever reworking of its source materials (ChrÃ©tien de Troyes and
continuators, Robert de Boron, Perlesvaus) and an attempt to re-write the grail literature in its most
sophisticated and orthodox formulation. By contrast, Jean de Meun's Rose continuation is fraught with heresy
and obscenity as he denounces the corrupt practices of the mendicant orders and marks his clear preference
for the University of Paris's secular masters (ca. 1270). Analyzing the question of ontology within the work,
one notices heresies that originate in the Islamic reception of Aristotle, and which resulted in the large-scale
condemnations within the decade of the continuation's composition. While strikingly different in tone and
purpose, the Queste and the Rose are theological romances that use the concept of providence to explain the
special place of man. While the former offers an explanation based on church sacramental practices, the latter
offers an extreme naturalism with an Arab-inflected Boethius as its principal source.
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ABSTRACT 
 
SUBSTANCE AND PROVIDENCE IN THE OLD FRENCH THEOLOGICAL 
ROMANCE 
 
Ian McConnon 
 
Kevin Brownlee 
 
The doctrine of divine providence was considered fundamental to understanding the 
nature of reality in medieval Christian orthodoxy.  One of our greatest modern 
impediments to proper understanding of this law are the radically different ontologies that 
flourished in the Latin West through the recuperation of Ancient thought, most notably in 
the divisions between the Platonists and the Aristotelians. Whereas Biblical exegesis 
owed more to Augustine’s Platonism, the rise of Aristotelian thought in the university 
curriculum entailed a serious threat to the doctrine of providence. The translation and 
dissemination of Islamic Aristotelians revealed an almost identical challenge to Islamic 
orthodoxy on the same matter. Philosophical, and especially ontological, speculation on 
the nature of substance (ontology) was therefore fertile ground for heresy. The main 
works under examination are the anonymous Queste del Saint Graal and the continuation 
of the Roman de la Rose by Jean de Meun. Deeply imbued with Augustinian figuralism 
and Biblical history, the Queste strongly distinguishes itself from the rest of the Lancelot 
en Prose, most notably La Mort le Roi Artu, in its theological purpose. It also shows a 
clever reworking of its source materials (Chrétien de Troyes and continuators, Robert de 
Boron, Perlesvaus) and an attempt to re-write the grail literature in its most sophisticated 
and orthodox formulation. By contrast, Jean de Meun’s Rose continuation is fraught with 
heresy and obscenity as he denounces the corrupt practices of the mendicant orders and 
marks his clear preference for the University of Paris’s secular masters (ca. 1270). 
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Analyzing the question of ontology within the work, one notices heresies that originate in 
the Islamic reception of Aristotle, and which resulted in the large-scale condemnations 
within the decade of the continuation’s composition.  While strikingly different in tone 
and purpose, the Queste and the Rose are theological romances that use the concept of 
providence to explain the special place of man. While the former offers an explanation 
based on church sacramental practices, the latter offers an extreme naturalism with an 
Arab-inflected Boethius as its principal source.   
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Introduction 
 
This dissertation will focus primarily on the interpretation of two theological 
romances of the thirteenth century in France, La Quête du Saint Graal and Le Roman de 
la Rose. The juxtaposition of two works, separated by some forty years in their 
completion and dissemination, under the same generic category might shock at first 
glance, for while the first work is obviously laden with much theological sermonizing, 
the theology of the latter is not foregrounded in the same fashion. And yet both romances 
are connected, to an extent, by their respective promotions of world-views that rely on 
conceptions of substance as this relates to providence. Both works elaborate on the 
position of man within a providential universe, and in their respective attempts to 
articulate such a position, they offer glimpses of their underlying ontology, or their 
perspective on being.1  It is my contention that these works must be contextualized within 
their respective settings in order to understand how they could have been meaningful 
within the milieu from which they sprang.       
 La Quête du Saint Graal, composed anonymously c. 1230, fits oddly into the 
Lancelot en prose or Vulgate series, given the extended theological glossing that occupies 
a large portion of the narrative.  But without disregarding its narrative insertion into a 
larger work, it seems that the Quête is more concerned with its extra-diegetical truth 
                                                 
1
 The link between allegory and ontology is brought to the fore in Peter Struck’s discussion of the 
Neoplatonist Plotinus’s theory of the intellects, emanating from the One, down to Mind (nous), Soul 
(Psyche), and eventually Substance (Hule). “The significance of this basic understanding for allegorical 
interpretation is hard to overstate.  First, the tiered ontology means that any given entity here in the physical 
world always also has other, hidden aspects to it.” Drawn from “Allegory and ascent in Neoplatonism” in 
Cambridge Companion to Allegory, 59.   
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status than the other works of the Vulgate.  The mode of interpretation offered by the 
work’s hermits is both Augustinian and exemplary of contemporary thirteenth-century 
exegesis.  This work exemplifies conservative militancy as it advocates for an increased 
ontology, meaning a universe with a greater number of existent things.  Relying on 
mystical theology that draws heavily on the Cistercian tradition, this work poses a major 
problem for modern criticism, because it does not treat meaning as linguistic (i.e. as a by-
product of language’s symbolic function), but rather as substantial (meaning as res, or 
really existent thing).  The term “theological” applied to the Roman de la Rose only 
properly describes Jean de Meun’s continuation (c. 1268-85), and not Guillaume de 
Lorris’s original (c. 1215), which was more concerned with a depiction of a courtly 
universe, both psychic and social, than a theological one.  While Jean de Meun never 
forsakes these contemporary extra-diegetical circumstances in his composition, he 
nonetheless contextualizes his lover’s quest within a larger frame, in such a way that the 
aesthetic and courtly telos of Guillaume de Lorris is supplanted with a universal and 
ontological one in Jean de Meun’s continuation.  Despite drastic differences between the 
theology propounded in this work and that of the Quête, Jean de Meun also propounds a 
theory of meaning (glose) that is highly “substantial”, although he fleshes out this 
principle with more contemporary Scholastic learning and a greater reliance on 
Aristotelian logic.   
This introduction will situate the problem of ontology, with special focus on 
‘things’ (as exemplary of ‘substance’) within realistic medieval exegesis.  This discussion 
necessarily entails some remarks on the history of the term allegory, whose usage was 
contaminated by a translatio from the Greek, thus cementing a homology of both verbal 
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and ‘providential’ (i.e. God’s writing) that is still in evidence in our 13th-century corpus.  
However problematic this homology may be from a modern perspective, I contend that it 
must be kept in mind throughout this dissertation in order to understand more fully the 
alternately conservative or subversive thrusts of the works in question.  In an attempt to 
explicate the foundational ontology from an exegetic perspective, I will focus primarily 
on the question of things/substance, and their connection to providential writing, to 
underscore their historical trajectory. We will conclude this discussion with Dante’s 
(somewhat elliptically stated) idea that the poetic rendering of an ontological falsehood 
can paradoxically yield truth by an apparent homology of verbal and historical 
translation.  This will be followed by the theoretical assumptions and brief outline of the 
dissertation.   
 
The language of Providence 
 
While the texts in this thesis are usually considered allegories, I show here that 
more fundamental than the term allegory are those of providence and ontology. In the 
context of this dissertation, providence will, in sympathy with the objects of my corpus, 
be taken as a conceptual reality (res). The acceptation of Providence as God’s 
(fore)knowledge was mostly steady throughout Ancient and Medieval exegesis. And yet 
to speak of ‘knowledge’ with reference to an omniscient God was naturally a thorny 
question for theology.  In the thirteenth century, to speak of divine knowledge often 
yielded discussions of substance and creation, as can be seen in Aquinas’s dictum 
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(following Boethius) that God’s knowledge, or providence, is the cause of things.2 But 
this idea goes back even further, and we can see how Saint Augustine, in De Civitate Dei, 
had used the term to describe the ultimate reality from which all others, especially the 
reality of ‘man’, drew their existence.3  Put simply, this means that providence relates to 
both reality and history as does cause to effect.4  As we shall see in chapter one, Boethius 
accords in the physical, naturalistic foundations of providence, but in the context of 
distinguishing it from its Hellenic rival, fate.   
 Because providence is taken as a foundational cause for a real narrative, I will 
seek to underscore some of its effects on exegesis.  Thus a discussion of ‘allegory’ 
imposes itself here, for this term, rich in both exegetical and rhetorical undertones, often 
exemplifies the tension between rhetorical and exegetical conceptions of writing that are 
operational in my corpus. Beyond the sense of ‘trope’, the assumptions of medieval 
                                                 
2
 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Pars 1, Q14, A8.   
3
 “Therefore God supreme and true, with His Word and Holy Spirit (which three are one), one God 
omnipotent, creator and maker of every soul and of every body; by whose gift all are happy who are happy 
through verity and not through vanity; who made man a rational animal consisting of soul and body, who, 
when he sinned, neither permitted him to go unpunished, nor left him without mercy; who has given to the 
good and to the evil, being in common with stones, vegetable life in common with trees, sensuous life in 
common with brutes, intellectual life in common with angels alone; from whom is every mode, every 
species, every order; from whom are measure, number, weight; from whom is everything which has an 
existence in nature, of whatever kind it be, and of whatever value; from whom are the seeds of forms and 
the forms of seeds, and the motion of seeds and of forms; who gave also to flesh its origin, beauty, health, 
reproductive fecundity, disposition of members, and the salutary concord of its parts; who also to the 
irrational soul has given memory, sense, appetite, but to the rational soul, in addition to these, has given 
intelligence and will; who has not left, not to speak of heaven and earth, angels and men, but not even the 
entrails of the smallest and most contemptible animal, or the feather of a bird, or the little flower of a plant, 
or the leaf of a tree, without an harmony, and, as it were, a mutual peace among all its parts;—that God can 
never be believed to have left the kingdoms of men, their dominations and servitudes, outside of the laws of 
His providence.”  (italics are my own) City of God, 5,11 
4
 Aquinas, Questiones diputatae de veritate, Q5,A1:  “Properly speaking, God’s providence is not the 
eternal law; it is something that follows upon the eternal law. The eternal law should be thought of as 
existing in God as those principles of action exist in us which we know naturally and upon which we base 
our deliberation and choice. These belong to prudence or providence. Consequently, the law of our intellect 
is related to prudence as an indemonstrable principle is related to a demonstration. Similarly, the eternal 
law in God is not His providence, but, as it were, a principle of His providence; for this reason one can, 
without any inconsistency, attribute an act of providence to the eternal law in the same way that he 
attributes every conclusion of a demonstration to self-evident principles.”  
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realism allowed the term ‘allegory’ to apply to God’s writing of history. In other words, 
Biblical allegory was seen as the fulfillment of God’s providential plan, and pertains as 
much to ontology as epistemology. 
 The exegetical tradition focused on the concept of providence in terms of 
universal history, manifested in the Scriptural allegoria in factis. God’s knowledge, 
necessarily omniscient, logically entailed his omnipotence, and was traditionally cast as 
the cause of all things and events.  This system of decoding providence was already 
implicitly philosophical, for the early Patristic scholars, including Augustine and Origen, 
had already imbued the concept with Platonic and NeoPlatonic ontologies.  This broad, 
and somewhat poetic, characterization of providence gave their exegesis its more literary 
flavor. Not simply a term that implied ‘foresight’ or ‘knoweldge of the future’ 
(providere), providence included an implicit characterization of a beneficent deity who 
ordered the events of universal history in such a way as to ensure the ultimate triumph of 
Christendom. It is a concept that pertains more to ontology than epistemology in the 
Middle Ages, and the term’s closest derivatives in English (‘provide’) and French 
(‘pourvoir’) similarly attest to the primacy of this ontological understanding.      
 The most significant reinterpretation of providence was provided by Boethius 
(A.D. 480-524/5?), whose Consolatio was instrumental in pioneering Christian 
Scholasticism. Boethius clearly saw Aristotle’s De Interpretatione as crucial in 
developing the question of the determinism occasioned by divine knowledge.  While 
clearly theological in tone and seemingly orthodox in intent, the Consolatio has bracketed 
providence from Christian, biblical history. Boethius allegorizes Aristotle’s explanation 
of necessity and contingency in such a way as to make it serviceable to his Christian 
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outlook. Linking the concept of providence with the process of generation itself, Boethius 
finds providence manifest in the cosmogony of substance:  
 
 Omnium generatio rerum cunctusque mutabilium naturarum progressus et quicquid 
 aliquo mouetur modo causas, ordinem, formas ex diuinae mentis stabilitate sortitur. Haec  
 in suae simplicitatis arce composita multiplicem rebus gerendis modum statuit. Qui 
 modus cum in ipsa diuinae intellegentiae puritate conspicitur, prouidentia nominatur; 
 cum uero ad ea quae mouet atque disponit refertur, fatum a ueteribus appellatum est. 
 Quae diuersa esse facile liquebit si quis utriusque uim mente conspexerit; nam 
 prouidentia est ipsa illa diuina ratio in summo omnium principe constituta quae cuncta 
 disponit, fatum uero inhaerens rebus mobilibus dispositio per quam prouidentia suis 
 quaeque nectit ordinibus. Prouidentia namque cuncta pariter quamuis diuersa quamuis 
 infinita complectitur, fatum uero singula digerit in motum locis, formis ac temporibus 
 distributa, ut haec temporalis ordinis explicatio in diuinae mentis adunata prospectum 
 prouidentia sit, eadem uero adunatio digesta atque explicata temporibus fatum uocetur. 5 
 The generation of all things, the whole progress of things subject to change and  
 whatever moves in any way, receive their causes, their due order and their form  from 
 the unchanging mind of God.  In the high citadel of its oneness, the mind of God has set 
 up a plan for the multitude of events.  When this plan is thought of as in the purity of 
 God’s understanding, it is called Providence, and when it is thought of with reference to 
 all things, whose motion and order it controls, it is called by the name the ancients 
 gave it, Fate.  If anyone will examine their meaning, it will soon be clear to him that these 
 two aspects are different.  Providence is the divine reason itself.  It is set at the head of all 
 things and disposes all things. Fate, on the other hand, is the planned order inherent in 
 things subject to change and through the medium of which Providence holds everything 
 in its own allotted place.  Providence includes all things at the same time, however 
 diverse or infinite, while Fate controls the motion of different individual things in 
 different places and in different times.  So this unfolding of the plan in time when 
 brought together as a unified whole in in the foresight of God’s mind is Providence; and 
 the same unified whole when dissolved and unfolded in the course of time is Fate.6   
 
Even if our human understanding, then, is limited to Fate, we have indirect access to the 
logic of Providence in the division of substance and generation. Paradoxically, it is the  
ultimate simplicity of God’s providence that renders it inaccessible to our understanding, 
but we can infer something about its laws through its effects.  If providence is the 
                                                 
5
 Botheius, book VI, Prosa 6, Text derived from G. Weinberger (Vienna, 1935, volume 67 in the series 
Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum). 
[http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/jod/boethius/jkok/list_t.htm] 
6
 Boethius, book IV, 104.   
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ultimate reality, those things subject to change will understand only the fatalistic aspect.  
The intellectual, by contrast, can seek an understanding of providence by examining the 
natural order and finding therein the most universal logic.  In one sense, Boethius’s 
translatio can be seen as furthering bolstering Augustine’s claim that full knowledge of 
things is necessary to proper exegesis. In another, it imbues the concept of providence 
with a physical naturalism, a maneuver that amounts to a time-bomb for the heretical 
ferments of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.   
 
Methodology 
 
My method of analysis, which will contextualize these works within medieval 
exegesis and philosophy (more specifically in the “universals debate”), aims to reduce the 
possibility of anachronism by locating the assumptions that undergird medieval notions 
of ‘substance’ (especially ‘man’) within a universe whose conceptions of time are more 
providential (and to some extent, circular) than linear. By anachronism, I mean the 
imposition of our present knowledge, values, and interpretive codes on a text that was 
composed in very different conditions from those in which we now live. Such 
anachronism can undoubtedly be productive, for this separation can bring a different 
perspective from interpreters of yesteryear, and serves to re-enhance the work’s 
transhistorical “value”. New Critics and Structuralists alike have tried to free us from this 
anxiety of anachronism by focusing on the text, in the sense of “words on the page”, 
yielding criticism that bespeaks a modern fondness for more empirical explanation. 
Despite the gains of these “schools”, some of which will be evident in this analysis, their 
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rise has perhaps been to the detriment of philology and other historicist perspectives, and 
perhaps especially to the metaphysical notion of meaning.7 Not sharing in any distaste for 
this concept, I argue that some aspects of the work’s meaning is bound to the conditions 
from which it arose, and that Jean de Meun’s continuation of the Rose, with its careful 
exposition of heresies in an age of explicit censorship, is but one example of this 
historical meaning, which is no longer directly accessible without such a 
contextualization.   
 This anxiety of anachronism cannot be dispelled, however, by simple recourse to 
a philological methodology, and nor am I optimistic about fully extricating myself 
entirely from this constant temptation. Given the contingency that accompanies critics in 
their own historical moment and the explicit and implicit assumptions of our modern (and 
more particularly, Western) ontologies,  this dissertation aims to overcome this 
chronological impediment by some more modern attempts to theorize the production of 
narrative and its ideas, most notably through the work of Fredric Jameson and Erich 
Auerbach.  The whole of this thesis operates under one of the basic assumptions of 
Auerbach’s Mimesis, namely that literature throughout the ages has tried to represent and 
imitate reality in the most ontological sense, not as an absolute and immutable 
phenomenon, but rather one that is bound to its historical moment.  In this context, it is 
the concept of ‘mimesis’ itself which alone escapes the contingency of historicism, as it 
is taken as the foundational aspiration for literature throughout the ages.  The absolute 
nature of this mimetic impulse thus yields an implicit teleology for the literary text, by 
making reality itself the providential telos to which literature aspires. Fredric Jameson’s 
                                                 
7
 Compare this to Jameson’s polemics against the ideological foundations of Paul de Man’s (Allegories of 
Reading) and Walter Benn Michael’s (Gold Standard, “Against Theory”) “postmodern” assessments of the 
concept of theory.   “Theory” in Postmodernism or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. 181-259 
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theory of a providential history accounts for the shifting ontologies of Auerbach’s 
transhistorical analysis.8  
Without taking providence as an historical absolute (immutable throughout the 
ages),  I would suggest that this concept, especially in its absorption of  the related 
concepts of ‘creation’ and even ‘reason for existence’, can be seen as fundamental to 
‘ideology’, a term rich in both philosophical (i.e. the logic behind ideas) and Marxist 
resonances. To recuperate the ideology of this pre-modern world that has since become 
alien, I would like to draw on the theoretical apparatus of Fredric Jameson as expounded 
in The Political Unconscious, for it is in the spirit of this work that I will try to resurrect 
the ideological, and in our case, ontological crux that hampers our understanding of 
providential signification.  While Jameson opts for a thoroughgoing historicism, he is 
aware that some aspects of humanity must be constant throughout history in order to 
bridge our present gap with the past – for Jameson, this transhistorical constant is 
narrative itself:  
These divergent and unequal bodies of work are here interrogated and evaluated from the 
perspective of the specific critical and interpretive task of the present volume, namely to 
restructure the problematics of ideology, of the unconscious and of desire, of 
representation, of history, and of cultural production, around the all-informing process of 
narrative, which I take to be (here using the shorthand of philosophical idealism) the 
central function or instance of the human mind.9 
 
Without really supplanting Auerbach’s concept of mimesis, Jameson suggests that 
narrative is perhaps an even more immanent capacity of the human mind.  Jameson thus 
elaborates a definition of narrative that is more dependent on idealism than materialism, 
for the philosophical implication is that narrative is a natural effect, the mind itself being 
                                                 
8
 This is analogous to the revisionist goals of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Wahrheit und Methode,  in which 
philosophical alignments are shown to have played a tremendous role in philological inquiry. Cf. Mailloux, 
Steven. “Hermeneutics, Deconstruction, Allegory” in Cambridge Companion to Allegory, 256-7.   
9
 Jameson, Fredric.  The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act. 13.  
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the cause. As a consequence, no narrative is exempt from ideological inscription because 
the root of both is the same (the mind), and similarly, both narrative and ideology try to 
map out the relations of individual to collective existence. To the extent that works arise 
from literary and artistic communities (clerkly and poetic circles, University of Paris, 
etc.), each with their own ideological investments, the notion that works could be 
intelligible to readers without inscribing traces of their libidinal and ideological 
preconceptions is, for all intents and purposes, untenable. I will have to forego, however, 
the materialist acceptation that drives Jameson’s polemics, namely, ideology as that 
which prevents revolution by projecting a false relation to the mode of production.  .   
 Seeing the explication or demystification of ideology as the interpretive nexus to 
which all criticism must aspire, Jameson reaches the conclusion that ideology inscribes 
itself within texts allegorically.10 The capacity of allegory to symbolize “universally” is 
maintained by what he describes as the collective impulse. Jameson, drawing on one of 
the key sources of Western hermeneutics, thus adapts the fourfold interpretation of 
Scripture to a Marxist hermeneutic, in which the moral and anagogical senses allow for 
the insertion of the individual subject into a providential Christian history by means of a 
libidinal and ideological investment.11 Jameson’s use of a translatio here results in a 
Marxist allegorization (and consequently, for him, a truer version) of the concept of 
Christian providence, as explicated later in the work:  
                                                 
10
 ibid, 34: “The idea is […] that if interpretation in terms of expressive causality or of allegorical master 
narratives remains a constant temptation, this is because such master narratives have inscribed themselves 
in the texts as well as in our thinking about them; such allegorical narrative signifieds are a persistent 
dimension of literary and cultural texts precisely because they reflect a fundamental dimension of our 
collective thinking and our collective fantasies about history and reality.”   
11
 Ibid. 30, 31: “LITERAL (historical or textual referent)/ ALLEGORICAL (allegorical key or interpretive 
code)/ MORAL (psychological reading [individual subject])/ ANAGOGICAL (political reading [collective 
“meaning” of history]).   
11 
 
I have throughout the present work implied what I have suggested explicitly elsewhere, 
that any comparison of Marxism with religion is a two-way street, in which the former is 
not necessarily discredited by its association with the latter.  On the contrary, such a 
comparison may also function to rewrite certain religious concepts – most notably 
Christian historicism and the “concept” of providence, but also the pretheological 
systems of primitive magic – as anticipatory foreshadowings of historical materialism 
within precapitalist social formations in which scientific thinking is unavailable as such.12 
 
Jameson’s teleology ultimately aspires to a fully scientific explanation, and yet,  sensitive 
to the work of  Walter Benjamin, Northrop Frye, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur, 
Jameson offers us a materialist ideology that is particularly accommodating to theological 
thought. This should be tempered with the observation that, for Jameson, pure theological 
thinking is only ideology, while his scientific translatio presumably aspires to the level of 
praxis.13  Jameson’s invocation of the ‘totality’ is logically bound to his Utopian thinking, 
deriving ultimately from the Platonic rather than the Aristotelian tradition, and this 
exemplifies quite clearly the persistence of metaphysical thinking inherent in Jameson’s 
materialist and idealist “History”. Innate ideas seem to be common to both Platonic 
idealism and Providential accounts of the Fall (and by extension, man’s knowledge), and 
form a major part of Saint Augustine’s thoughts on man’s spiritual providence through 
grace. If, on the one hand, innate ideas and providential history seem to be philosophical 
foundations for the utopian impulse of the work, to use Jameson’s term, they are, on the 
other, philosophical impediments for an empirical, fully materialist Marxism.  This 
conflict, cast roughly as that between idealism and materialism, lies at the heart of 
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Althusser’s relentless anti-Hegelian critique, which Jameson likens to a distaste for any 
narrative whose logic is akin to that of providence:  
The fullest form of what Althusser calls “expressive causality” (and of what he calls 
“historicism) will thus prove to be a vast interpretive allegory in which a sequence of 
historical events or texts and artifacts is rewritten in terms of some deeper, underlying 
and more “fundamental” narrative, of a hidden master narrative which would then 
include providential histories (such as those of Hegel or Marx), catastrophic visions of 
history (such as that of Spengler), and cyclical or Viconian visions of history alike.” 
(italics are my own)14   
 
These philosophical presuppositions inherent in Jameson’s brand of idealism, as well as 
his use of dialectics with constant reference to the world as History and his insistence on 
referential signification (ibid, p. 35), make his methodology very serviceable for the 
interpretation of these theological romances.       
Despite my emphasis on the idealist aspects of Jameson’s thinking, there is still an 
element of materialism to be retained, in somewhat altered terms:  In traditional Marxist 
analysis, “production” has been the dominant means of analysis for the market. I argue 
that distribution (via the translation movement of ancient texts) was more important than 
production in the ideological shifts which took place in the thirteenth century. This 
translatio studii is not merely the material translation/alteration of the study of ancient 
logic, however,  but rather something far more fundamental to all thought, namely, the 
place of ‘man’ in the world/universe and the exact validity of such universal terms. Both 
works examined in this dissertation also elaborate quite extensively on these 
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philosophical questions. Medieval works also have intricate material histories in the sense 
that they are material objects, and susceptible to scribal corruption, intercalation, and 
differences in production/consumption that separate them from modern material text.  
While the material history is sometimes necessary for explanation (e.g., the manuscript 
translation/transmission of Aristotle), it is the Scholastic history of the idea(s) of a 
substantial providence that will dominate the majority of this dissertation.  It should also 
be noted from the outset that explicit censorship of ideas is a reality of this century, and 
heresy, both in the mind and in utterance, was subject to consequences of a material 
nature, including excommunication. 
In an influential study, Maureen Quilligan states plainly the ideological 
foundations of allegorical reading and writing, though she never tackles the ideological 
assumptions when she ascribes to allegory a “suprarealist” attitude concerning things and 
words.  By suprarealist is meant the belief that all abstract nouns are fully existent things.  
It is this conviction that animates her theory for the desuetude of the “genre” when this 
attitude was supposedly forsworn in the seventeenth century.15 Although the first 
statement seems to this reader be mostly correct, the totalizing assumptions about the 
dominant ideologies toward language are not borne out by historical evidence, as we shall 
see in the first chapter.16 Quilligan assumes that the suprarealist attitude toward language 
was lost in the seventeenth century, thereby resulting in the loss of allegory as the 
dominant form.17 We know, however, that realism suffered its greatest attack at the hands 
of Ockham in the fourteenth century, and Abelard’s anti-realism in the early twelfth 
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century was no less important in its own moment. Despite the lack of supporting 
evidence for her claims about the prevailing suprarealist attitude, her intuition about the 
logical and philosophical underpinnings of integumental allegory is fundamentally 
correct. Augustinian sign theory was dominant throughout the Middle Ages, but dialectic 
was thriving in a curriculum that was becoming increasingly Aristotelian in the twelfth 
and thirteenth centuries.18 This tension, between the Platonic realism that is inherent in 
Augustinian sign theory and the growing suspicion in logic that universals had no 
existence outside sensibles, resulted in the crisis of predication that is the universals 
debate,  and reflects, in broad strokes, the ideological (also ontological and theological) 
context out of which these theological romances emerged.  
  Taking a turn from the exegetical account of substance (or things), the medieval 
universals debate offered a quite different, and somewhat more turbulent, perspective on 
the matter.  The second part of the first chapter will show that ontology and epistemology 
were often indistinguishable in Scholastic logic, perhaps due to Aristotle’s non-
distinction between ‘thing’ and ‘thing named.’  While a modern critic might dub this a 
homology, we will see that it is crucial for thirteenth-century ontology, and one without 
which the exploration of truth of these theological romances cannot be fully grasped. The 
exegetical injunction to know things means that in chapter one we will explore the 
various conceptions of substantia, with special reference to ‘man’, by adherents to the 
two most influential sects on the Middle Ages,  namely the Platonists and the 
Aristotelians. While Plato and Aristotle both preserved the immateriality of thought, the 
latter grounded knowledge of things within sensible objects (via abstraction), and the 
former located them within the immaterial realm of forms.  The medieval debate about 
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universals found various prefigurations already within the ancient sects, e.g., Aristotle’s 
writings already contain at least two (the differentia as “added to” substance, the nous 
poetikos or intellectus agens as a “world soul” [Timeaus]). Platonic realism suffered its 
death blow by Abelard, who contended that genera and species can no longer logically be 
treated as separable substances.  The development of more complicated grammars in the 
13th century (often tinged with elements of Priscian’s Stoic grammar) led to the 
development of new theories of reference (supposition), meaning that grammar, rather 
than ontology, became the new battle ground for realists and nominalists.   At the same 
time, translations of Aristotle were becoming increasingly prevalent, and the various 
Arab commentaries also revealed an entirely different conception of “the Philosopher” 
(Aristotle, as he was often dubbed in this century), one which fused Aristotle’s logic with 
a Neoplatonist ontology.   The writings of the Islamic philosophers were of enormous 
importance for the Latin West, but they presented an Aristotle that was no more 
conducive to contemporary Christian orthodoxy than he had been to Islamic.  Averroes’s 
contention that the world was eternal (an idea explicitly stated in Aristotle) and that the 
intellect was not multiplied by the number of living souls found numerous adherents in 
the Latin West, and these tenets were inextricably linked to the question of genera and 
species, universal and particular. This chapter will explain why the universals debate 
spills almost immediately onto theology, and becomes the ne plus ultra of ideological 
analysis, in the sense that ontology is the most fundamental of all ideologies. In the 
thirteenth century, this ontological question was necessarily a theological one: how freely 
does God create substance and how does man speak of this without falling into heresy? In 
addition, this chapter will show how the terms of the debate are intimately connected to 
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providence, thus relegating this extended debate to a vast and intricate background from 
which the works of our corpus frame their theological expositions.  
 The second chapter will develop the question of ontology and providence further 
with reference to the literature of the grail, culminating in an analysis of La Quête du 
Saint Graal.  This last work, using an elaborate translatio of a somewhat contemporary 
object (here, “the grail” from Roman d’Alexandre to Chretien de Troyes, and 
continuations), manages to redefine things, including the object of the quest itself, within 
a theological providence that mirrors the narrative telos. By insisting on the real, extra-
diegetical referent of its story (i.e., the real world under the control of a Christian God), 
the glossing hermits almost wholly engulf the romance world in which the “literal 
adventures” take place.  This real world is a world of things, and one that is ready to 
dispense with the advances in Scholastic logic even as it makes abundant use of 
Scholastic vocabulary. The logic of the Grail, in its lucid yet unproblematic realism, 
owes much, though by no means exclusively, to a vulgarized Augustinianism for its 
ontology.  From this remapping of the Quest’s ontology I will show how this work 
expounds the place of man in the universe. By accounting for both historical Providence 
through genealogy and etiology, and double “senses” (adventure/gloss), the Grail (as 
literal and spiritual thing) is made to account for both the historical “age of miracles” and 
the eternal reality of Grace. Although conservative and militant in its ontology and ethics 
(partially in response to Abelardian theology), it often flirts with the ascetic ideology that 
begot the Albigensian heresy, in which the rigidly dualistic conception of substance 
proved dangerous to the faith as regarded the Incarnation (denial of Christ’s material 
substance).  One of the corollaries of this ascetic ideology, however, is that all meaning is 
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spiritual and/or providential. At the end of this work, the expected gloss is missing, much 
in the same manner as the later Rose.  By both philological and philosophical means, I 
will offer a selective glossing of the work that will lay bare its providential meaning. 
 The third chapter will be devoted to epistemology in the Roman de la Rose.  I will 
be analyzing in particular the speeches of Reason and Faux Semblant to show how they 
develop a theory of reading various genres of writing, with specific instructions about the 
role of language in a whole gamut of modal registers (Scholastic, integumental, satirical, 
etc.).  These voices are elaborating on different ways to reach truth, with a special focus 
on the growing autonomy of various disciplines (e.g., physics, theology, pure dialectic, 
and in Jean de Meun’s case, mythography as well) and the resultant change in 
perspectives.  While these characters diverge necessarily in the content and, even morals, 
of their respective speeches, they are both bound by contemporary Scholastic logic, and 
Jean de Meun shows here a particular reliance on Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations, a 
logical manual which cuts through sophisms to both comedic (i.e. Raison’s refutations to 
the lover) and deadly effect (Faux Semblant and Malebouche).  This manual is preparing 
the reader for the carefully developed heresies, namely the eternity of the world and the 
collective “world soul”, that are in evidence in the Nature/Genius section.   
This will be the subject matter of chapter four, which will explain how Jean de 
Meun revises the definition of Providence, a theological concept, using the contemporary 
dialectic concerning universals, to quite heretical and subversive ends. The logic that Jean 
de Meun uses to pursue this analysis is framed from an extended discussion of the place 
of ‘man’ as species, in which he evinces some of the logic and argumentation of the 
radical Aristotelianism that erupted at the University of Paris around the time of the 
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work’s composition. Extricating Jean de Meun’s naturalism from its apparent Chartrian 
subtext yields an entirely different perspective on the Rose’s theology from the 
Augustinian debt that has been so crucial to previous theological interpretations of the 
work.  
The anxiety of anachronism, which I evoked earlier in this introduction, cannot be 
dispelled by simple recourse to a philological methodology and an historical idealism.  
On the one hand, anachronism is a natural, and almost necessary, by-product of the 
contingency of critics in their own historical moment, insofar as one cannot fully 
extricate oneself from both explicit and implicit assumptions of our modern ideologies. 
On the other, this dissertation will show that some anachronisms (and sometimes even 
conceptual homologies) are productive and account for the difficulty of relating universal 
to particular, material to immaterial, and chronology to eternity, mirroring an anxiety that 
I detect at the heart of these romances. These conceptual dichotomies are products of the 
“homology of writing” that we have been exploring. Furthermore, they are also 
exemplified in the various acceptations of ‘translatio’, which at once encompassed both 
‘rhetorical trope’ akin to metaphor (Donatus’s Metaphora est rerum verborumque 
translatio)19  and ‘historical importation of knowledge’ under the same term. And in fact, 
this may also be a quite common assumption for the less historically-minded proponents 
of the translatio studii, who believed that their interpretations of the Ancients were valid 
not only for their own time, but omnitemporally, as if the full implications of thought 
could be understood even without recourse to the specific context of its enunciation.20 
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But by the close association of ‘translatio’ and ‘allegoria’, the former cannot but assume 
many of the providential overtones of the latter, and it shall therefore be the main term 
used in my analysis of these works. Indeed, if we examine the uses of the term translatio 
– rhetorical (trope), theological (signum translatum of Augustine), material (translation), 
and historical (translatio studii) - we find that it more accurately reflects this “language 
of Providence” than any other term. Providence, here taken in the realistic sense as a 
‘reality’ and which, in Christian manifestations of the thirteenth century, accounted for 
both linear and cyclical histories via translationes, provided a sound logic for these 
theological romances to be read for truth and meaning. It is this conviction that animates 
the interpretive maneuvers in this dissertation. 
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Chapter 1 - The Signifying Power of Substance 
 
 
  This chapter will explore the question of substance and its importance for both 
exegesis and medieval philosophy. The recuperation of the Pagan texts whose value had 
been displaced within Christendom led to the allegorization, or providential re-writing, of 
Virgil and Ovid. 21  These stories were seen as integumenta for hidden (and to their 
original authors, unconscious) truths for which the Pagan author was merely the 
instrument or vehicle. Here the stories are rewritten as exempla of Christian truths, to be 
coded by means of similitude. This is similar to the Biblical exegesis of the Song of 
Songs, whose literal, and often carnal, sense is rewritten as the soul’s quest for God.  
Allegorical reading in the Middle Ages has one ultimate source, namely Biblical 
exegesis.22  It is thus providential in origin.   
The history of the term ‘allegory’ is somewhat complicated, even before we take 
the prejudices of the Romantics into account. On the one hand, there is a certain 
amplificatory continuum of its usage in medieval exegesis and Hellenic 
philosophy/theology, by which I mean that it referred, in both cultures, to writing which 
contained implicit, as opposed to merely explicit, truths.  On the other, they had also 
inherited a host of definitions of the term from Latin grammarians and rhetoricians which 
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suggested that allegory was always a matter of ‘words’. Quintilian’s  rhetorical 
definitions of allegory are still salutary in their concision: (a. “allegoriam facit continua 
metaphora” [Institutio Oratoria, III,9,2,46] b.  “allegoria, quam inversionem 
interpretantur, aliud versibus aliud sensu ostendit” [ibid. VIII,3,83]).  Donatus the 
grammarian offers another definition that says nothing of extended metaphor, but instead 
suggests that words conceal a true meaning beyond their literal sense: “Allegoria est 
tropus quo aliud significatur quam dicitur” [De Tropis, 17].23 These Latin attempts to 
define allegory as a trope or device still remain fundamental to our contemporary 
conceptions.  As trope, allegory belongs squarely within a verbal domain. Donatus’s 
definition suggests that some kind of verbal utterance is imperative in order for the word 
allegory to obtain.  Narrative allegory can, to some extent, be seen as an extension and 
amplification of this foundational rhetorical definition, for rhetoric relates to entire texts 
as well as their constitutive sentences and tropes. While these Latin 
rhetorical/grammatical definitions were, in one sense, narrower than those offered by 
earlier Hellenic philosophy, by suggesting that allegory was a matter of words suggested 
the possibility for a species of allegory in the vernacular, even though this entailed a 
conceptual confusion between verbal and providential signification.   
  By the Latin Middle Ages, the term ‘allegory’ was already richly saturated, for 
the Classical Romans had borrowed a term from Greek philosophy, narrowed its usage to 
rhetoric, and bequeathed to the Christian theologians of the Latin West a confusion about 
allegory as both a theological concept/reality (early Greek philosophy) and a more 
limited verbal trope (Latin rhetoric/grammar).  With such a broad conceptual conflation, 
allegory became the main tool for discerning God’s providence in action. The Bible came 
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to signify not only through verbal representations; the sensitive exegete would now come 
to understand that God writes in events as well as words, and that human history can be 
analyzed within a providential narrative of salvation. This practice finds sanction in the 
words of Jesus himself: “Just as Jonas was in the belly of the sea monster […], so the Son 
of Man will be in the bosom of the earth.”24 (Matthew, 12:40). From this historical and 
logical correspondence between Old and New Testaments, the early church fathers 
cemented the conflation between verbal and historical allegory, though not without 
spilling into questions of ontology.25  This is the famous distinction between allegoria in 
verbis and allegoria in factis, or that of the poets and that of the theologians, the former 
dealing with the verbal allegory of the words themselves and the latter being understood 
as God’s providential writing of human history within a structure of likenesses.  This was 
a form of interpretation that pertained exclusively to God’s writing, for Revelation, via 
providence, meant that the world, its history, and ultimate teleology, were all meaningful 
and interrelated. Medieval commentators and certain modern critics have long separated 
the Bible from other texts under the assumption that the Bible requires a hermeneutic that 
could not, by definition, be applicable to secular texts:  
 
W.K. Wimsatt reminds us that “The poetic universal is of a different sort from the 
historic and Incarnational,” and Morton Bloomfield similarly objects to such a symbolic 
approach, not because it finds a Christian sententia, but because “it assumes that this 
symbolic method is unique to the period and that there is no essential difference between 
literary works and theological or pastoral works. It misunderstands the nature of meaning 
and of literature.” Nor does historical perspective clear the confusion: St. Thomas 
reserves the fourfold method for the theologian, not the poet; Boccaccio interprets the 
poetic fiction of Perseus on four levels; and Dante, who distinguishes “allegory of the 
theologians” from “allegory of the poets,” apparently invites a reading of his Commedia 
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which is theologically allegorical. St. Thomas, of course, speaks as theologian and not as 
poet; Boccaccio’s fourfold interpretation does not accord with what we might call the 
“classical” tradition of scriptural exegesis; and critics are still arguing over what to do 
about Dante.26    
 
While some critics, especially those operating from a Christian framework, have taken 
great pains to reserve typological readings for the Bible, this hermeneutic has inevitably 
witnessed spillage into secular genres, not least of which is the theological romance. The 
exegetical basis for figural representation in the Bible must be underscored because “the 
special power of biblical language [lies] in its unusual method of signification.” 27  
Despite the almost vertiginous accumulation of senses, the usefulness of the fourfold 
method can hardly be doubted when one is aiming at a totalizing understanding, “because 
in a single method it found a way of representing history, morality, and metaphysics 
simultaneously.”28 Thus, the adoption of the fourfold method reflects the ideological 
presuppositions of an orderly providential universe that explains the whole continuum of 
history in one extended narrative.  The figures of the Old Testament designate literal 
events in the New Testament as well as offering moral lessons and glimpses of the 
afterlife.  While the means of representation for Biblical interpretation have not changed, 
the Greek allegoria and Roman sententia (akin methods that preceded the fourfold) 
resembled only one of the four senses: the moral.  The newer method also had the 
advantage of diachronicity, because this seemingly cyclical history of Providence takes 
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place in time (after Creation).29  This provided a providential context for both the Bible 
(as written) and the world, thus uniting the exegete with the object of his study on the 
same order of existence. 
 Before extending this concept any further, we must first take a detour through the 
sign theory of Saint Augustine (354 – 430 AD),  who felt it necessary to begin with the 
most basic building blocks of reading and knowledge in order to lead his readers to a 
higher understanding of Biblical truth. An elucidation of this sign theory imposes itself as 
essential because its ontology must be rigorously distinguished from that of Saussure. 
The contrast between the two theories cannot be emphasized enough: Augustine believed 
in a world of referential signification, whereas Saussure underscored the notion of 
language as a self-contained system whose logic was internal and not rooted in 
extramental reality.  Most of Augustine’s sign theory can be found in his concise 
preaching manual entitled De Doctrina Christiana.30 Augustine defines the sign as “a 
thing which, in addition to the impression it brings to our senses, yields knowledge of 
something else” (Doct. Christ., II, 1,1).  In addition to the signum, we have the res, the 
thing which yields no knowledge of anything outside itself, such as wood, stones, or 
cattle.31  According to Augustine, a res can become a signum when context would grant it 
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a meaning that would extend beyond its material ontology.  God’s writing can transform 
the natural object into one endowed with signification, thereby bestowing the things of 
this world with a greater signification in a providential universe. Augustine divides signs 
into two categories: natural (signa naturalia) and intentional (signa data).  Natural signs 
are things which, by their very nature, lead to knowledge of something else.  They can be 
as simple as the footprint of an animal or smoke resulting from combustion, or they can 
involve more primal aspects of human communication, such as facial expressions, which 
will be indicative of certain emotions.  Among the intentional signs, which are given by 
animals, man, or God (through human intermediaries), the most common, of course, are 
words. Although words are things in themselves, they are used, first and foremost, to 
signify things beyond their sonorous characteristics.  Moreover, Augustine sees in these 
signs different kinds of functions, depending on the degree of literality.  Literal use of 
words (signa propia) will designate things belonging to a particular class in the most 
common acceptation.  When figuration is involved, or the thing is removed from its usual 
context to signify something of a different order, we are dealing with a signum 
translatum, corresponding in rhetorical terminology (i.e., not ontologically) to 
‘metaphor’.      
Absent from Augustine’s discussion, however, is an even more fundamental 
question: namely, what are things? the answer to which I shall return to shortly, and 
which will reveal one of the most fundamental ideological gaps between our present age 
and the past. C.S. Lewis rightly pointed out that our critical impulses with regard to this 
question have been, to some extent, misguided: “To ask how these married pairs of 
sensibles and insensibles first came together would be great folly; the real question is 
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how they ever came apart.”32  Evidence for their disentanglement can be found as early as 
Geoffrey of Vinsauf (Poetria Nova – c. 1210) in the thirteenth century, who asserted the 
primacy of thought over language. 33  Centuries later, Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) 
offered a philosophy of history which divided the world into three ages – the ages of 
gods, heroes and men - corresponding, respectively, to increasing rationalization and less 
abstraction, with the heroic age being the descriptor for what corresponds to allegorical 
writing. 34   Vico’s cyclical history concerning narrative, however antiquated, yielded 
some impressively suggestive explanations, which hinge in part on societies’ conceptual 
relation between ‘general’ and ‘particular’ throughout the ages. In this heroic age, less 
rigorous in its distinction between concrete and abstract (or alternatively, particular and 
universal) the mind is supposedly “closer” to the objects of thought. Ultimately I will 
suggest an alternative answer to Lewis’s question in the first chapter of the present work.  
Suffice it to say now that we can temper Lewis’s observation by saying that the marriage 
of sensibles and insensibles is fundamental to the realist mind rather than to mind in 
general.  
 Augustine’s conception of things belongs to a Platonized Christianity.  No 
individual entity could signify anything in itself, but its properties can be abstracted to 
their most ideal form within the Divine Mind.  This becomes evident in Augustine’s gloss 
of the Genesis, in which he reserves a huge place for the literal sense, but it must be 
maintained that the referent of this literal sense is usually the Platonized archetype 
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located within the Divine Mind.  In a preface to De Genesi ad Litteram, A. Solignac 
explains why the literal sense is stretched to its very limits:  
One may ask how one can call an exegesis ‘literal’ when it seems to devote so much 
explanation to allegory. […] When the words concern God and His action, Augustine, in 
order to discern the literal sense within Biblical narrative – meaning not what we 
understand upon first reading, but what God wanted to tell us through the letter -, applies 
this rule of analogy that is inseparable from the very notion of creation.  God speaks to 
man in a language that man can understand, a language borrowed from things from time 
and space, while He is before all time and all space.35  
 
In dealing with what may be called “ultimate truths” about the nature of the universe, 
Saint Augustine offers his literal gloss, but in relying so heavily on a Christian and 
Platonic ontology, his treatment of the Genesis seems to engulf all forms of figuration as 
a kind of “analogical” literalism.  Thus, when speaking of God’s words “Let there be 
light”, Augustine offers a literal gloss in the following manner:  
These words of God were prior to any vibration of air, prior to any voice from the flesh 
or the clouds; in His sovereign wisdom through which all things were made, God did not 
really make these words resound for human ears, but rather He inserted within the things 
made the causes of things to be made, He made the futures through his all-powerful 
virtue and he created man, who would be formed in his own time, by inscribing him the 
seed or in the root of time, when He created this beginning in which the worlds originate, 
created by Him who is before all worlds.36  
 
Augustine’s gloss on the Genesis remains squarely literal because human language is 
only an approximation of these divine concepts which are not empirically apprehensible. 
Augustine thereby extends the bounds of the literal sense by emphasizing the disparity 
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between divine and human signification, and one that is retained in Aquinas’s theory of 
Analogy, as we shall see in the first chapter.       
 Augustine frequently appeals to a Platonic metaphor of ascension with regard to 
understanding, which stems from sensory impressions into something intelligible and 
ultimately to some spiritual truth.  In book four of De Doctrina, “the theme […] is that of 
the eloquence of words (verba) versus the immeasurably greater eloquence of realities 
(res), of truth.”37 Augustine warns of the danger of words being used for their own sake, 
for this would result in the preacher loving the words carnally and not for God 
(cupiditas).  Unlike sacraments, themselves signs, words are subject to temporality and 
thus are not part of the immutable signs of a divine order. This is perhaps why Augustine, 
to supplement his exhortation that preachers become familiar with languages, also 
recommends knowledge of things. “The real utility of knowledge of things lies in the 
clarification of signs rather than vice versa.”38  It must be remembered that for Augustine, 
words themselves are things, and to confuse signum with verbum is to misunderstand a 
large portion of Augustine’s semiology, i.e. words signify precisely because they form 
part of his theistic ontology. In addition, Augustine uses a common term for both 
terrestrial things and divine realities (res), thereby cementing a homology between 
concrete and abstract nouns/“things”. Pagan authors had their place, according to 
Augustine, but only with the understanding that, in themselves, classical works imparted 
temporal wisdom rather than the immutable wisdom of the divine, both of these branches 
of wisdom falling under the term ‘res’.39 Mazzeo argues that the ascension up the ladder 
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of knowledge will result in direct contemplation of divine realities, a culminating 
moment which is marked by silence.  At this crucial instant, one leaves behind temporal 
words in favor of immutable truths. The moment of ‘absolute’ understanding is 
accompanied by silence, and this is hardly paradoxical if one underscores the 
insufficiency of human language.  Mazzeo’s observation is fruitful in that it underscores 
the importance of the metaphor of movement within Augustine’s conception of 
knowledge.  Signs ultimately point to or ‘designate’ a destination.  The bustling din of 
rhetoric is but a means of transport to a sphere of knowledge that, when coupled with 
caritas, renders the obscurities of the Bible intelligible.   
   Following in Augustine’s footsteps, the Venerable Bede (672? – 735 AD) offers a 
more succinct elaboration of tropes in his De schematibus et tropis sacrae Scripturae 
liber, a work which manages to synthesize the ‘allegory’ of the grammarians, notably 
Donatus and Cassiodorus, with Augustine’s more providential conception. His analysis of 
‘allegory’, itself a genus, with “irony, antiphrasis, enigma, charientismus, paroemia, 
sarcasm, and asteismus” as various species of this master-trope, proceeds immediately 
from rhetoric to exegesis, as a reflection of the increased serviceability of the term after 
its translatio from the Greek. Bede frames rhetoric within a work of Christian apologetics 
and uses the former to examine various aspects of biblical symbolism. 40 When Bede 
defines the trope (“tropus est dictio translata a propria significatione ad non propriam 
similitudinem”)41 , Armand Strubel, a keen reader of Jean de Meun’s Rose, asks the 
question of what “proper” means in this context and notes that the ambiguity lies in 
whether the propriety is with regard to the discourse itself or the symbolizing referents. 
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Terms such as ‘proper’ and ‘improper’ were both in use even into the late Middle Ages, 
and this categorization may have been, as I will argue in the first chapter, detrimental to 
the development of ‘improper’ signification and the role it plays in logic.42 As we shall 
see in chapter 1, ‘improper’ signification was discarded from the dialectic because it 
came to designate all figurative usage.  
Bede makes historical allegory (in factis) a simple extension of his earlier 
definition of verbal allegory (in verbis), thereby retaining the same term ‘allegoria’ for 
both modes of signification.  What at first appears a confused gesture on Bede’s part is 
ultimately revelatory of how inextricably linked these two forms of allegory are, for they 
betray his ultimate realistic assumptions about analogous (human and divine) forms of 
writing. 43  Bede explains that historical allegory, except in the case of prophecy, is 
necessarily contaminated by our notions of verbal allegory and operates by similar 
means, namely, by a similarity between predicates.44  The historical event of Jacob’s coat 
finds resonance with all the faithful of Christ because the act of putting on a multi-color 
garb is similar, and not just rhetorically, to the act of ‘clothing oneself in virtue.’  Similar 
accounts are offered for the way in which Christ’s passion was prefigured both verbally 
and historically in the Old Testament. In contrast to Bede, Augustine’s use of the term 
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‘allegory’ had been rather more limited (i.e., pertaining only to realities and not words) 
and it seems that he does not see it as playing any direct role in his sign theory: “Allegory 
is not found in the words, but in the historical events themselves” (De Trinitate, XV, 9, 
15).45  
We have seen how the term ‘allegory’ alternately embraces both a figure of 
speech and a historical reality, and in the latter some notion of “providence” can always 
be assumed  This is clearly exemplified in the same section of De Trinitate, where the 
providential aspect of the trope is in evidence in the testamentary significance of Jacob 
and Esau:   
Of this trope, that is allegory, there are various species, and among them the one called 
enigma. Now the definition of the general term must necessarily embrace all its species.  
And thus in the same way as every horse is an animal while not every animal is a horse, 
so every enigma is an allegory while not every allegory is an enigma. […]  When the 
apostle talked of allegory, he did not find it in words but in a fact, arguing that the two 
testaments are to be understood from the two sons of Abraham, one born of the slave 
woman, the other of the free; this was not just said – it happened.  And before he 
explained it, its meaning was obscure.  So allegory of this sort, called by the general 
name, could specifically be called an enigma.46  
 
In keeping with his rhetorical training, however, Augustine explains the relation of the 
tropes as being one of genus (allegory) to a species (enigma).47 What is interesting for our 
purposes, however, is how, within this conception, rhetoric and providential meaning 
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were but two facets of the same reality, the consequence of which is that words are not 
the intermediary for things, but rather inseparable from them. This generic division of 
allegory into its various species was laid out more systematically, as we saw earlier, by 
Bede in his De schematibus et tropis, where we find a greater clarity of discussion about 
individual tropes, but without Augustine’s clear exposition of his ontological foundations. 
Although the terms in question here - allegoria, species, genus - all acquired much more 
specific usages in Scholastic debates, the juxtaposition of said terms in this seminal work 
of Augustine is still evidence of, at the very least, a latent association.  In this particular 
passage, Augustine divorces the term ‘allegory’ from rhetoric almost entirely, making it 
rather a function of extra-linguistic signification, for God can dispense with the signifiers, 
(i.e., human language) and link two referents (discrete historical events) by an analogous 
form of writing whose slate is divine providence.  While the sign bridges the gap between 
the mundus sensibilis and the mundus intelligibilis, divine semiology utilizes events as if 
they were concrete signs, and the only link between them lies in some kind of external 
similitude.  
 Despite these gains that its methodology necessarily entailed, providential 
allegory, as exemplified in the fourfold method of reading Scripture, had become so 
complex and subject to confusion that twelfth and thirteenth-century exegesis was 
becoming a hodgepodge of various methods.  There arose two problems with the fourfold 
interpretation of Scripture: the first pertained to parables, whose literal sense did not 
coincide with historical truth; the second was the fact that the fourfold method was first 
and foremost chronological, the historical sense belonging to the Old Testament and the 
33 
 
other senses to the New and beyond.48  Many exegetes, including Hugh of Saint Victor 
(1096-1141), asserted that there are only three senses.49 Alexander of Hales (c. 1183 – 
1245) was not alone in trying to resolve this bifurcation of senses, and allowed for 
parables to be included within the literal sense because of their likeness (similitudo) to 
real events. In addition, he noted that there was some overlap in the other senses 
depending on perspective. 50  The ambiguity present in the words “allegorical” and 
“moral” may have been responsible for some of the confusion.  While there seems to be 
some consensus about the chronological basis of the fourfold method, the semantic echo 
of such words inevitably led to expositions that were more suitable to the “allegory of the 
poets” than to the theologians. Sensitive to the excesses of interpretation following the 
fourfold method, Saint Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225 – 1274) dispenses with the method 
altogether, instead opting for only literal and spiritual senses of Scripture. The tension 
between verbal and ‘real’ allegory evoked in Alexander of Hales’ Sum of Theology finds 
more concise expression in St. Thomas’s Summa Theologica:  
 
Though in every branch of knowledge words have meaning, this science [theology] has 
this special property, that the things meant by the words also themselves have meaning.  
That first meaning, whereby the words signify things, belongs to the first sense, which is 
the historical or literal sense. That meaning, whereby the things signified by the words in 
turn signify other things, is called the spiritual sense, and this is based upon the literal 
sense and presupposes it.51  
 
By this broad stroke, Aquinas extends the domain of the literal sense to include all kinds 
of verbal figuration, and he is well aware of the consequences of such a statement that 
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“there should be several meanings in one passage of Scripture, even when interpreted 
literally.” 52  Bede’s exposition of verbal allegory therefore becomes superfluous in 
Aquinas’s system, for the latter is not interested in allegory as a trope, but rather in the 
significance that extends from things.53 As we shall see in the next chapter, Aquinas’s 
proposed conceptual shift in the senses of Scripture corresponds with his more 
philosophical (Christian Aristotelian) distinctions between human and divine predication, 
which, for the sake of concision, correspond to his theory of Analogy.   
 The word ‘res’, alternately translated as ‘thing’ or ‘reality’ depending on context, 
is, according to both Augustine and Aquinas, endowed with the capacity to signify other 
‘res’ in the Bible in a similar fashion to words. Alexander of Hales, Thomas Gallus and 
Thomas Aquinas all mention ‘similitudines’ as the primary means of referring to 
something other than that which is designated.  All three offer cogent examples of how 
things, through their likeness to other things, can be translated onto different 
chronological or contextual scenes. 54   Thomas of Chobbam, following Cicero (De 
Inventione 1.24.34-27.41) and Boethius (De tropicis differentiis, book 4), states that one 
thing can signify another “through the interpretation of a name, through the quality of a 
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thing, and similarly through quantity, condition, gesture, deed, and number; and 
especially through cause, manner, place, and time.”55 Both quality and condition relate 
almost exclusively to persons and things and their attributes.  One must in turn assume 
that these attributes are stable and immutable, i.e. posit that the Word is not susceptible to 
temporal/historical corruption, in order that its timeless significance can be transmitted 
from one age to the next.   
 It is a suspicion of contingency in the nature of things, however, that characterizes 
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and gave rise to one of the great debates of the Middle 
Ages: namely, the universals debate.  In Plato’s Cratylus, the word was assumed to arise 
naturally from a resonance within the thing itself.  This belief, though not without contest 
(for even Porphyry acknowledges some ambivalence on this matter in his Isagoge), had 
done much to secure realistic ideology for centuries following its initial exposition.  
Marc-René Jung makes this point concisely in the introduction to his work on French 
allegorical poetry. This, however, accompanies his conviction that personification 
allegory flourished from the twelfth to the fourteenth century which he dubs “l’époque du 
nominalisme philosophique.”56 Despite the rather crude equivalence of certain centuries 
with one or the other philosophy, here yielding a historical error, there is nonetheless a 
correct intuition about the link between literature and philosophy.  Allegorical literature 
in the vernacular, though hardly a new phenomenon, thrived at a time when the inherent 
link between words and things was being called into question in the universals debate. 
Predication or definition (i.e. that “man is a mortal, rational animal,” or the more 
contested “man is a species”) was a means of relating language to the extramental world, 
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and not just descriptively, but necessarily. When the nature of the universal was called 
into question by the likes of Abelard (1079-1142), the claims for predication had to be 
reevaluated.  Although I will treat this subject in greater depth in the first chapter, suffice 
it to say now that Abelard’s interrogation of the nature of genera and species resulted in a 
crisis in predication, and by extension, a crisis in signification which medieval scholars in 
the twelfth century were hard-pressed to resolve.  This resolution almost always began 
with a logical reevaluation of the authority’s ontology, especially when resolution 
through verbal ambiguity was not a possibility.  
We can see this “ontological anxiety” in operation Dante’s characterization of his 
own prosopopoeia Amore in Vita Nuova.57  Here, Dante asks a philosophical question 
that he does not resolve by philosophical methodology:   
 
At this point it may be that someone […] could be puzzled at my speaking of Love as if it 
were a thing in itself, as if it were not only an intellectual substance, but also a bodily 
substance.  This is patently false, for Love does not exist in itself as a substance, but is an 
accident in a substance.”58 
 
There is no doubt as to the provenance of this vocabulary: these are terms borrowed 
directly from Aristotle’s Categories, and were equally important in the debate over 
universals.  Dante is justifying the rhetorical use of ‘Amore’ for Cupid, god of love based 
on Roman precedence (Ovid, Virgil, translatio studii). He thus manages to avoid a 
discussion of the philosophical conundrum he poses, which deals with the homonymous 
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designation of material substance and immaterial reality, and this difficulty of conceptual 
representation is manifest in both logical, and consequently, theological discussions of 
substance that will be the subject of the first chapter. Dante’s question brings us straight 
to the ‘ineffability’ topos that seems to be a constant of allegory itself.59 While Dante 
eschews a realism that would grant existence to these abstract nouns outside sensibles, he 
simultaneously sanctions the use of abstractum agens (i.e. the god of love = love), 
because knowledge, from a cognitive standpoint, proceeds from the concrete to greater 
levels of abstraction.  Both poetically and didactically I believe that Dante’s justification 
would also have served Jean de Meun in his own highly abstract narrative, as we shall see 
in the third and fourth chapters.  
 
Signification by ontology  
   
 A consequence of the incorporation of Aristotle into questions of substance is that 
it entails a questioning of what ‘literal’ designations are.  Literality presupposes that 
words, and particularly substantives, are utilized in their most common acceptation.  
These substantives, which we called ‘things’ in the introduction, can be rendered more 
specifically here by the more technical term ‘substance’.  This last term, Aristotle’s ousia, 
was foundational to his ontology, metaphysics and epistemology. Nonetheless, his 
complete, and sometimes contradictory view of the problem of substance, was not readily 
available throughout the Latin Middle Ages, due to lack of translations. While Porphyry 
(A.D. 234- c. 305) and Boethius had in their own time translated or partially expounded 
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some of the “Philosopher’s” works,  both had broached Aristotle’s theory of substance 
from a perspective that was, in the case of the former, NeoPlatonic in the extreme,  and in 
the case of the latter, derivative of a more mitigated Platonism.   
 The question of universals has long plagued philosophers.  Ancient and medieval 
philosophers tried to solve the problem of genera and species, but judging from the 
history of philosophy, none has managed to offer the definitive sentence on this debate,  
for variations of the debate have appeared in such thinkers as Locke, Hume, and Kant.   
In the broadest strokes,  the debate can be framed thus:  there are those who believe that 
every existent thing is individual and that there is no such thing as a species ‘dog’,  but 
rather there are only individual dogs, therefore universality is a property of the term ‘dog’ 
being applied to discrete individual dogs (early Ockham).   There is another belief that 
‘dog’ is not only a linguistic sign, but also a universal in that it calls to mind the same 
image and definition for many different people, even though the abstract species does 
not, in itself, exist (Abelard).   There are other philosophers who believe that individual 
dogs are the reason for the species, and this abstract species is not merely conceptual, but 
rather reflects the common substance shared by any individual dogs (Aristotle).  Finally, 
there are those who believe that the abstract species ‘dog’ is more real than any 
individual dogs, since the idea of ‘dog’ is immutable, whereas individual dogs are subject 
to change (Plato).  In this quadruple schema, which is only a broad glimpse of the 
possible alternatives, we have the first option granting reality only to individuals, and the 
final option which grants the highest degree of reality to the universal (here treated as a 
separately existing substance). And yet, on both sides of the debate, there is an implied 
question which is always looming in the background yet rarely made explicit, namely, 
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how do we safeguard the validity of general (scientific) statements?  Throughout western 
philosophical history, variations on this basic conceptual scheme have been myriad, and 
so, for the sake of brevity, I am limiting myself to only some of the most famous 
spokespeople on the debate throughout Antiquity and the Middle Ages.  Given the often 
complex network associations that occur within this debate for well over a millennium, as 
well as the reliance of our philosophers on the auctoritas of precedence, this chapter will 
aim, for the most part, to frame the problem chronologically rather than thematically.  
This methodology aims to ensure the realization that, at no stage in the history of this 
debate was there, properly speaking, unanimity on the subject.   This survey of a thorny 
linguistic predicament will lay bare the foundational assumptions about language and 
reality which are integral to the notions of allegory and troping.     
 Both the Queste and the Rose aspire to a form of signification that can properly be 
called providential.  Because discussions of substance logically lead into hypotheses of 
cosmogonies, they are one of the best markers at this time for dealing with providence in 
philosophical terms. If Augustinian exegesis held as its first tenet that one must know 
things, the twelfth and thirteenth centuries augmented the technical vocabulary for the 
discussion, in such a way that Aristotelian terminology would often be placed alongside 
quotations from the gospels. As we saw in the introduction, exegesis concerned the 
interpretation of Biblical language, and the means of exposition had to be, in theology as 
in any other science, “logical”. It would be hard to imagine that any of the exegetes dealt 
with in this study was unfamiliar with Aristotle’s Categories,  and equally hard to 
imagine that they were unaware of the controversies surrounding this most fundamental 
of logical treatises.  Because of the broad, though hardly monolithic, tendency within the 
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Middle Ages to treat language as a natural reflection of reality, rather than itself 
constitutive of that reality, it follows that when exegetes interpret the words of the Bible, 
they cannot but tacitly parse the sentences according to the same logic as in scientific 
inquiry. The relative autonomy of exegesis and glosses on the trivium need not dissuade 
us from tracing a connection between the two disciplines, for the fact that the Bible is 
written in a language entails the corollary that its language is susceptible of logical 
analysis.   
 
The Ancient Foundations  
 
 In turning to our corpus of logical glosses from Antiquity to the high Scholastic 
period, it should be noted that the greatest instigators of our debate, Plato and Aristotle, 
were almost always the origin of the conundrum, though their influence on the first half 
of the Middle Ages was more like that of a vestige, for direct access to their works was 
certainly not a possibility, especially in the case of Plato.   The inclusion, then, of these 
masters of Antiquity within a work that purports to explain the role of providence in the 
Middle Ages, might at first glance seem superfluous. It is my contention, however, that to 
begin with Porphyry or Boethius puts us in the same position as people such as Anselm 
or Abelard, whose important work was quickly rendered obsolete by the appearance of 
new translations and a more complete Aristotle in the mid twelfth century.  The second 
advantage of such a chronological exposition is that it shows that throughout the various 
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phases of the debate, certain critiques remained constant, such as the appeal to allegory 
and figuration, or in the Islamic and Middle Ages, the threat of heresy.60   
  Much care has been taken in scholarship to disentangle Aristotle from the 
Neoplatonism with which his thought was first presented, in an attempt to treat 
Aristotle’s logic on his own terms.  Given Aristotle’s critiques of his former master, it 
seems odd now that Boethius believed the two philosophers could be reconciled.  And 
yet, the dialectical reaction to these early endeavors, namely in the treatment of the two 
philosophers’ thought as wholly dichotomous (the more standard interpretation 
nowadays), is also fraught with its own difficulties. In assessing the work of the so-called 
“Middle Platonism” (80 B.C. – A.D. 220),  L.M. de Rijk has argued cogently against 
some of his contemporaries about the validity of the modern endeavor: “It seems [...]  that 
the later Platonists are shamelessly appropriating and fathering on Plato the distinctive 
discoveries and formulations of Aristotle. [...]  Modern enthusiasm for ferreting out 
‘aristotelianisms’ and ‘stoicisms’ in works from (Neo)platonian circles, seems to lead to a 
false view of the historical situation.”.61  Although one may sense an element of Platonic 
apologetics in De Rijk’s work, he manages to argue persuasively for the reasons such 
conflations between the two philosophers continued to crop up centuries after Porphyry’s 
initial exposition.  This is not only to show historical continuity between Ancient and 
Medieval times,  but rather to show how the problems raised by Ancient logicians were 
echoed, not only in by Porphyry and Boethius,  but also by several centuries of Islamic 
                                                 
60
 Cf. Copletston, Frederick, S.J. A History of Philosophy,  Vol. 1 : Greece and Rome 294: “Plato tries to 
explain the relation [between Form and sensible object] by the use of terms such as “participation” or 
“imitation,” but Aristotle retorts that “to say that they (i.e. sensible things) are patterns and that the other 
things share in them,  is to use empty words and poetical metaphors.” Cf.  Aristotle, Metaphysics. M 1079 b 
24-6; A. 991 a 20-2.   
61
 De Rijk 1- 84 
42 
 
thought (who had a much fuller Aristotelian corpus at their disposition than did the first 
generation of medievals),  and by the two waves of medieval commentary with the 
arbitrarily drawn rupture that occurs with the vast translation movement of Aristotle’s full 
corpus.62 One of the key points of De Rijk’s reconstructionist argument is that the 
Peripatetics were already fully immersed in Platonic logic and that Aristotelian and 
Platonic logic need not be considered so antithetical.     
 The Platonic theory of forms and participation distinguishes Plato’s ontology 
from Aristotle’s most clearly. If we say that both Susan and Emily are beautiful, the 
primary reality of the sentence lies in the abstract predicate ‘beauty’, that real entity in 
which both women participate.   And for Plato, beauty, a pure form, can also be a 
universal, or “the logical side of the ontology of Forms”.63 The corollary of the theory of 
participation is that the predicate will be both abstract and treated as a substantive, given 
that the temporal aspect of verbs signals their mutability, and consequently, their failure 
to assimilate into true knoweldge.  (i.e., Mary sings/is a singer = Mary participates in 
song). While a mainstay of Platonic thought, the theory of forms was problematized by 
Plato himself in the Parmenides, where the old Parmenides levels various critiques 
against Socrates’s theory of participation, noting especially how the unchanging world of 
forms bears no relation the mutability of the sensible world.64  In fact, Plato had already 
acknowledged as metaphorical such formulations as “So-and-so is beautiful” (in contrast 
to “so-and-so partakes of beauty”). Parmenides then shows that these metaphors break 
down when Forms are brought into question,  for if one participates in the form of beauty, 
then this beauty must, consequently, be divisible,  thereby destroying the absolute unity 
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and simplicity of the Form.  This is an early indication of a certain rationalism in Plato’s 
writing, for he seems cognizant of the fact that such metaphorical language is not entirely 
propitious to his new philosophical system.65 Cast in such terms, ‘forms’ have not only 
the qualities of substantives, but of substances.  
Forms are arranged in hierarchy, as outlined in the Sophist,  from the generic form 
(animal) all the way down to species (e.g. man, horse),  and the physical, mutable world 
of individuals lying at the lowest chain of being.  This world of individuals is not 
divisible, but rather is the consequence of the division of the most complex form, yielding 
parts (moria or merê).  The divisible forms encompass individuals, but not in the sense of 
containment,  but rather as “pervading them and extended throughout all of them.”66  
While the ontology of the form has been at the forefront of this discussion thus far, it 
should also be noted that these forms bear also on linguistic usage, and a passage from 
the Republic makes explicit that the common name of individual objects, referring as they 
do to Forms, designate “the same object in the understanding of both speaker and 
interlocutor.”67 
 Plato’s student Aristotle was one of the most critical of his master’s theory of 
Forms.  Instead he places individuals at the center of his ontology, making the secondary 
substances (genera and species) dependent upon the individuals for their existence.  This 
pivotal step within Aristotle’s Categories should not imply that the logical use of the 
categories trumps their ontological status, although this was the conclusion drawn by the 
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Structuralist linguist Emile Benveniste.68  De Rijk has argued persuasively that this 
tendency finds greater sanction in our modern way of thinking than was the case for 
Aristotle.69  But De Rijk’s salutary observations must be framed within his own 
ideological agenda, which consists, namely, in rejecting the epistemological break 
between Plato and Aristotle in favor of greater continuity.  Thus, he is able to state that 
the latter’s rejection of the theory of Forms “was just a rejection of their separate (i.e. 
transcendent) status and an attempt at yielding, accordingly, the ontological monopoly to 
their immanent status.”70 Indeed, Aristotle’s formulations show not only a new primacy 
of the individual as far as sensible knowledge, but also a formalism that is strikingly not 
so divergent from that of his former master.71 The universal is equally real for Aristotle, 
although not located in an immaterial realm, but rather determinate of the form of the 
individual and, in the case of knowledge, abstracted from individuals.     
 While the homonymous term ‘substance’ encompasses both primary (individual) 
and secondary (species, genus) substances,  Aristotle shifts  drastically from the notion of 
participation by insisting that these secondary substances are not present within primary 
substances (like sugar in a cake),  but rather they are said of a subject (e.g. Socrates is a 
man).   Thus for Aristotle, the Platonic notion of these Forms (“universals” when these 
Forms are considered logically) existing ante rem, or prior to their individual 
instantiations, is flatly dismissed. So too, at least in the case of the Categories, is the 
possibility of universality in re, as would be the case if we were to say that “humanity 
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inheres in Socrates”.72  Therefore,  Aristotle endorses a view of universality post rem,  in 
which the sentence “Socrates is a man” remains valid but the common noun ‘man’ is 
subordinated to and made dependent on individuals for its existence.  But this 
classification does not suggest that these secondary substances are merely logical 
figments, for they are, like individuals, substances.   Furthermore, Aristotle does not think 
of predication as a mere linguistic game.  It is not the name that is predicated of a subject, 
but rather the thing signified which is predicated.73 
 A further investigation of Aristotle’s Organon (his logical corpus) shows that 
within the Categories, the Metaphysics and the Posterior Analytics, various, somewhat 
contradictory definitions are given of the universal.  In the Metaphysics, Aristotle states 
that no universal is a substance, but this seems to be in direct conflict with the 
foundational principles of the Categories where genera and species are treated as 
secondary substances. To confuse matters further, in the Posterior Analytics, II, 19, he 
characterizes the universal as “resting in the soul as a unity outside of any multiplicity” 
residing “one and identical in all particular subjects.”74  While the more standard (and 
Abelardian) interpretation of Aristotle favors the definition laid down by the Categories 
(the universal is ‘said of’ subjects rather than inhering in them),  there is doubtless a case 
to be made that Aristotle’s writings about the universal are, when taken literally,  more 
than slightly incongruous. It is no wonder then, that in the thirteenth century, when the 
full logical corpus became available and Aristotle was increasingly being taken on his 
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own terms and divorced from his former master, there was a further realization of the 
complex network of Platonism residing within the thinking of Aristotle himself.75  
Although the complexity of the debate within Antiquity could hardly be known in the 
Middle Ages, except through secondary sources, we can see that even at its earliest stage 
there was already a vast network of intricacies that would later haunt future generations, 
often without significant alteration of the original terms.       
 Equally crucial to the medieval universals debate is stage of Middle Platonism,  
when one figure in particular, the avowed NeoPlatonic philosopher Porphyry, writes his 
logical textbook,  the Isagoge (literally ‘introduction’),  which meant to serve as an 
introduction to the Categories.  Here he defines the Aristotelian substance (ousia), and 
proceeds, using division by various differentiae, to divide substance (here in an 
acceptation similar to prime matter, the genus generalissium) into their various genera 
and species.   This is demonstrated by his great pedagogical tool, the Porphyrian tree, 
which presents this division of substance (using the Aristotelian predicables definition, 
property, genus, differentia, and accident) as an ontological given:76   
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In Late Antiquity as well as the Middle Ages, only natural things could properly be called 
substances. There seems to be no place for man-made items under the heading 
‘substance’.77  It is also important to note here that this division of substance is based on a 
theory of emanation, which itself can be considered a theology.  If we posit a continuity 
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between the thinking of Porphyry and his master Plotinus, we can infer that the latter 
believed in the diffusion of various intelligences, ultimately proceeding from the One 
(“God”), purely intelligible, down to the lowest stratum of being, i.e., sensibles. 
Aristotle’s similar reliance on the emanating intelligences further cemented the notion 
that these were uncreated and eternal, which entailed as a corollary that the world itself 
could not have been created in time. Therefore, this basic introductory textbook serves 
not only as an introduction to the logic of Aristotle, but also places him squarely within a 
mystical theology which accounted not only for the existence of material objects,  but 
also the reason for their existence in the first place.78  Unlike his master Plotinus, 
however, who believed that Plato’s exploration of categories as elaborated in the Sophist 
was wholly sufficient, Porphyry was less reluctant to accept the value of Aristotle’s 
Categories.79 
 This is not to say that Porphyry shamefully traduced the logic of Aristotle, but 
rather that he did not bracket off his own (neo-Platonic) ideological presuppositions when 
expounding the Peripatetic. In addition, Porphyry states quite clearly the epistemological 
ramifications of his theory, and shows remarkable restraint (the textbook is explicitly 
deemed an introduction) in leaving these three questions unanswered: a) whether 
universals exist in the world or subsist only in the mind; b) if they exist, are they 
corporeal or incorporeal c) if they are incorporeal, do they exist within or around sensible 
things?  Despite his aforementioned ideological prejudices, Porphyry writes with 
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remarkable impartiality, opting as he does for a sharp division between logic and 
ontology, a gesture that “was not always completely grasped or accepted by later 
scholastic authors.”80     
 Now, the medieval universals debate must be framed, almost exclusively, in the 
restrictive art of predication, which corresponds roughly to defining a substance within a 
more general category, in other words, finding an individual substance’s species within a 
genus.  Porphyry’s tree is an excellent pedagogical tool for understanding how the 
Aristotelians came to conceive substance and further paves a way of talking about it in 
terms of contrary possibilities, extending all the way from prime matter (substantia/genus 
generalissimus) down to individual men. The differentia is here presented as that which 
distinguishes species in the genus (e.g. rationality differentiates man from other species in 
the genus animalia).  The concept of the differentia, however, is enmeshed in another set 
of problems that were not clearly expounded in Aristotle.   Is the differentia a quality that 
inheres within every member of a species, like a universal, separable substance?   De Rijk 
sees the differentia as similar to the vestige of a Platonic Form that has to account for 
both the logical and ontological differentiation of species. The fact that this differentia is 
raised to the level of a universal, along with species and genus, means that this unstable 
quality somehow entails the postulation of a separable world of being, as was found in 
Plato.81  In a discussion concerning the discernment of the differentia from an accident,  
D. P. Henry bolsters De Rijk’s claim by adding that the “differentia is a kind of half-way  
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(quoddam medium) between substance and quality, having some of the nature of each.”82  
It seems the case that when the rationalism of Aristotle is pushed to its very limits, 
various incarnations of Platonism emerge to fill that void.  Whether or not these 
Platonisms are to be treated, following Ockham, as entia ficta, is another matter entirely.   
Suffice it to say that such lingering Platonisms result in what I identify as a three-fold 
possibility:  1) the differentia is a real existent quality that inheres in any member of a 
species; 2) the differentia is a real concept of the mind, based on observation of similitude 
within members of a species; 3) the differentia is a convenient fiction, or allegory, that 
designates a complex network of observable structures, here concretized for the sake of 
simple expression.  This constellation of possibilities is mirrored by Jean de Meun’s Rose 
continuation, where the differentia serves as the denotative “gloss of things”, more 
equivocally, in his discussion of (alchemical) transubstantiation.  
 
From Boethius to Early Scholasticism 
     
 Boethius is, by all accounts, one of the most important thinkers for the Middle 
Ages.   Not only was he one of the first great Christian commentators on both Plato and 
Aristotle, but his translations, especially of the latter, held the monopoly on Peripatetic 
scholarship for half a millennium.  Boethius explores the questions raised in Porphyry’s 
Isagoge, and the notion of abstraction is given greater attention than it had received at the 
hands of Porphyry.  In addition, Boethius seems to emphasize the importance of formal 
coherence in logic, without really problematizing the relation of language to the 
extramental world.  Indeed, the truth of self-evident statements is dependent on the kind 
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of predicative expression to which it can conform, such that “every inference owes its 
cogency to an axiom”.83   Axioms are self-evident propositions either of the ‘if-then’ 
variety or relational (e.g. hot is the opposite of cold, dogs belong to the genus ‘animalia’).  
This rationalistic idea of logic owes more to Aristotle than to Plato, but Boethius’s 
allegiance to both philosophers meant that this rationalism did not discredit the 
fundamental assumptions of Plato’s ontology.  He thus proposes his own solution to the 
problem of universals by making the likeness (similitudo) “between particulars of a class” 
is “universal in thought” and “sensible within particulars.”84  Neoplatonism is in evidence 
both when Boethius seems to suggest that in the construction of the universal in thought, 
the intellect is asserting its primacy over sense perception, and when he says that the 
mind grasps the incorporeal nature of bodies, “gazing at the form in itself.”85    
Logical curriculum at the medieval clerical schools included Aristotle’s full 
Organon – Categories, De Interpretatione, Prior and Posterior Analytics, Topics, and the 
Sophistical Refutations.  The Poetics and the Rhetoric were also a part of early medieval 
curriculum, although not through Boethius.  While Neoplatonism flourished in the half-
millennium after Boethius, in writers such as John Scotus Erigeuna and Anselm of 
Canterbury, a different brand of logic began to appear toward the end of the eleventh 
century.  This age saw the first major assault in the Latin West on Plato’s (or 
NeoPlatonic) ontology, as well as a greater formalism within logic. A more rigorous 
study of logic (vetus logica, comprised of the main logical texts of Aristotle, Porphyry, 
and Boethius) began in the second half of the eleventh century, in sharp contrast to the 
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prior century.86  It was during this time that Roscelin of Compiègne began formulating 
those radical tenets of his new vocalist logic and the sparest of ontologies.   
   Direct access to Roscelin’s work has only been recent, but the greater part of our 
access to Roscelin’s thought has been paved through the refutations of his adversaries.87   
Anselm had caricatured his beliefs on the Trinity, and questioned the foundations of his 
vocalism, both of which are inextricably linked.  His Trinitarian reflections were 
probably spurred by a question of translation from Greek of ousie, or substances.   
Roscelin puzzled over a remark made by Saint Augstine in De Trinitate, V, 8-9,  that the 
Greeks opted for one essence and three substances,  whereas the Latins opted for one 
essence/substance, and three persons.88  Although he never reaches the conclusion that 
Anselm ascribes to him, namely a rejection of God’s unity, he does indeed suggest that 
these plural names are based on linguistic convention.  This conflation of person and 
substance was based on Priscian’s definition of the term nomen, which signified 
substance and/or quality.  Despite the ultimate simplicity of God, the plurality of 
persons/substances that “constituted” this single essence entailed a linguistic and spiritual 
conundrum for these philosophers.  Roscelin’s theological speculations must be framed 
within his linguistic Platonism, according to which “every noun, even those used of God, 
signified a substance”.89  Roscelin’s reliance on Priscian (fl. circa 500 AD) entailed an 
atomistic belief in the correspondence between language and the world, with each word 
corresponding, in the end, to a kind of substantive.   
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This logic extended to composite substances as well, and Roscelin did not accept 
the dichotomy of parts to whole.  If one considers a house to be the sum of and equal to a 
foundation, walls, and a roof, then the wall will be part of this thing which is walls, 
foundation and roof.  And this means that the wall be a part of itself, which is plainly 
absurd.  To bolster his claim, Roscelin states in a letter to Abelard that parts are naturally 
prior to their corresponding whole. Abelard retorted that, according to this logic, the wall 
would be anterior to the wall/foundation/roof composite, consequently making the wall 
anterior to the wall, resulting in another logical absurdity.   Roscelin granted existence 
only to the whole, for the parts were not autonomous substances.90 But because words 
refer to individuals, universals are only universal insofar as the same word ‘man’ can be 
applied to Socrates and Plato, but there is no logically-prior universal substance ‘man’ 
from which these two derive their humanity.  Lacking corroborative evidence, we must 
rely on Roscelin’s adversaries for one of his most infamous statements, in which he 
allegedly calls universals flatus vocis (mere words).   
 Roscelin thus advocates the sparsest of ontologies by insisting that reality can 
only be accorded to whole, discrete individuals.  This makes universality an effect of 
language insofar as the same word is said of many such individuals.   But unlike the a 
house, which is a composite object made of parts, and indivisible in its unity, the 
universal is no such entity, for the universal word is not subject to the same division into 
its respective parts (the ‘ideal men’ encompassing individual men like parts to a whole) 
because this kind of universality can only be ascribed to the former (the house) 
metaphorically, although this appeal to figuration is not found within Roscelin’s work 
itself.   One of the consequences of such a reduced ontology is a substantive literalism 
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with regard to signification, for in his theory of reference, every utterance properly 
extends only to individuals, thus “respecting the identity of every proper noun invented 
by man.”91 
 One of Roscelin’s students, Abelard, eventually became one of the greatest 
dialecticians of his day.   Although in his early years, he certainly propounded a form of 
vocalism not so distinct from that of his former master, his theory of genera and species 
goes much further than Roscelin’s in safeguarding the validity of general concepts.  In 
fact, Abelard, having in greater part accepted the reduced ontology of his master, is 
writing against a more primitive Platonic realism that attributed to genera and species the 
same substantial reality as found in individuals.  This seems to be one of the most striking 
consequences of the adherence to the Porphyrian tree, for there we start with the 
generalized substance and proceed down the line of division to individuals.  In this 
schema, then,  ‘man’ and ‘ass’ are both individual substances that take part or 
‘participate’ in a higher level of substance,  namely ‘animal’,  therefore ‘animality’ must 
be a divisible substance fully inhering in any of the individuals who fall within the genus.  
But when this genus is posited as an existent substance (as opposed to a ‘subsistent 
concept’), then the qualities that define the individual substances beneath it must 
somehow be harmoniously reconciled.  Now, the rationality of man can be contrasted 
with the irrationality of Brunellus (a donkey), both these adjectives being common (and 
considered intrinsic) to the objects they designate here respectively.  But the animality 
that is informed by irrationality in Brunellus is also the animality that is informed by 
rationality in man.  But if both qualities inhere fully within the genus, here considered a 
separable substance, they cannot be considered contraries anymore (resulting in a 
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semantic absurdity), for this would violate the terms of the rules laid forth in Categories, 
6.92  To remember Aristotle’s logic, substances can receive contraries, though never 
simultaneously, for the same water cannot at once be frozen and boiling. Although one 
could quibble that irrationality does not really inform the ass in the same way that 
rationality informs man, Abelard manages to go further than anyone before him in 
upsetting those NeoPlatonic hypostases that had plagued contemporary logic.93   
 Given that every existent thing is a particular in Abelard’s ontology, we come to 
another stumbling block in semantics, for a sentence such as “Socrates is a man” is 
nothing more than the insertion of a particular into a universal.   Abelard opts for a 
broadly conceptualist view of language that does not consider words as significant in 
themselves, but rather insofar as they yield something to the mind:  “Abelard insists that 
the intellectual import rather than the denotation (omnia quibus est impositum) is the 
proper Aristotelian sense of to ‘signify’.”94 In other words, signification is not a property 
of terms, but rather of propositions. To account for universality in a world of discrete 
particulars, he must somehow fuse the ontological concerns of existent objects with the 
semantic concerns of signification. He insists, therefore, that genera and species have no 
real existence in nature, but do subsist as concepts (sermones) within the mind. 
Universality, for Abelard, is consequently a property of words, insofar as the same word 
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“dog” can refer to many dogs. But these words are not vocis, but rather sermones/nomina 
in that they designate a status- and by status, we mean simply “being a man.”   Thus 
universality is a matter of being suitable for predication.  The argument may seem 
circular, but Abelard ventures into some metaphysics to acquire an answer.  The status is 
based on a similitude of particulars, and this similitude is abstracted from individuals, not 
from the properties of the words themselves.  Abelard insists on the most semantic 
aspects of Aristotle’s thought regarding universality (i.e. “said of particulars rather than 
prior to them”), although the similitude that is identified within particulars is a real one, 
rather than an arbitrary philosophical imposition.95   
One of Abelard’s pupils as well as one of the greatest historical minds of his day,  
John of Salisbury,  offered a brief account of Abelard’s forays into this philosophical 
problem:  
 One holds that universals are merely word sounds, although this opinion, along 
with its author Roscelin, has already almost completely passed into oblivion.  
Another maintains that universals are word concepts, and twists to support his 
thesis everything that he can remember to have ever been written on the subject.  
Our Peripatetic of Pallet, Abelard, was ensnared in this opinion.  He left many, 
and still has, to this day, some followers and proponents of his doctrine.  They 
are friends of mine, although they often so torture the helpless letter that even the 
hardest heart is filled with compassion for the latter.   They hold that it is 
preposterous to predicate a thing concerning a thing, although Aristotle is author 
of this monstrosity.   For Aristotle frequently asserts that a thing is predicated 
concerning a thing, as is evident to anyone who is really familiar with his 
teaching.  Another  is wrapped up in a consideration of acts of the [intuitive] 
understanding, and says that genera and species are nothing more than the 
latter.”96  
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This account from a fair-minded pupil allows a glimpse of the kind of reception that 
Abelard’s philosophical speculations garnered from his contemporaries.  He is perhaps, 
wrong, however, in asserting that predication for Aristotle always involved a thing of a 
thing, for this was indeed one of the classic ambiguities within De interpretatione, 7, 17a 
39-40,  according to which the universal is “what, by nature, is naturally predicated of 
many”.  This definition, which lacks both substantives ‘word’ and ‘thing’, allowed 
Aristotle to straddle the fence, so to speak, on the real nature of the universal.  Abelard’s 
questions, however, cannot be so quickly dismissed as a gross misunderstanding of 
Aristotle’s text; rather, he was seizing upon the ambiguities that were inherent in 
Aristotle’s early formulations, and subjecting the Platonism therein to his shrewd 
dialectics. He is a nominalist in the sense that he believes that there is nothing that exists 
which is not a particular, but he has transcended the vocalism of Roscelin by ascribing 
meaning to the universal. Indeed, such categories of ideological affiliation are at best 
anachronistic (Abelard’s nominalism is far more Platonic than that of his fourteenth-
century successor, Ockham), and at worst they imply a huge divergence with thinkers 
such as Thomas Aquinas, who was, by all accounts, a realist, and yet, within a different 
chronological and ideological context, equally hostile to the various forms of Platonic 
ontologies which plagued contemporary thought.       
Abelard’s logical treatises were neither helped by his quarrels with Bernard of 
Clairvaux, a vowed Augustinian, concerning his tract on the Trinity. Long-standing 
rivals, Abelard challenged Bernard to a public debate among the council of Sens in 1141.  
Abelard remained silent and retired after Bernard’s first question, an act which marked 
the first symbolic defeat of speculative thought in the twelfth century.  Abelard and 
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Roscelin inaugurated the tendency within Scholasticism to graze the bounds of heresy 
when they attempted to reformulate prior conceptions of substance. Furthermore, the 
century after Abelard’s death saw a great proliferation of Aristotle’s non-logical works, a 
fact which may have led to the early obsolescence of his Aristotelian scholarship.97 
Furthermore, Abelard composed a dream vision called the Collationes, in which he stages 
a debate between a philosopher, a Jew and a Christian, in which the Christian out-argues 
the representatives of the other sects, though without any explicit judgment.98 As the 
twelfth-century “philosophus” (Marenbon, 145) par excellence, he incarnated for his 
adversaries both the perverse dialectician and fornicator. If the post-Abelardian academy 
haunts the word-play of Chrétien, it is completely foresworn in the later, more 
Augustinian Queste.  The common maneuver in both works to treat the question of 
substance from proto- to anti-Scholasticism, respectively, must owe something to this 
first phrase of the universals debate.   
  
Logic,  Semantics and Reference  
 
While the formal aspects of logic had already been in place since Aristotle’s 
foundational tracts, questions of reference and context, more properly ascribed to 
semantics, became increasingly important in the thirteenth century.  An early distinction 
elaborated by Saint Anselm between appellatio (calling), an utterance taken as 
referential, and significatio (meaning), which yields a concept (intellectus) in the 
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definition attached to the name, shows that the question of context was already essential 
to these early grammarians.99  The thirteenth century also saw the flourishing of the 
philosophical study of grammar. Supposition, an early theory of reference that stems 
from the mid-thirteenth century, was one way of classifying sentences that accounted for 
context before acceding to signification, as in modern pragmatics. Supposition was used 
by both realist and nominalist grammarians alike, although the inability to reach an 
agreement on the question of simple supposition eventually led to its near exhaustion in 
the fifteenth century.  Proponents of supposition theory like Peter of Spain and the 
anonymous author of the Summa Lamberti espouse broadly realistic definitions of the 
universal;100 others, such as William of Sherwood, used supposition theory at the service 
of a more nominalistic tendency.101   
 
VARIETIES OF SUPPPOSITION 
   
a) improper  (metaphorical)     b) proper  (literal) 
      
   material   formal 
          
     discrete  common 
           
     simple  personal 
                                                 
99
 Henry, D.P.  “Predicables and Categories” in CHLMP, 137.   
100
 See Summa Lamberti: “For suppositing belongs to what stands on its own and to what represents its 
stable [signified] thing, but to stand on its own and to represent its stable [signified] thing is a property of 
substantives.”  Medieval Philosophy, ed. Klima, Allhoff, and Vaidya, 69.   
101
 De Libéra , 236-8.   
60 
 
           
      determinate confused 
                                           
       merely confused    distributive confused 
           
         immobile  mobile 
 (This table is reproduced from Spade, P.V., “The semantics of terms” in CHLMP, 196) 
The note to Spade’s Porphyrian scheme states that it includes almost every variant on 
supposition theory, though of course some grammarians and logicians privileged certain 
ones over others.  The ideological prejudices of the grammarians are especially salient in 
this pictorial presentation, though they were no less so in actual practice. Improper 
supposition is immediately discarded from logical analysis, and from such a rigid 
partitioning, the obvious conclusion to draw is that figuration is wholly separate from 
semantic reference, and indeed from logic itself.  But the dismissal of improper 
supposition by the grammarians should not entail that it is a mere misuse, because in fact 
the notion of improper supposition is in fact dependent on the proper.  Figurative 
designations cannot be said to be ontologically prior or even concomitant with literal 
ones; rather, figuration tends to stem directly from proper usage and supplement it, 
especially where proper designation would be laborious or unintelligible.   Although 
supposition theory remained in use in the fourteenth century, the debate on universals 
would make such a theory, especially in the hands of William of Ockham, more 
serviceable to questions of philosophy than to grammar and semantics.     
 The three main kinds of supposition that will be of interest to us are material, 
personal and simple.   The suppositio materialis is when a word is treated purely 
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grammatically (e.g. ‘Man’ is a noun).   The suppositio personalis is when the word 
designates something as a particular (This man knows that man).   Finally, the suppositio 
simplex designates an object definitionally (Man is a species/ Man is a mortal, rational 
animal).   This final form of supposition would be the thorniest for philosophers, and the 
sentence “man is a species” could reliably serve as a litmus test of realism or nominalism 
in semantics.102  While both realists and nominalists could concede to the truth of the 
sentence “Man is a mortal, rational animal” (all men conform to this definition), the 
sentence “Man is a species” is another matter entirely.  Realists would say that there is no 
difference between the two sentence (man’s species is his genus [animalia] differentiated 
[by rationality]) while a nominalist would retort that there is no individual man who 
corresponds to an entire species.  At first, this seems like a clever semantic trick on the 
part of the nominalists, but when we think of Abelard’s objections to the hypostatization 
of species, we are better equipped to see exactly what their target was: the notion of 
‘man’ as a separable entity, a pure idealized form in which individual men partook or 
participated. This was the most common explanation in Platonic realism for why the 
sentence “Man is a species” was literally true. It is no wonder, then, that later thinkers 
like Ockham and Buridan, respectively, either had to eliminate simple supposition 
(making it rather an extension of personal supposition), or bracket it from any realist 
connotations.103 
 It is here that we can see the greatest rift between the nominalists and realists with 
regard to signification.  For the nominalists, figuration is the mode of signification for 
simple supposition; indeed, simple supposition (homo est species) would be nothing more 
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than improper supposition.  For the realist, however, figuration would begin later, since 
man is, properly speaking, a “species”.  But if both realists and nominalists availed 
themselves of supposition theory (e.g.  Peter of Spain, William of Sherwood), then there 
must also be some unanimity with regard to the notion of improper supposition.  In a 
sentence such as this one I drew from a sports headline, “Since dawn of man, ravens only 
as good as their defense”,104  there cannot be any individual man which would make this 
sentence true.  Similarly, “dawn” is a word that is predicated of man only allegorically, so 
the compound “dawn of man” is more properly a designation of time (immemorial) than 
a reference to the species or its constituents.  As we can see here, the allegory is not 
simply an enlargement of simple supposition (as in Spade’s example for improper 
supposition, “After three moves, the chess player was another man down”), but rather a 
higher level of abstraction that relies on the association of more than one predicate 
(“dawn” and “man”).  An important feature of such allegorical language is the privileging 
of quality (dawn of man) over quantity (first man, in such-and-such year), due to the fact 
that quantity is not susceptible of further abstraction.   
It is now fitting to remember that abstraction was an Aristotelian concept that was 
meant to supplant Plato’s theory of knowledge as reminiscence (of when we were 
disembodied and connected with pure forms/ideas).   The theory of abstraction also 
granted greater independence of the human mind from God, for Saint Augustine had 
offered divine illumination as a theory of knowledge to replace that of reminiscence. 
Both the Platonic and Augustinian conception relied, respectively, on either the 
postulation of a separable realm of forms, or God’s grace.  The striking development of 
supposition theory shows the rising interest in an abstractive and philosophical approach 
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to grammar. A corollary of supposition theory is that propositional language is necessary 
referential and contextual.   
 
Islamic Peripatetics and New Translations  
 
 In his seminal book on the universals debate, Alain de Libera identifies three 
major phases of the debate in the Latin West:  
 
Le platonisme eut son heure de gloire à l’époque où l’on ignorait tout de Platon.  
Aristote lui-même eut plusieurs vies : le haut Moyen Age mit l’accent sur 
l’ontologie des Catégories, la scolastique sur la Métaphysique et les écrits de 
philosophie naturelle, le XIVe siècle sur ce qu’il fallait retrancher de 
l’aristotélisme scolaire pour accéder à la philosophie authentique.105  
 
The second and third phases cannot be considered independently from the other culture 
that had been plagued by similar conundrums.  Indeed, it would be impossible to shed 
light on the debate over universals in the thirteenth century without giving a brief account 
of Aristotelian thought in the Islamic world.  Unlike the Latin West, the Islamic 
philosophers were privy to a much fuller Aristotelian corpus, including the Metaphysics 
and Posterior Analytics.  This meant that they were already interspersing their reflections 
on the categories with corroborative evidence from Aristotle’s other works.  Their 
commentaries are therefore much different in flavor and scope than we had seen from the 
early Scholastics.  
Arab philosophers had inherited the same Neoplatonism with their Aristotle, with 
Porphyry’s Isagoge being particularly influential on their conception of logic.   
Aristotelian commentaries by Alfarabi and Avicenna had similar difficulties in trying to 
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reconcile Aristotelian doctrines with the Quran, most notably in the question of the 
eternity of the world and God’s knowledge of particulars. Emanationism and 
participation were constant temptations due to the various brands of cosmologies and 
cosmogonies that had been bequeathed to them by the Ancients. Benefitting from a larger 
Aristotelian corpus than the Western dialecticians of the logica vetus, these Islamic 
philosophers were able to analyze Aristotle’s metaphysical contribution to the question of 
universals in greater detail than Abelard.  In addition, they go beyond the purely logical 
quandaries occasioned by the universal of the Categories to a greater level of 
psychological and cognitive analysis.106  This does not imply, however, that Abelard’s 
objections were nullified by the appearance in the Latin West of these Islamic 
philosophers, but rather that the problems within Aristotle’s “pure” logic were more 
blatant in the absence of his entire system of metaphysics. What will be of greatest to 
interest to us is not the complicated reasoning utilized by these philosophers in support of 
Aristotle, but rather the continuities that emerge when the same problem is dealt with in 
different religious, cultural and historical contexts.   
 Alfarabi  (c. 872-c. 951) privileged certain knowledge over speculative reasoning 
and even outlined a hierarchy of disciplines in which he subordinates religion to 
philosophy.   On the ladder of knowledge one proceeds from induction, yielding 
generalizations, to methodic experience, which alone yields necessary certainty.  Such 
tendencies within his thought earned him suspicions of unorthodoxy, not only by the later 
Sufi philosopher Al-Ghazali (1058-1111), but also by Averroes (1126-1198), who would 
face similar accusations, both in Islamic Spain and in his philosophical successor of the 
Latin West.  In his own commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge, Alfarabi goes much further 
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than did his Greek precursor in fusing Aristotle’s metaphysical observations to the logical 
status of universals.107  Alfarabi does not problematize, however, the existence of 
universal forms the way Abelard does, for he relies on an emanationist scheme of the 
universe, with the last of the heavenly intelligences radiating out the universal natures of 
things in the sublunar world.   Objectivity of knowledge is thus safeguarded by the 
presence of these universal forms which are numerically one both external 
(emanating/universal) and internal (particular) intellects.   
 When these forms are properly universal, irrespective of the multiplicity of minds 
that attend to such forms, there remains the problem of how certain knowledge is not 
shared by the multitude.  Alfarabi sees this not as a result of the instability of language 
per se, but rather as a  result of unstable usage,  and this is especially true of those 
sciences whose fundamental premises are rendered figuratively : 
 
Since religion teaches theoretical things only by imaginative representation and 
persuasion, and since its followers are acquainted with these two methods of 
instruction to the exclusion of others, it is clear that the art of theology, which is 
dependent upon religion, is only aware of the persuasive things and verifies 
religion only by persuasive methods and arguments, in particular if it seeks to 
very the similes of truth as though they were true.108  (italics are my own) 
 
Much like  Aristotle in his criticism of Plato’s doctrine of forms,  Alfarabi quickly 
dismisses from certain knowledge anything that cannot be rendered literally, otherwise 
the statement will be at best an approximation of truth,  or at worst,  yield a philosophical 
absurdity.  Thus, figuration becomes for him the antagonist philosophy proper. 
  The Persian phiosopher Avicenna (c. 980- 1037) made various commentaries on 
Aristotle in the following century,  and he claimed to have read Aristotle’s Metaphysics 
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over forty times without being able to understand it,  until he happened upon Alfarabi’s 
commentary on the same work which finally rendered it intelligible.  He does not play the 
role of a submissive successor to Alfarabi, however, and his treatment of logic shows a 
striking divergence.  While Alfarabi believed that logic could be universal, insofar as 
logic dealt with meanings and not with words (he even tries to Hellenize his Arabic when 
dealing with logical propositions), Avicenna makes logic about second intentions, as it 
were, meanings of meanings.109  At first glance, Avicenna’s scheme seems to remove 
logic further away from linguistic considerations, but this is indeed not the case,  for 
these second intentions are simply a further degree of abstraction from those first 
intentions to which Alfarabi had categorically attributed universality.  This brings us to 
one of those famous phrases of Avicenna, much quoted in the Latin West: “Equinitas est 
equinitas tantum.” (Horseness is simply horseness).  While the universal ‘horse’ is, for 
Avicenna,  only existent as a concept within the mind,  he also grants that there are 
common natures within particular things,  which can in turn be abstracted by the soul : 
“When [the soul] comes to the form of ‘human’, which can be applied to many, with 
many taking on a single nature,  it separates it from all material quantity, quality, and 
position, then it abstracts it from all that to make it suitable to be applied to all.”110  Here 
we note a similarity with Abelard (status), for knowledge of the universal is made 
entirely dependent on the mind’s abstractive faculties rather than any external 
illumination. Universality is thus not only a property of terms, it also reflects a common 
nature amongst particulars. He also makes a trenchant distinction between intellection 
and representation by insisting that intelligible forms within nature have no shape, for 
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that would make them representational rather than intelligible.  Because the forms of 
things are purely intelligible and are seized by an immaterial faculty (the soul), they 
cannot be assimilated as a representation.  This brackets logical predication from pictorial 
representations and instead makes predication a matter of receiving the ‘whatness’ or 
quiddity of the intelligibles directly from the (external) Active Intellect.  
 The consequences of his logical teachings extend all the way to his theology, and 
this would be the greatest cause of concern for both Muslims and Christians.    
Answering how the Necessary Existent through Itself intellects Itself and things, 
Avicenna states:  “The Necessary Existent intellects everything only universally, but 
nevertheless no individual thing escapes Its notice, ‘not even the weight of a dust speck, 
whether in the heavens or on Earth, escapes His notice.’  This is one of those wonders 
that require a subtle genius to understand.”111  Despite the concession to Quranic 
teaching, Avicenna privileges universality in God, because the active intellect radiates 
universal forms, which alone are capable of being intellected, because they alone are 
necessary.  In fact, the question of divine providence extending to particulars is quite hard 
to reconcile with this philosophical groundwork.  Furthermore, to preserve the notion of 
eternal bliss,  Avicenna makes this dependent on the communion of the individual soul 
with the active intellect, and this can also be seen as a transformation of a particular 
substance (the individual soul) into a universal one (the active intellect).   
 Despite their wide renown in the Islamic world, Alfarabi and Avicenna were not 
without critics, the most famous of which was Al-Ghazali, the Sufi philosopher who 
underwent a conversion after a mystical experience.  Ghazali was not so much hostile to 
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intellectual speculations as he was suspicious of the Hellenizing tendencies of his fellow 
theologians.  In his Rescuer from Error, he concedes that the philosophers can achieve 
demonstrative knowledge in mathematics, although their ventures into metaphysics 
cannot but remain conjectural.112 But if metaphysics is a dead art for Al-Ghazali, this is 
perhaps a natural consequence of his occasionalism, that doctrine according to which no 
created being can be the efficient cause of anything. This is one of the most radical 
rejections of Aristotelianism, for it makes God the efficient cause of all action.  A fire 
which burns wood can be said to be a normal occurrence, but within occasionalism that 
causal chain is no longer necessary.  Al-Ghazali accuses the falsafa (= philosophers, 
including Alfarabi and Avicenna) of cutting off God from particular acts of creation by 
insisting on man’s sovereignty, but his solution may have been no more orthodox than 
those of his predecessors.   
 By the time of Averroes, who for most of his lifetime resided in Islamic Spain in 
the 12th century, the arguments of all the preceding philosophers were well-known, and 
Averroes takes a major stand against Al-Ghazali, to whose Incoherence of the 
Philosophers he retorts with the Incoherence of the Incoherence.  Like Avicenna, he was 
a Renaissance man (doctor, lawyer, theologian, philosopher), but he goes beyond the 
Baghdad Peripatetic in striving for a greater Aristotelian orthodoxy.   His numerous 
commentaries, both short and extended, earned him the sobriquet of Commentator in the 
Latin West, and the intellectual rigor of these documents bolsters his claim that the study 
of philosophy should be mandatory for the learned. 
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 Averroes became especially known in the Latin West for a peculiar doctrine 
called monopsychism that he attributes to Aristotle himself.113  If the notion of the world 
soul (anima mundi) had been a point of contention for Abelard and the Chartrians in the 
previous century, it was then based almost entirely on the Plato’s Timeaus, and lacked the 
rationalistic (and non-allegorical), Aristotelian explanation that would later be provided 
by Averroes.114 In Avicenna, Aristotle’s active intellect was both an internal feature of 
the individual soul, as well as the entity that delivers the universal forms for intellection.  
By contrast, the material or passive intellect was just a feature of the individual soul.  
Averroes rejects the latter belief, stating instead that the material or passive intellect also 
had to be universal (one for all men), otherwise the forms delivered to it from the Active 
Intellect would be particular rather than universal.115  The separable material intellect 
therefore managed, though not without a (perhaps) unwitting return to Platonism, to 
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“preserve the immateriality of the subject of thought.”116  There are obvious objections to 
this theory: namely, how can monopsychism account for individual thought?  Secondly, 
Averroes seems to remove the active aspect of thinking entirely, instead defining man as 
‘thought’ by the intersection of two external intellects.  John Marenbon proceeds to 
answer the first of the objections, stating that the imaginative faculty can account for the 
ways in which thought is ordered and individuated.117  The second objection was raised 
by Saint Thomas Aquinas, and will be addressed later.  From his revised definition of 
‘mind’, Averroes takes up the metaphysical definition of the universal from Aristotle, 
much cherished by the fourteenth-century nominalists, according to which "the universal 
is only in the soul", otherwise one would need, following Avicenna, to postulate an agent 
intellect to deliver the forms.118 It would be hard to claim, however, that Averroes bore 
nominalist tendencies, because while universals are not present within particulars, the 
universal is located within the separable world mind. The only individuation of mind 
occurs in the particular phantasmata and particular imaginative faculty of every human 
being, becoming the acquired intellect.  The doctrine of monopsychism also caused a 
huge rift in Latin intellectuals of the thirteenth century, for this would be, along with the 
eternity (i.e. non-creation) of the world, the most controversial aspects of Averroes’s 
Aristotelianism.   
 Averroes is more sensitive than Alfarabi and Avicenna to the question of 
orthodoxy, and to this end he even advocates the killing of heretics!  But orthodoxy is a 
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slippery issue with these philosophers, and his critics in the Latin West were particularly 
hostile to what they saw as an endorsement of a "double truth", where the truth of 
Scripture was a popular (i.e. allegorical) expression of deeper philosophical truths.119   
Within this conception there is no contradiction, only a different means of expression.  
Furthermore, Averroes does accept allegory as a valid mode of expression, however 
unscientific, and even concedes that allegorical interpretation has been the norm 
throughout most of the Islamic sects, save for “a small group of literalists who can be 
refuted by [sacred] texts.”120  Indeed, so constitutive is allegorical speech of all language 
that no one can dispense with it entirely.  And if such figuration appears in the discourse 
of lawyers, Averroes sees no reason why it should not figure in that of the theologians.121 
 In this second chapter of The Decisive Treatise, Averroes seeks to show that there 
is nothing in philosophy opposed to Islam.  If this is where the long justification of 
allegorical practices occurs, it is immediately followed by a discussion of God’s 
knowledge of particulars, which was unresolved in Avicenna and Alfarabi, according to 
Al-Ghazali.  In order to demonstrate the contrary, he rehabilitates not his Islamic 
predecessors, but rather the Peripatetics themselves.  Here, he says that the Peripatetics 
believed in premonitory visions of particular events, which would refute the notion of 
only universal knowledge passing through the active intellect.  Further, he sees the charge 
of heresy as moot, owing to the fact that knowledge, which is necessarily eternal and 
unoriginated in God, can only be predicated of Him homonymously, since His 
knowledge, which is the cause of all things known, transcends the categories of particular 
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and universal.122 This reasoning, so similar to Aquinas’s theory of Analogy, shows the 
extent to which divine Providence was the doctrine invoked, in both Islam and 
Christendom, when philosophical logic came to an impasse.   
 
Scholastic Aristotelianism  
 
 It would be hard to overestimate the importance of these Islamic thinkers on 
thirteenth-century Christendom.  Not only were their manuals in wide circulation 
throughout universities, they were also finding strong adherents in certain thinkers who 
were anxious to expound the "true" Aristotle.  Perhaps the most famous of these was 
Siger of Brabant (c. 1240 – 1280s), whose teachings were so in accord with Averroes that 
they earned him a condemnation in 1270 by the bishop of Toulouse.  Siger eventually 
modified his position, perhaps based on official constraints, but his first line of defense 
was to say that he was only transmitting Aristotle rather than seeking to refute sacred 
teachings.  In a work dubiously attributed to St. Bonaventure, this appeal to Aristotelian 
orthodoxy within the Averroists was regarded as nothing more than a heretical 
subterfuge.123  C.J. Lohr also suggests that for the Averroists, the divisions between 
philosophy and theology were quite pronounced, in a manner reminiscent of Alfarabi: 
“The theologian sought to unveil a truth concealed; the philosopher need not seek to 
conceal the errors in his sources.”124 These tendencies within a burgeoning university 
Aristotelianism were perhaps the most damning evidence of the apparent incompatibility 
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between Peripatetic and Christian doctrine, and further hindered the efforts of less radical 
Aristotelians (e.g. Aquinas) in their efforts to reconcile the two.   
  The transfer of Averroes’s Aristotelianism to the Latin West makes the 
continuities between the Islamic and Christian conceptions of Aristotle strikingly similar 
in terms of the developmental phases.  In both phases of Aristotelian exegesis, one 
notices ambiguities and contradictions within Aristotle’s texts, resulting in several 
doctrines that are, in their own ways, at variance with both faiths (monopsychism, 
eternity of the world, God’s knowledge of particulars).   Furthermore, accusations of 
heresy are a feature of both civilizations, and the means of refuting such accusations  
is usually either an appeal to allegorical language or to a radical dissociation of 
theological and philosophical disciplines. The first condemnation of 1270 of Aristotelian 
teachings meant that subsequent Latin Aristotelians would not be afforded the luxury of 
Averroes’s “double truth” in trying to safeguard the teachings of the Philosopher.    
Writing around the time of the first condemnation, St. Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-
1274) was left with the task of freeing Aristotle from the heretical implications that strict 
adherence to his philosophy entailed.   Not only was Thomas’s philosophy markedly 
Aristotelian, but he also adopted certain distinctions made by Avicenna, especially when 
these were useful in combatting certain Averroistic interpretations.  His Summa 
Theologica was meant to replace Peter Lombard’s Sentences as the official theological 
textbook,  but the condemnation in 1277 of 219 Aristotelian theses,  20 of which were 
Thomistic,  by Etienne Tempier, bishop of Toulouse, left this goal unfulfilled.125  
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Aquinas served as regent master at the University of Paris, the first from 1256-59, the 
second from 1269-1272.  During both tenures, he was engaged in the polemics roused by 
secular clerk Guillaume de Saint Amour against the mendicant orders, and this position 
of power that he occupies at this time makes him extremely important to discussions of 
the Jean de Meun’s Rose.  
Fully aware of the constraints of such a momentous reconciliation of disparate 
systems, St. Thomas had to forge a new Aristotelianism which would be in keeping with 
the literal truth of Scripture.  To this end, he proposed a revision of the old vocabulary, 
and the notion of ‘species’ receives a wider application, since the hitherto ontological 
category of the species becomes also an epistemological one. Not only did Aquinas, like 
the Arabs and unlike Scholastic philosophers of the twelfth century, have access to an 
almost complete Aristotelian corpus, he also benefitted from newer, and sometimes 
specially commissioned translations from the Greek by William of Moerbeke.   
As an avowed realist, Saint Thomas carefully selects his quotations from the De 
Anima and the Metaphysics in order to support this tendency.  For him, then, the species 
was the intermediary between the intellect and the perception of the individual. In man, 
the theoretical faculty of the soul, distinguishing man’s soul from that of animals receives 
the intelligible species – the quidditas (translated as the quiddity, or “whatness”) – prior 
to knowledge of the individual.  The species is not only a class of individuals, but also 
that by which any object is known.  For the mind, being wholly immaterial, cannot grasp 
that which is material; rather, it must receive a form of the matter which turns the species 
sensibilis into a species intelligibilis.  Since there is no knowledge of the singular, the 
species assumes a prominent role in his theory of knowledge.   The species thereby 
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transforms the sensible object,  which only potentially yields knowledge, into an object of 
perception actually known, and this knowledge of the object is properly designated as its 
‘quiddity’ or ‘whatness’.  As with Abelard, who was less inclined than Saint Thomas to 
admit any essential reality of the species but who invoked the status as a similitude of 
particulars, Aquinas similarly grants a place for similitude within his theory of 
knowledge.   The formation of a mental definition of an object occurs not through a 
representation within the mind, but rather through a similitude to the extramental object, 
but there must be two cases of similitude for such an apprehension, first of the intelligible 
species, the second being that of the "mental definition produced by the possible/potential 
intellect activated by the species".126   
This revised definition of the species is a careful way to preserve the universality 
of thought within individual souls.  Saint Thomas was one of the harshest critics of the 
Averroistic doctrine of monopsychism.  Following the Averroistic ferment at the 
University of Paris, he published a tract, De Unitate Intellectus (contra Averroistas) in 
1270, in which he sought to disprove the existence of a separable material intellect, and 
"affirm that the intellect is numerically distinct and multiplied by the number of 
individual human souls". 127  Aquinas was aware that the doctrine of monopsychism was 
pernicious to the doctrine of personal immortality and free will, but his line of reasoning 
in this tract is philosophical rather than theological.  In order to warrant the term 
‘human’, thought must be considered an action immanent to man, rather than the 
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"transitive action of the separate intellect".128 As chapter four of the tract shows, the 
position of Averroes would hold that the intellect is the only thing that thinks and 
individual humans become its instruments.  What emerges between these two 
philosophers is a radically different conception of the human soul, which for Aquinas, 
following Aristotle, is the substantial form of every human being.  In addition, it is 
through the species that something is thought, but one thinks via an intellectual power, 
and this power is individuated within every human soul.  In this case, it is hard to imagine 
how Averroes and Saint Thomas could have both been reading the same De Anima to 
reach such vastly different interpretations.  Aquinas saw the separable material intellect 
as yet another invocation of Platonism that rationally accounted for the universality of 
knowledge, and, in rejecting this view, he had to establish the sovereignty of an 
individual soul capable of receiving the quiddities of things via the active intellect.  It is 
entirely possible to see the elevation of the status of the species, like Averroes’s 
monopsychism, as yet another unwitting Platonism in the thinking of Saint Thomas.   
The recurring importance of similitude for such disparate thinkers as Abelard and 
Aquinas means that, throughout both phases of the Latin quarrel over universals, this 
concept is retained as a constant guarantor of knowledge. Whereas for Abelard, this 
similitude was only found among individuals, in Aquinas it is a similitude between the 
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object in the world and its apprehension in the mind.  Despite such drastic differences, it 
becomes clear that for both thinkers one cannot accede to general concepts without a 
certain likeness. Indeed, for Aquinas, the link between thought and world was a 
similitudo shared by the intelligible species and the mental definition.129   
  Besides an early philosophical tract, De ente et essentia, universality was never a 
central issue within Aquinas’s thought, but this does not mean that he is a passive 
bystander in a huge debate.  Still less could one qualify him as a rhetorician or 
grammarian, but his ventures into the realm of divine predication, resulting in his theory 
of analogy, are indispensable to the elucidation of both his linguistic thought and his 
entire philosophy of being. While there are certain words that can be applied univocally 
to God, such as ‘eternal’ and ‘simple’, for the most part the words used to describe him 
are equivocal (God is wise and so are some people, though not in the same way).  
Therefore, most words can only be predicated of God by analogy, that is to say that they 
yield something to the human understanding, but precisely on human, rather than divine 
terms.130  Analogy was a useful concept not only in maintaining the divine simplicity and 
demarcating the divine from the terrestrial, but it also had the great asset of preserving the 
literal truth of revelation.  The sources of such a theory are taken directly from Aristotle’s 
Categories, but it is also fitting to note that ‘analogy’ was one of the four senses of 
Scripture elaborated by Saint Augustine, although Aquinas classes it within the literal 
sense.131    
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It is only through an understanding of the place of analogy within Aquinas’s 
thought that we can fully appreciate the import of his theology.132  The consequences of 
analogy are immediately present in his exegesis, which most moderns would properly 
call allegorical.  "Sacred Scripture fittingly teaches divine and spiritual truths by means 
of comparisons with material things.  For God provides for everything according to the 
capacity of its nature.  Now it is natural to man to attain to intellectual truths through 
sensible objects, because all our knowledge originates in the senses." (Part 1-question1 – 
article 9)  This justification for figures of speech in the Bible does not entail the corollary 
that the truth of the Bible is purely allegorical. Rather, the Bible is literally true, and to 
accommodate the austerity of such a position, Aquinas must, as we have already seen, 
expand the bounds of the literal sense to encompass such figures.  In addition, theology is 
not a science of words, but of things, and although certain revealed truths must resort to 
figures, the truth itself is not susceptible of such simple expression.  Therefore literality 
and allegory must not be seen as a feature of words, but rather as a property of those 
things signified : "The author of Sacred Scripture is God, in whose power it is to signify 
His meaning,  not by words only (as man also can do),  but also by things themselves.  So 
whereas in every other science things are signified by words, this science has the 
distinctive property that the things signified by the words in it also have a signification."  
(question 1- article 10).  If linguistic signification is thus subordinated to the significance 
of things, it is not only because language is ontologically posterior to real things and 
events ;  it is also because things are the causes of words,  and things alone are properly 
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intelligible.  As in Aristotle, the distinction between the thing and the thing named is 
treated by Aquinas as superfluous.   
Like Augustine,  Aquinas accepts the principles of allegorical readings, but like 
Augustine,  he is eager to show that allegory has a very limited application in exegesis, 
and he prefers the twofold ‘literal’ and ‘spiritual’ senses to the traditional fourfold 
method.   This is because he recognizes figuration as an integral part of human 
expression, yet this is not what constitutes the Bible’s unique power of providential 
signification. This also settles the problem of Biblical parables, for which the literal and 
historical senses cannot coincide (the parable is not rooted in history, yet there is still a 
literal sense): 
The parabolical sense is contained under the literal, for words signify things 
strictly or figuratively.  The literal sense is not the figure of speech itself, but  
what it stands for.  When Scripture speaks of God’s arm, the literal sense is not 
that God has such a physical limb, but only what is signified by such a limb, 
namely operative power. (question 1- article 10).   
 
 In this sense, all descriptions of God are a form of catachresis, the rhetorical trope by 
which we designate literal objects (e.g. the ‘wings’ of an airplane) with a figurative 
misnomer.  This form of catachresis is not really so distinct from his theory of analogy.  
In fact, it is this theory, in making distinctions between terrestrial and divine predicates, 
that manages to avoid the difficulties associated with the inflation of the allegorical sense 
and likewise exposes the insufficiency of human language.133      
 Aquinas is often associated with a natural theology.  That is to say that divine 
realities are analogous with the reality of the world.  We cannot know God for what he is, 
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but rather by what he is not (material).  But if there is logic to creation, then Revelation 
must be of analogous logic. Our concept of species is analogous to species as an idea in 
the Divine Mind, but unlike Augustine, they are not identical.  Following an Aristotelian 
rubric, Aquinas no longer had to posit the universals as separable Forms/Ideas, and yet 
they did correspond to the repeatable, intelligible structures of reality.  
 Aquinas marks the end of our exploration of the debate over universals, not 
because he provided the definitive answer, but rather because his death is roughly 
coterminous with the end of our literary corpus.  The debate over universality would 
continue to flourish in the hands of philosophers such as Duns Scotus, William of 
Ockham, and John Buridan.  It would be fair to say, however, that since the end of 
Scholasticism, the debate has never been given the same investment that it had received 
in the millennium following Porphyry’s initial questions.   
 
Conclusion 
 
In all the phases of the debate explored here, including the Ancient, the question 
of universals can never fully be disentangled from theology.  It is quite difficult to 
imagine how one could come up with a novel ontology of substance without butting 
against any questions that are the proper domain of the theologian.  Even Aristotle and 
Plato were taken, especially in the later Middle Ages, as theists, and their thoughts on 
universality, although quite divergent from Christianity, Judaism, or Islam, were either 
treated purely logically (or ontologically) in the early Latin West, and later treated as part 
of a greater metaphysical system that could not be easily assimilated into the knowledge 
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gleaned from revelation.   This is why the question of universality was frequently 
juxtaposed with naturalistic (especially in Islam) accounts of (non)creation, and at every 
stage they had to postulate a specific kind of God (providential, static, or arbitrary) 
according to their various ontologies.   
In the prologue to this work, I claimed that the various attitudes towards universal 
genera and species could be deemed ideological; this is not meant to imply a flat 
dismissal of all the aforementioned theories as convenient fictions of their own time and 
context.  Rather, they are ideologies in the sense that they are a network or bundle of 
assumptions about the basic building blocks of reality, from which myriad other 
principles and corollaries flow.  ‘Ideology’ is also the term favored by Fredric Jameson in 
the Political Unconscious, there designated as those tacit assumptions that maintain 
power structures and prevent revolution.  Jameson makes no such distinction between 
ideology and theology, and for his purposes, such a conflation is hardly problematic; 
indeed, it can even be understood as productive: 
 
I have throughout the present work implied what I have suggested explicitly elsewhere, 
that any comparison of Marxism with religion is a two-way street, in which the former is 
not necessarily discredited by its association with the latter.  On the contrary, such a 
comparison may also function to rewrite certain religious concepts – most notably 
Christian historicism and the “concept” of providence, but also the pretheological 
systems of primitive magic – as anticipatory foreshadowings of historical materialism 
within precapitalist social formations in which scientific thinking is unavailable as 
such.134 
 
Based on the fact that earlier in this work, Jameson had transcribed the fourfold senses of 
Scripture onto a Marxist hermeneutic that dispenses with providence in favor of a 
materialist trajectory of history, it becomes clear that allegories, for Jameson, are natural 
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symbolic processes emerging both directly and indirectly from the contradictions entailed 
by the mode of production.  The place of ideology, then, is to resolve these contradictions 
and render them palatable, and these instantiations of ideological inscription, however 
transmuted or displaced, find their place within collective narratives. 
But if ideology is not considered mere false consciousness, but rather, as Jameson 
suggests, a “structural limitation” (p. 285), then we can see how much more clearly how 
the various ideologies surrounding universal genera and species can be rendered more 
properly as “theologies”, for it is here that we clearly see the structural limitation 
imposed on philosophical thinking under the constraints of orthodoxy. It is only within 
this last discipline of theology that full ramifications of the debate come to the fore.  If we 
live in an atomized world of discrete particulars, the major problem is the validity of 
general concepts, as well as deriving meaning from “created” objects.  On the other hand, 
if we are individuated within a species by our accidents, then we face the problems of 
personal immortality and God’s free act of creation.   
In the thirteenth century, when philosophical speculation was often constrained by 
strict adherence to orthodoxy, we find the flourishing of the Latin summae, those 
encyclopedic works which offer discussions of all facets of reality.  Concomitant with 
this development is the theological romance, which transposes traditional romance 
narrative elements onto a more universal sphere. The natural precedent for such a 
universal translatio is of course allegoria in factis of Biblical exegesis, which, in its 
comprehensiveness, accounts for both parabolic and historical/chronological aspects of 
allegory. The literal chivalric world of the Queste is but a degraded world of perishable 
sensibles which must be forsaken in order to accede to spiritual truths.  By contrast, the 
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dream narrative of the Rose places all major actants within the mind of the lover, where 
the idealized rose and fountain of Narcissus stand alongside the concretized prosopopeias 
of Reason and Nature.  The former work (c. 1220-30) advances a deeply Augustinian 
theology, with a depreciation of the senses and an emphasis on divine providence,  
whereas the latter, in the case of Jean de Meun’s section,  juxtaposes arguments from this 
older theology with the newer natural theology that was flourishing in the University of 
Paris at the time (c. 1270).     
 Both theological romances espouse a realistic ideology regarding signification.  In 
the network of abstractions ranging from particular to universal to allegory, the mind has 
to move from particular encounters to general ideas and eventually to a translatio, or 
transfer, of those general ideas to a different logical sphere. This is most perfect example 
of this type of allegory is metaphor, Aristotle’s sign of genius, for the “good metaphor 
implies an intuitive perception of similarity within dissimilars.”135 The nominalists, 
especially in the fourteenth century, ascribed no reality to the universal, and therefore, 
allegory is in play even in the designation of universals (when treated as things, i.e. the 
universal man).  Lacking the almost mystical flavor of the realists’ view of the world-
language relation, the nominalist favors the increasingly literal designation of things, 
ideas, and concepts by common terms which refer, at their origin, to individuals.  If 
allegory is to be susceptible to decoding via predicative logic, we must once again tacitly 
suspend the disbelief occasioned by our scientific age, and once again allow for the 
possibility of immaterial existent entities/substances and a cyclical history. Hence our 
exploration of the signifying apparatuses utilized by these allegorical narratives, during a 
time in which such a process could hardly be deemed ideologically innocuous.  In an age 
                                                 
135
 Aristotle, Poetics, XXI.  
84 
 
of explicit censorship, both the Queste and the Rose will attempt to provide the 
foundations for universal signification within the logic of divine providence.      
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Chapter 2 - The Holy Grail and Providential Re-Writings of the Prose Lancelot 
 
La Queste du Saint Graal is a romance written with multiple senses, more 
specifically, the earthly and the heavenly.  Although many theological resonances are 
prefigured in the Conte dou Graal of Chrétien, the works of Robert de Boron, and the 
Perlesvaus, only the Queste displays this rigorously drawn division between its senses. 
The Queste is explicitly and simultaneously allegory and allegoresis.   While this work is 
inscribed on the level of plot within the Vulgate cycle, or the Lancelot en Prose, Jean 
Frappier’s notion of a single architect for the entire cycle does not adequately account for 
the palpable difference in tone and motivation between the Queste and the rest of the 
cycle.  The Queste is certainly a theological romance, but it does not quite fit the genre of 
philosophical allegory to quite the same extent as Dante’s Commedia or Jean de Meun’s 
Rose, for example.  One will find in it few examples of dialectic or Aristotelianism. 
Instead, it favors a time-honored Augustinianism bolstered by a miraculous supernatural.  
This chapter will elucidate some of the peculiarities of the Queste, which bears little tonal 
and doctrinal affinity with its either its predecessor (Conte dou Graal and its 
continuations, Perlesvaus) or its successors (La Mort le Roi Artu). This chapter will focus 
first on Chrétien’s verse romance before turning to the Queste; the chapter ends with a 
discussion of La Mort le Roi Artu, and through this comparative study the Quest’s 
singular providential structure emerges most clearly.  
 
Chrétien’s Epistemological Quest 
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 We must first turn to the origin of the grail legend, namely Chrétien’s incomplete 
Conte dou Graal, for the first indications of the grail as a Christian object.   This romance 
is not, properly speaking, allegorical, for the romance world depicted here does not 
systematically refer to another reality of a different order.  It does contain, however, the 
foundations of an allegorical narrative without explicitly inscribing itself in the 
allegorical tradition.  This point has been contested by Jacques Ribard, whose 
Christological readings of the Chevalier de la Charrette and the Conte du Graal seek to 
add ideological coherence to the works’ literal sense.136 Evoking a similar allegorizing 
tendency, Winthrop Wetherbee has established both formal and thematic links between 
the romances of Chrétien and the allegorical poems emerging from the School of 
Chartres.137  Without wishing to undermine such approaches, I contend Chrétien’s poems 
seem to emerge from a more literal world of merveille and intricate Christian and secular 
poetic allusions.  This is still quite far from the explicit bifurcation of senses that is 
propounded in the later Queste, whose value system derives more explicitly from 
Christianity (both militant and monastic) than Chrétien’s courtly world.  The tendency to 
allegorize Chrétien’s Perceval is justified in part by the romance adaptation of Biblical 
proverb,138one which Eugene Vance has signaled for its reliance on Pauline 
allegoresis.139  This didactic prologue thus « sows the seeds » for allegoresis, but in its 
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in worthless land a good seed will dry up and die 
139
 Matthew 13 and Luke 8.  This proverb is also taken up by Saint Paul in one of his exhortations to the 
spiritual interpretation of Scripture: Gal 6,8. “Car ce que l'homme aura semé, il le moissonnera aussi. Celui 
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incomplete state, there is little to suggest that this is any more allegorical than Chrétien’s 
previous romances.  In order to speak meaningfully about an incomplete work, I have 
assumed some unity within its bipartite structure, that is to say within the radically 
distinct ‘Perceval’ and ‘Gawain’ sections. We shall focus our attention first on the 
Perceval, the newcomer in Arthur’s kingdom.   
Perceval’s first dialogue with his mother brings us right to the crux of an 
enigmatic chivalric past. Perceval’s mother attributes the death of her husband and other 
children to chivalry, and has retired in the Gaste Forest to protect Perceval from the same 
fate [379-452].  This narration of a remote history will reveal its significance later in the 
story, but the evocation of both familial and societal devastation prefigures a recuperation 
of lost order, serving as the primary impetus which drives this romance’s plot. The 
mother’s narrative is a generational or genealogical one.  The mother thus divides her 
narrative between the generation of Uther Pendragon, along with Perceval’s father and 
brothers, and the new generation, of which Perceval is the only remaining exponent. 
What remains to be uncovered in her narrative is that which will expiate the misdeeds 
inflicted on the previous generation.  This generational schema elaborated by the mother, 
as well as the ‘testamentary’ division of the Perceval and Gawain sections, suggest a 
much broader chronological scale than is in evidence in Chrétien’s earlier romances.  In 
addition, the mother’s tale is filled with holes and mysterious invocations (e.g. the isles of 
the sea, the murder of Perceval’s brothers), lending to the romance a cryptic opacity that 
                                                                                                                                                 
qui sème dans la chair moissonnera de la chair la corruption; mais celui qui sème dans l'esprit moissonnera 
de l'esprit la vie éternelle. »  According to the late Eugene Vance, this metaphor was fundamental for 
medieval thought:  « Dante exploite là une longue tradition exégétique fondée sur la vigoureuse parabole de 
Matthieu (13) où le Christ compare la révélation de la parole divine à du grain qu’on sème, parabole qui 
donna naissance au Moyen Age à bien des analogies osées entre l’acte de parler et l’éjaculation du 
sperme.” Eugene Vance,  « Desir, rhétorique et texte », 142. 
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is far more developed here than elsewhere in Chrétien.140  These will provide substantial 
fodder for more Christian renderings of this past in the Queste.  
Prophecy emerges as the clearest example of prefiguration, this being a 
commonplace throughout medieval literature.  In the Perceval, the prophesies of the 
young damsel [995-1000] and the fool in Arthur’s court  [1015-18, 1206-24] are realized 
in a literal manner: the young damsel predicts a time when young Perceval will surpass 
any of the knights in Arthur’s court, while the fool more prosaically predicts Perceval’s 
eventual defeat of Kay.  This premonitory telling of future events signals a textual order 
that verges on the magical when the latter is realized:  
 
Ensin con une seiche estele,  
L’os do braz destre li brissa,  
Si con li soz lo devissa,  
Que molt sovant deviné l’ot.  
Voirz fu li devinaus au sot. [4244-4247] 
 
[Thus he broke the right arm with a dry switch just as the fool recounted, and as he had 
often predicted.  The fool’s prediction was indeed true.] 
   
In this magical setting, it is not the hermit, endowed with a higher knowledge from God, 
but rather the fool who, on occasion, mysteriously yields exact predictions of significant 
events.  But here the insistence is on the veracity of the prophecy and its literal 
fulfillment; the significance of the right arm is a literary commonplace of strength and 
power, but there is no suggestion that this scene’s significance extends allegorically 
beyond the concept of chivalric superiority.    
  While the use of prophecy is one of the clearest forms of literary prefiguration, it 
is also dependent on a firm chronology by which retrospective similitude is established, a 
                                                 
140
 Jean Frappier, Chrétien de Troyes et le mythe du Graal,  67.  Drawn from Keith Busby, 18.  
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luxury that is not always granted to readers of the Perceval.  Jacques Ribard has 
demonstrated how the repetition of certain evocative verses serves to blur the time 
between the Perceval and Gawain sections:141 
 
Dames en perdront lor mariz 
Terres en seront essilliees 
Et puceles desconseilliees 
Qui orferines remanront,  
Et maint chevalier en morront : 
Tuit cil [mal] av[en]ront par toi ! [4608-4613] 
 
Et si a dames ancïenes 
Qui n’ont ne mariz ne seignors,  
Ainz sunt de terres et d’enors 
Deseritees a grant tort 
Puis que mari furent mort,  
Et damoiseles orphenines 
Et avec les does reïnes,  
Qui molt a grant henor les tienent.  [7490-7497] 
 
[Women will lose their husbands, lands will become barren, helpless damsels will 
become orphans and many knights will die.  All these ills will come to pass because of 
you!] 
 
[There are old women who have neither husbands nor lords, but they have been unjustly 
disinherited of their lands and manors when their husbands died.  And there are orphaned 
damsels who live with the two queens who hold them in the highest esteem].  
 
Following Jean Frappier, Ribard notes that the future in the prophecy of the Loathly 
Damsel who mocks Perceval becomes a “quasi-intemporal” (105) present in the 
description of the enchanted castle by Gawain’s host.  The verbal correspondence 
between the two passages is undeniable, in such a way that the enchanted castle seems at 
first glance the literal fulfillment of the Loathly Damsel’s prediction. The situation with 
the two queens as described by the host, however, harks back to well before the prophecy 
of the Loathly Damsel, given the familial relation between the queens and Perceval.  And 
                                                 
141
 Ribard, “Ecriture symbolique et visée allégorique dans  Le Conte du Graal".  
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while the apocalyptic prediction of the Loathly Damsel is partially realized in the Gawain 
section, the results are far less disastrous than what she had foretold.   These narrations, 
one prophetic, the other literal history, are clearly linked thematically and semantically 
and lead this reader to postulate a spectral relationship of prefiguration and fulfillment. 
This interplay is rooted in an attenuated deterministic history, but it is impossible to tell 
whether we are dealing with Christian providence or a supernatural fatalism.142  In other 
words, does the narrative’s teleology correspond to a divinely ordered history, or does the 
Perceval appeal to another form of preternatural determinism?   
In a dense and detailed piece of criticism, Antoinette Saly demonstrates that the 
structure of the Conte du Graal rests on a series of inversions within the plot.143 Relying 
on various examples, most of which deal with Gawain’s expiation of Perceval’s silence, 
Saly contends that these inversions provide the inner coherence of the narrative.  In other 
words, within these inversions resides the work’s senefiance:  
On ne saurait parler ici de contrepoint ni d’entrelacement, car les aventures de Gauvain 
ne se situent pas sur le même plan que celles de Perceval, auxquelles elles se réfèrent.  Le 
romancier, tout en les donnant comme aussi réelles, aussi vécues du point de vue 
romanesque, les charge d’une signification relative à autre chose qu’elles-mêmes [...] 
C’est une romanesque allegoria in factis mise comme en abyme. 144   
 
Saly’s thesis is borne out by a structural analysis of motifs within the romance, without 
recourse to Biblical exegesis.  By showing a series of faults and expiations, she discovers 
an almost complete symmetry in the romance, allowing her to postulate Perceval’s final 
victory in a tournament against Gawain. Saly’s identification of allegoria in factis (here 
                                                 
142
 Moult Obscures Paroles, 8 : “Le mortel ne peut soutenir  le face-à-face avec la divinité. Pour 
communiquer avec les dieux, il lui faut un écran, ou plus précisément, un filtre. C’est à travers le prophète 
que l’homme entrevoit la sphère divine.  Cela est particulièrement vrai pour ce qui concerne le langage, oû 
il faut un truchement pour faire passer le langage surnaturel dans la langue des mortels....” 
143
 Saly,  “La récurrence des motifs en symétrie inverse et la structure du Perceval".  
144
 Ibid. 158-159. 
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stripped of any of its historical and chronological implications) suggests an expanded use 
of this Biblical (providential) signification, for the system of inversions that constitutes 
this allegory does not refer to biblical narratives. Saly provides an explanation for those 
narrative devices of prophecy, prefiguration and specularity which were exploited deftly 
in the full allegorization of the grail story that is the Queste, suggesting that such an 
enterprise may have been the continuation of a latent, or inchoate, allegory in Chrétien.     
 
Names and Things 
 
 Chrétien’s work privileges epistemology over ontology, fitting for a work that 
emerges at a time when the ontology of pre-Abelardian realisms was far less tenable than 
it had been just a century prior. Fully versed in the exegetical dialectics of Peter 
Lombard, who himself had been present for Abelard’s lectures at Sainte-Geneviève, 
Chrétien employs a proto-Scholasticism that emerges mostly for comic effect in this 
particular romance. Furthermore, most invocations of any Scholastic methodology are 
used for questions of nomination, especially as this relates to substance.  Chrétien’s 
romance offers a comic, and often satirical rendering of the question of nomination than 
we find in the Queste or in Robert de Boron. When the seductive Gawain arrives in 
Escavalon, his kiss with a pretty damsel is interrupted by a rear-vassal who hurls 
accusations of murder at Gawain and unleashes a misogynist tirade against the damsel:  
 
« Se fame doit faire nul bien,  
En cesti n’a de fame rien 
Qui het le mal et le bien aime.  
Tort a qui plus fame la claime,  
Que la en pert ele le non 
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Ou ele n’aime se bien non.  
Mas tu iés fame, bien le voi,  
Que cil qui la siet delez toi 
Ocist ton pere, et tu lo baises ! 
Quant fame puet avoir ses aises,  
De soreplus petit li chaut. »  [5781-5791]  
 
[If woman can do no good, then there is no woman in this one, who hates evil and loves 
good.  It would be wrong to call her ‘woman’ for the name is lost on her if she loves 
nothing but good.  But I see clearly that you are a woman, for the man who sits there next 
to you killed your father, and you greet him with a kiss.  But when a woman can have her 
needs met, she cares little about the rest.] 
 
Definition and nomination converge in this mock-Scholastic definition of woman.  In 
Scholasticism, the typical example of definition would be ‘man’, since according to 
Aristotle (Metaphysics, 7.5), male and female derived their definitions from the genus 
animal (i.e., ‘woman’ is not a sub-species of human).   In this extreme form of realism, 
the perversity of woman is treated as so inherent, that to insist on her innate goodness 
would be a perversion of language, or, a definitional error.  By insisting on the mutual 
exclusivity of ‘woman’ and ‘goodness’, the rear-vassal brings us back to the less subtle 
realism of the generation that had preceded Abelard nearly a century prior to the 
composition of the Perceval. The rear-vassal thus shares with the young Perceval a 
certain hastiness to conflate nouns and names, which in this case amplifies his vitriol.        
    While the delayed revelation of knight’s names is a commonplace in medieval 
literature, this work foregrounds the epistemological process in nomination and 
negativity more explicitly than Chrétien’s previous romances.  Perceval emerges in this 
romance as nice (that is to say, ignorant or Latin nesciens), and Chrétien develops this 
portrayal by insisting on Perceval’s continual mistaking of objects based on rudimentary 
definitions. While such explicit references to contemporary dialectic are relatively few in 
this work, the repetition/wordplay of ‘non’ (name/word/not) permeates the work as a 
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whole.  Perceval’s mother, believing that her son’s vision extended to the angels of death, 
is met with a more shocking revelation from her son: “Non ai, mere, voir, non ai, non! / 
Chevalier dient qu’il ont non.” [373-374] [No mother! I most certainly did not (see 
angels).  They said their name was ‘knight’.] Perceval’s ‘unwitting’ and emphatic word-
play (non/non) suggests that apprehension of name, thing, and essence are neither 
simultaneous nor a given.145 An epistemological uncertainty here yields both comic and 
dramatic effect, for one wonders how the young and chatty Perceval depicted here could 
have ever kept his mouth shut during the grail procession.  As yet, Perceval does not 
distinguish between particular and universal, accident (knighthood) and substance (man).  
These seem to be the defining features of his niceté.    
 The incomplete Perceval is still a good deal longer than any of Chrétien’s 
previous romances.  In contrast to the Lancelot, or the Yvain, for example, the adventures 
of this romance are delayed and the action remains somewhat muted in the first half.  
With its more comedic opening, the Conte dou Graal employs a dissonant palate, 
combining brilliant wordplay with a thrilling juxtaposition of the sublime (description of 
knights’ shining armor) and the bathetic (Perceval’s questions).  In this more bleak and 
serene world, Chrétien juxtaposes generic courtly openings with the dissonant and 
clamorous arrival of the knights.  We begin with the typical troubadour reverdie, or 
springtime exordium, the birds singing ‘an lor latin’, which imbues the scene with 
vitality and suggests an amorous awakening.  Then suddenly, Perceval, here known as the 
                                                 
145
 This rhyme pair was used first in Chrétien’s Chevalier de la Charrette, though the effect is not as comic.  
Rather it shows the hospitality of the citizens of Logres to the victorious Lancelot,  2443-46: Et dit 
chascuns : “Sire, par foi, / Vos vos herbergeroiz o moi!”/ “Sire, por Deu et por son non, / Ne herbergiez se 
o moi non!” [And each one said: “My lord, please lodge at my house!” “My lord, by God and his holy 
name, don’t lodge with anyone but me!”] 
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nice (ignoramus) emerges “de la gaste forest soutaine” (the remote waste forest).  The 
reverdie conceals a dark and mysterious past.   Chrétien’s hauntingly evocative setting 
for this first scene is carried through to both the Perlesvaus and the Queste, both of which 
offer morbid explanations of how the forest was laid waste.    
Renewal and retribution are both presaged by the juxtaposition of death and new 
life, yet Chrétien resolves the tension more immediately with levity.  The irruption of the 
knights dazzles visually, and the sonorous din of their armor frightens young Perceval.  
With his limited experience of the world and his senses numb with the beauty before him, 
Perceval’s emotions shift rapidly, from panic to wonder to admiration. These confounded 
senses and the limited vocabulary of young Perceval lead him to postulate that the 
knights are devils, then angels, then finally God himself.  At every turn, Perceval falls 
into error by assuming a theological explanation for the knights before him:       
 
Ensin a soi meïsmes dist  
Li vallez, einz qu’il les veïst. 
Et quant il les vit en apert 
Que do bois furent descovert,  
Si vit les hauberz fremïenz 
Et li hiaumes clerz et luisanz  
Et vit lo vert et lo vermoil 
Reluire contre lo soloil 
Et l’or et l’azur et l’argent,  
Si li fu molt tres bel et gent 
Et dit : « Biaus sire Dex, merci ! 
Ce sont ange que je voi ci.  
Et voir or ai je molt pechié,  
Or ai je molt mal esploitié 
Qui dis que c’estoient deiable... » [121-135] 
 
[And so the young man spoke to himself before seeing them.  But when he saw them in 
the open out of the woods, their chain mail glistening, their bright and shining helmets, 
the green and red gleaming in the sunlight, and the gold, blue and silver, he simply said, 
“Dear Lord, my God, I beg your pardon!  These are angels that I see before me.  I truly 
sinned greatly before when I said they were devils.”] 
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After finding his senses completely dazzled, Perceval reveals his lack of knowledge by 
taking every universal for a particular.  When Perceval asks a knight to identify himself, 
he receives a laconic “Chevaliers sui.” [170], leading him to postulate that ‘chevaliers’ is 
a proper name: “Biaus sire chiers, Vos qui avez non chevaliers...” (My dear lord whose 
name is Knight) [183-184].146  In setting up a romance dedicated to the greatest of 
Arthurian heroes, our first glimpse of Perceval is of a simpleton, or tabula rasa, from the 
remote wilderness.  Perceval’s induction into knighthood is therefore both a primordial 
loss of innocence and an initiation into knowledge.   
 Perceval is eventually destined to transcend his niceté through trials and 
experience. This is because we are dealing with an epistemologically optimistic romance.  
Perceval’s disorderly reality of discrete particulars is the first sign of his limitation.  It is 
clear, however, that Perceval is not to blame for this lack, since he does not have any 
exposure to or experience of the court. 147 After mistaking a universal noun for a 
particular, Perceval tries to remedy his error by assuming that ‘knighthood’ is an inherent 
quality (“Fustes vos ensin nez?” – Were you born thus? [276]).148  In addition,  Perceval  
                                                 
146
 This comic assumption that all nouns are particular finds an analogous inversion in Perceval’s dialogue 
with his cousin. concerning  Perceval finds “the Fisher King,” to be an epithet of mutually exclusive terms :  
- Ha ! sire, ou geüstes vos donques ? 
Chiés lo riche Roi Pescheor ?  
- Pucele, par lo Salveor,  
Ne sai s’il est peschieres o rois,  
Mais molt est riches et cortois.  [3432-3436] 
 
 ["My lord, where did you lodge then ?  At the Fisher King’s Palace?” “Maiden, by the grace of the Savior, 
I don’t know if he was a king or a fisherman, but he certainly was very wealthy and courteous.”] 
147
 Ribard,  “La symbolique du nom dans le Conte du Graal “, 122.   “Il s’agit pour [Perceval] de bien 
marquer que la connaissance du nom de ces armes ou de ces édifices religieux manifeste un progrès évident 
dans la formation du jeune sauvageon de la forêt galloise. Il passe de l’inconnu au connu.”  
148
 When viewed from a philosophical perspective, Perceval’s question asks whether knighthood is an 
essential and intrinsic quality.  The knight invokes existentialist reasoning avant la lettre,  insisting that one 
is not born a knight, but  rather becomes one:   
 
Et cil qui petit fu senez 
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builds all of his definitions from particulars, including mistakenly believing that one hurls 
(lance) a spear (lance) like a javelin, a homonymous designation of noun and verb which 
provokes Perceval’s interlocutor to dub him soz (foolish).149   
 The link between epistemology and nomination is developed further as an 
essential part of Perceval’s induction into knighthood, most often with comic 
consequences.  Perceval’s mother insists on the importance of knowing proper names 
(N’aiez longuemant compaignon/ Que vos ne damandez son non/ Et lo sornon a la 
parsone. Par lo sornon conoist en l’ome [523-6]), (Never delay in asking a fellow knight 
his name and epithet, for it is by the epithet that one knows the man). She also asks that 
Perceval visit churches and abbeys for the preservation of his soul.  Yet, lacking any 
exposure to such places,   Perceval believes the first tent in the forest to be that which 
corresponds best to the definition of ‘église’ given to him by his mother.150 As was the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Li dist : « Fustes vos ensin nez ? » 
- Nenil, vallez, ce ne puet estre  
Que nule riens puise ansin nestre. [275-278] 
 
[And the young dim-witted lad said to him : "Were you born that way ?" "Not at all, boy, for nothing can 
be born that way."] 
 
149
  - Que est ce que vos tenez ? 
[.....] 
- Jo te dirai : ce est ma lance.  
- Dites vos, fait il, la lance qu’en  
Si con je faz mes javeloz ? 
- Nenil, vallez, tu ies toz soz,  
Ainz en fiert en tot demenois.  [185, 191-195] 
 
["What are you holding ?" "I’ll tell you : this is my spear/lance."  “So you say that you throw it just as I 
throw my javelins?” “Not at all, boy! You’re quite foolish.  You must strike from close range."] 
150
   - Mere, fait il, que est eglise ? 
- Uns leus ou en fait lo servise 
Celui qui ciel et terre fist 
Et homes et bestes i mist.  
- Et mostiers qu’est ? Filz, ce meïsme : 
Une maison bele et saintime 
Et de cors sainz et de tressors. [537-543] 
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case earlier with knighthood, Perceval’s solecism is the result of his taking an accident 
for an inherent differentia, a common Aristotelian error that is amplified for comic effect.   
In order to achieve knighthood, Perceval opts not for imitation, but rather a total 
usurpation of the knight’s name and identity well before his career has even begun (“Ne 
serai chevaliers des mois/ Se chevaliers vermaus ne sui” - I won’t be a knight for ages, if 
I am not the Red Knight. [954-955]). In their encounter, Perceval slays the red knight 
with a javelin through the eye [1068-1073] before proceeding to rob the cadaver of his 
armor in a highly uncourtly gesture:  
Et li vallez est descenduz,  
Si met la lance a une part 
Et l’escu do col li depart,  
Mais il n’en set venir a chief 
Do hiaume qu’il ot sor lo chief,  
Qu’il ne set comant il lo praigne  
Et l’espee, qu’il li desceigne 
Maintenant, mes il no set fere 
Ne do desarmer a chief traire. [1076-1084] 
 
[The young man puts his foot on the ground and leaves his spear to one side, he takes the 
knight’s shield off his neck, but he is unable to remove the helmet from the knight’s head 
                                                                                                                                                 
[“Mother,” he says, “what is a church?” “It’s a place where they give the service to Him who made teh 
heavens and the earth, and placed man and beast there.”  “And an abbey ? What’s that ?”  “ My son, it is a 
beautiful and most saintly house with many relics and treasures. “]   
 
 
Li vallez vers lo tref ala 
Et dit ainz qu’il parvenist la : 
« Dex, or voi je vostre maison ! 
Or feroie je desraison  
Se aorer ne vos aloie.  
Voir dit ma mere tote voie,  
Qui me dist que ja ne trovasse  
Moutier ou aorer n’alasse  
Lo Criator an cui je croi... » [627-625] 
 
[The young man headed toward the tent, and before reaching it he said, “God, now I see your house!  It 
would be senseless of me not to go worship you.   My mother certainly told the truth (about your beauty) 
and she told me if ever I found a church or monastery, to go worship there the Creator in whom I believe.”] 
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for he doesn’t know where to grab it from.  Now he tries to ungird the sword, but he is 
unable to do so, and thus cannot bring the disarming to completion.] 
 
The naturally gifted yet unschooled Perceval derides the proper meaning of knighthood by 
believing it to be a matter of external appearances.  In this respect, Perceval’s first victory is 
heavily qualified.   
Having witnessed the procession of the grail in the Fisher King’s castle, Perceval remains 
silent and does not ask the purpose of the grail, an omission which is later recounted as a sin. His 
first cousin reveals to him that his born identity (Percevaus li Gaulois [3513]) is to be replaced by 
a more appropriate epithet (“Tes non est changiez, biax amis/ - Commant? – Percevaus li chaitis!” 
(“Your name has changed, fair friend?” “To what?” “Perceval, the weak/unfortunate”) [3519-20], 
further bolstering his mother’s claim that the epithet is the clearest marker of one’s identity. In a 
probable clerical interpolation found in two manuscripts, Perceval’s identity during his first 
encounter with the knights goes through a more rapid (and comical) shift that reflects the 
protagonist’s poor grasp of nomination and definition:  
  
- Par quel non je t’apelerai. 
- Sire, fet il, jel vos dirai,  
J’ai non Biaus Filz. - Biaus Filz as ores ? 
Je cuit bien que tu as ancores 
Un autre non. – Sire, par foi,  
J’ai non Biaus Frere. – Bien t’an croi,  
Mes se tu me viaus dire voir,  
Ton droit non voldrai je savoir.  
- Sire, fet il, bien vos puis dire 
Qu’a mon droit non ai non Biaus Sire. 
- Si m’aït Deus, ci a bel non.  
An as tu plus ? – Sire, je non,  
Ne onques certes plus n’an oi.151 
 
[“By what name do I call you?” 
“My lord, I will tell you.  My name is Fair Son.” 
“Fair Son is your name now?  I think that you still have another name.”  
“My lord, yes, my name is Fair Brother.” 
                                                 
151
 This interpolation follows verse 334 in my edition.  For a commentary on this passage, see Ribard, “La 
symbolique du nom”, 127.  
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“I believe you, but if you wish to tell the truth, I do not think you can do it justice.”  
“My lord, I can tell you to the best of my knowledge that my name is not Fair Lord.    
“Good heavens, that’s a nice name.  Do you have any more?”  
“My lord, I don’t, at least I never heard any others.”] 
 
Unaware of how to converse with his interlocutors, Perceval reveals that his identity is 
constellated through the various relations into which he was born, yet invariably qualified 
by his beauty (biaus), which here functions almost as Perceval’s given name. Attached as 
he is to this qualifier, his self-designations are relational, that is to say that their definition 
(father, son, lord) is predicated on a relation to another noun.   Perceval’s shifting and 
inchoate identity is here depicted as the play of various parts of speech from a mind as 
yet unaccustomed to abstraction.     
 The importance of knowledge, nomination, and recognition of objects in the 
Conte dou Graal suggests that epistemology (rather than ontology) is used as a 
structuring device for the narrative.  Perceval’s emergence from niceté into full-fledged 
knighthood makes it an early precursor to the Bildungsroman, and the importance of 
unasked questions (what was the purpose of the grail?) and misrecognized objects 
(church, armor) show that the epistemological process is brought about by reconciling 
words with their corresponding things.  In its incomplete state, we can only surmise that 
the work will conclude with Perceval’s expiation of his sin and full assimilation into 
knighthood. It is impossible to conclude, however, that this would be based on divine 
providence.  For while Christian allusions abound in Chrétien’s final romance, including 
an intricate network of prefiguration and fulfillment, we are still in a very different 
ideological setting from the providential narrative of the Queste.   
 
 
La Queste del Saint Graal  
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 The Queste del Saint Graal inverts the chivalric values exemplified in Chrétien 
The shift from poetry to prose, or from rhymed romance to historical chronicle is the 
most obvious generic and stylistic difference.  Absent from the Queste is Chrétien’s 
humor, irony, and word-play; instead we have a more intricate plot and a truly epic scale 
which runs from Genesis to Late Antiquity.  Its deeply Christian ideology can be seen 
most clearly in the systematic translatio of ‘heavenly’ for ‘worldly’ chivalry, a 
distinction that owes something to the Perlesvaus  (c. 1200),  where it is less 
schematically and rigorously developed, and which finds no precedent in Chrétien.  If we 
compare the Queste to the rest of the Vulgate, the former still emerges as ideologically 
and intentionally singular despite more stylistic and generic homogeny.152   It is this 
double narrative of adventure and gloss, allegory and allegoresis, which sets the Queste 
apart, and it is within the more systematic framework of Christian providence from which 
the discrete and various adventures of the Queste draw their ultimate meaning.  The goal 
is no longer to “arimer lo mellor conte qui soit contez en cort reial” (rhyme the best tale 
ever told in a royal court) (Perceval, 62-3), but rather to transmit Christian truths within a 
chivalric context, truths that are to resonate with the reader on both the level of affect and 
that of intellection.153  The work exhorts the reader to accede to these deeper truths by 
                                                 
152
 Unlike the other works of the Lancelot en prose, the quest of the holy grail is neither recounted in 
Geoffrey of Monmouth’s Latin  Historia Regum Britanniae  (c. 1135-8) nor in the French adaptation by 
Wace, Roman de Brut.  The Queste is therefore not quite so constrained in its plot by earlier “historical” 
accounts of a quest.   
153
 Etienne Gilson, relying heavily on Pauphilet’s assertions of Cistercian authorship or influence, 
underscores the primacy of affective as opposed to intellectual understanding : “Il  se trouve que l’école 
mystique de Cîteaux a pour caractère propre de désigner par des formules cognitives des états 
essentiellement affectifs.  En d’autres termes, il y a deux manières d’atteindre Dieu pour un mystique 
cistercien, l’extase en ce monde et la vision béatifique dans l’autre. [….] Les bénédictins de Cîteaux sont 
des augustiniens, et ce sont même les représentants typiques de la mystique affective dont s’inspireront des 
Franciscains tels que saint Bonaventure.”  “La Mystique de la Grace”, 345.   
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furnishing the tools of contemporary (and ancient) exegesis.  Unlike the Conte dou 
Graal, which had engaged in extensive word-play and equivocation, the Queste opts for 
an ideology of the sign’s transparency that is consistent with the latter work’s greater 
realism, as we shall see when we come to the hermits’ exegesis. While the author has 
clear predecessors in the process of “Christianizing” the grail story or even in inserting it 
within an extended Biblical history, he is certainly unique making it conform to the logic 
of providential Augustinian exegesis.  
  The tendency to attribute Cistercian patronage and influence to the Queste has 
certainly elucidated much of the work’s theology.154  In her preface to the work, Fanny 
Bogdanow demonstrates multiple similarities between the wisdom of the Queste and that 
of the monks of Cîteaux, most notably Bernard of Clairvaux.  I find that this presentation, 
especially in the juxtapositions of quotations from Saint Bernard and the work in 
question, excessively limits the field from which the work’s author could have drawn his 
theology.  While it is clear that Bernard of Clairvaux favored allegorical readings, as 
illustrated by his gloss on the Song of Solomon, it seems that the exegesis of the Queste 
appeals to a much wider audience than the mystically-minded monks of Cîteaux.  Points 
of commonality abound between the exegesis of Saint Bernard and that of the Queste, 
such as a disdain for lust, a taste for mysticism, the ineffability topos, and a certain 
skepticism toward the notion of semblance/appearance. Such similarities are too general 
to suppose Cistercian authorship, and Karen Pratt and Jean Frappier, pace Bogdanow and 
Pauphilet, have made this point by a categorical claim that Cistercian monks did not write 
                                                 
154
 Pauphilet inaugurated the connection between the Queste and the Cistercians, a position still held by the 
Bogdanow in her edition of the work. La Queste du Saint Graal, ed. Anne Berrie et Fanny Bogdanow 
(2006).  All citations from the work are drawn from this last edition.   
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romances.155  In addition, the apocryphal attribution of the work to Gaultier Map only 
weakens the claim of Cistercian influence, for Map had made remarks concerning the 
decadence of the order in his De Nugis Curialium.156  It seems more tenable, therefore, to 
posit a broader theological foundation than the writings of Saint Bernard.157 Nonetheless, 
the Queste seems to share the Cistercian hostility (evinced primarily in Bernard) to 
the ‘decadence’ of certain secular dialecticians, especially Abélard et Gilbert de la Porrée, 
noticing in their « efforts intellectuels des obstacles sur le chemin de la réforme 
intérieure.»158  The advances in dialectic made in the twelfth century are here rejected in 
favor of a more militantly Augustinian realism which I shall discuss further on.   
 Following the example of Robert de Boron (Roman de l’Estoire dou Graal), the 
Queste inscribes itself in biblical history. The grail, as a mysterious object in the Fisher 
King’s castle in the Chrétien’s Conte dou Graal, is endowed in the Queste with an extra-
textual history.  The mysterious and marvelous objects which haunt Chrétien’s marvelous 
world are given full etiology, or historical causality: « Ci doit sooir cil.... .iiii.c. anz et 
.liiii. a aconpliz aprés la Passion Jesucrist. Au jor de Pentecoste doit ciz sieges trover son 
mestre. » (Here shall sit a man….454 years after the passion of Jesus Christ.  On the day 
of Pentecost this seat shall find its master.) (Queste du Saint Graal, p. 88).  The knights 
marvel at the prophecy, and Lancelot adds that the prophecy, if true, will find its 
confirmation that very day.  In other words, this narrative will re-write the marvels of 
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 ibid. 87.  see also Jean Frappier, Arthurian Literature in the Middle Ages) 114.  
156
 Karen Pratt, “The Cistercians and the Queste del Saint Graal”. 
157
 Cf. Michel Zink, “Traduire Saint Bernard: Quand la Parabole devient Roman”, 30:  “Ainsi, dans la 
Queste du Graal, l’esprit cistercien, mis en évidence par Albert Pauphilet et par Etienne Gilson, viendrait 
étouffer la richesse romanesque qui était jusque-là celle de l’univers arthurien, simplifier le sens, réduire les 
personnages à des ectoplasmes ou à des symboles algébriques de la vertu et du vice [...] A l’époque de la 
Queste du Graal, un auteur de langue française intéressé par les questions religieuses ne pouvait pas, quel 
que fût son propre statut, ne pas subir l’influence de la spiritualité cistercienne.” 
158
 Histoire de la Philosophie, 1334.  
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previous romances by replacing them with the more religious category of miracles.  The 
marvelous resists explanation, whereas the miraculous offers the first step towards the 
rationalization of the narrative for the modern Christian community.  While the history is 
no doubt apocryphal, this rationalization of the marvelous is an indication that the Queste 
offers a historical (and omni-temporal/universal) setting which further bolsters this 
work’s designation of reality.     
 This transformation toward increasing verisimilitude in the Queste is not the 
result of a more scientific or empirical conception of the world, but rather a testament to 
the preponderance of the didactic mode in comparison with Chrétien’s romance. Its 
pedagogical efficacy lies in its systematic conversion of esoteric exegesis into exoteric 
givens about the nature of the universe, here relayed in narrative form.  If there is 
epistemology to speak of, it is in the form of intuitive knowledge, viz., knowledge that is 
conceived as an ontological given rather than as a logical process. This privileging of 
intuitive knowledge comes at the expense of the sensory, which invariably deludes the 
knights, including the notably sensuous Gawain:  “Et ce n’avint onques mes en nule cort, 
se ne fu chiés lo Roi Pescheor, que l’en apele lo Roi Mehaignié. Mes de tant sont il 
engignié qu’il ne le porent vooir apertement, ainçois lor en fu coverte la veraie 
senblance...ne revendré ja mes a cort por chose qui aviegne devant que je l’aie veu plus 
apertement que il ne m’a [ci] esté mostré.." (And this had never occurred in any court 
before that of the Fisher King, now known as the Wounded King.  But they were so 
enchanted that they were not able to see it openly, but rather its real appearance remained 
hidden from them.  I will not return to this court before I see more clearly what has been 
shown to me) (p. 114).  Gawain is not satisfied with his first vision of the grail, yet 
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blinded by his own pride, he believes that his future vision will be more complete, with a 
vocabulary pertaining to vision and revelation (semblance, voir, covert, apertement).  The 
warning of an old hermit sent by Nascien explains the reason for Gawain’s failure:   
 
Ceste Queste n’est mie queste de terrienes ovres, ainz doit estre li encerchemenz des 
granz segrez et dez grans repostailles Nostre Seignor qui li Hauz Mestres mosterra 
apertement au beneuré chevalier qu’il a esleu a son serjant entre toz les autres chevalier 
terriens, a cui il mosterra les granz merveilles del Saint Graal, et fera vooir ce que cuers 
[morteus] ne porroit penser ne langue d’ome terrien deviser. (p.120) 
 
[This is not a quest for earthly things, but should be the search for the great secrets and 
mysteries of Our Lord which the High Master will show openly to the fortunate knight 
whom He has elected as his sergeant from among all worldly knights.  He will show him 
the great marvels of the Holy Grail, and will make him see what no mortal heart can 
fathom and which no language of man can express.] 
 
Here the Queste elevates its pedagogy to the same level as the Bible, for it uses human 
language to describe divine realities which cannot be apprehended by the senses. This 
‘heavenly’ or ‘spiritual’ sense eludes all knights contaminated by sin, especially of a 
sexual nature.  And while this heavenly chivalry remains elusive, it is not depicted as an 
intellectual or rational category, but rather an ontological, and indeed ethical one.  This is 
to say that the ethical disposition of the knights, rather than their intellect, is what makes 
heavenly chivalry available to them.   
 
Militant Realism   
  
In the early twelfth century, Abelard launched an attack on Platonic realism, 
which when combined with the Aristotelian ‘substances’ (genera and species), affected 
the entirety of logic up to that point. Abelard’s dialectical pyrotechnics were often 
received hostilely, not least by Bernard of Clairvaux, whose focus on the intuitive 
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knowledge was inherently resistant to the former’s cold logic.  The Augustinian realism 
that bolstered Bernard’s mystical tradition, with an ontology that included divine ideas as 
causes of things and man’s innate knowledge, finds a militant proponent in the author of 
the Queste.  These long-standing ideas are developed with extensive use of Scholastic 
vocabulary, which suggests that the author must have been versed in all aspects of the 
trivium, including dialectic.  There is, however, no concession to any nominalist logic 
here.159 The author’s realistic ontology is expressed readily in the common phrase of the 
hermits: « Or vos dirai la senefiance de ceste chose », or even the more realistic 
“Senefiance est chose”. Augustine’s insistence on signification being a property of things 
(res) is rendered here in the vernacular with ‘chose’ (from Latin ‘causa’). The semantic 
evolution of the Latin ‘res’ into the French ‘riens’ (something) would have made this an 
unsuitable translation of Augustine’s terminology. As a property of things (res, ‘reality’), 
meaning (senefiance) is thereby inscribed within ontology rather than epistemology.  For 
this quest is indeed more ontological than Chrétien’s narrative:  Chrétien’s romance 
hinges on an unasked question (What is the grail used for?), and the Queste hinges on the 
quest for the grail tout court.    
 The Queste’s amplified ontology, at the expense of epistemology, has 
consequences for the hermits’ allegoresis.  In an article concerning the Queste, Tzvetan 
Todorov suggests that the rhetorical figure of tautology functions like a degree zero of 
this allegorical format.160  Todorov demonstrates that tautology (as based on the formula 
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 See Strubel (La Rose, Renart, et le Graal, 281-282): “La richesse du vocabulaire technique est 
remarquable, et chaque niveau de sens a sa constellation de termes regroupés autour d’un concept clef 
(« semblance » / « senefiance » - « demonstrance »)[...] La Queste du Graal est comme celle de la rose une 
queste de la connaissance, de la présence du sens.  A ceux qui savent déceler les « demonstrances » sont 
réservés les « secrez et repostailles » tandis que les autres ne dépassent pas le stade de l’étonnement." 
160
 Tzvetan Todorov, “La Quête du récit". 
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A = A) never yields perfect equivalence even in the most simple of utterances.  If one 
allows that the gloss is the spiritual explanation, or equivalence, of worldly adventures, 
then the Queste’s narrative is double: the literal/historical narrative is systematically 
transformed into a spiritual narrative, one whose meaning is supposed to be the purer, 
truer narrative.  
 
Il ne suffira pas que les signifiants et les signifiés, les récits à interpréter et les 
interprétations soient de même nature.  La Queste du Graal va plus loin ; elle nous dit : le 
signifié est signifiant, l’intelligible est sensible.  Une aventure est à la fois une aventure 
réelle et le symbole d’une autre aventure ; en cela ce récit médiéval se distingue des 
allégories auxquelles nous sommes habitués et dans lesquelles le sens littéral est devenu 
purement transparent, sans aucune logique propre.161  
 
Todorov’s interpretation is salutary for the grail, for it underscores the ontological 
radicalism of the Queste while preserving the autonomy of its literal and allegorical 
meanings, in keeping with the Patristic tradition.162 Todorov’s schema is in accordance 
with medieval allegoresis, then, for both adventure (literal sense) and gloss (spiritual 
sense for the soul) are both senefiances, that is to say existing things or realities, the 
former only temporal, the latter both temporal and eternal.  Within this partial 
simultaneity of senses (on the chronological, rather than the narrative level), the work 
must explain how these literal adventures could signify a heavenly battle for the 
individual soul.  Taking the work’s fictional status for granted, Todorov does not require 
any historical reality to correspond to the adventures, seeing them instead as parabolic. 
The advances made by his article, therefore, bear more on its literary, rather than 
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 Todorov, 136.  
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 Rosemond Tuve explains that the literal sense must correspond to real history, and the meaning of the 
literal sense is not derived from its allegorical significance: “There is no question of substitution of 
figurative for literal meaning; all doctrine touching allegory, varied and irreconcilably different in some 
other respects, is unanimous in claiming the validity of both the literal historical event and its allegorical 
significance.” Allegorical Imagery, 222.  
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philosophical, analysis. The later Tree of Life sequence will, in fact, show that history 
does indeed play a role in the hermit’s exegesis.       
 This self-glossing work explains the correspondence between the two senses 
through an allegoresis that is much indebted to the Augustinian tradition. In one 
particular scene, Perceval dreams of two ladies, one seated on a lion, the other on a 
serpent.  These are the same animals that Perceval has seen fighting previously in the 
narrative.  The lady on the lion urges Perceval to prepare for conflict, then the other asks 
him to expiate the crime of killing the serpent, or, in other words, become her vassal.  
Perceval refuses her demand and wakes up instantly.  Confused as to the dream’s 
meaning, Perceval seeks the aid of a hermit (prodons) who counsels him thus:   
 
Percevax, de cez .ii. dames que vos veistes si diversement montees, que l’une estoit 
montee sor .i. lion et l’autre sor .i. serpent, c’est grant senefiance, si la vos dirai. Cele qui 
sor le lion estoit montee senefie la Novele Loi, qui sor le lion, […] Cele dame siet sor le 
lion, qui est Jesucrist ; cele dame si est Foi, Esperance, [creance], batesme. Cele dame si 
est la pierre dure et ferme sor quoi Jesucriz dist qu’il [ferm]eroit Sainte Yglise la ou il 
dist : « Sor ceste pierre edefieré je m’yglise. » Par cele dame, qui estoit montee sor le 
lion, doit estre entendue [la Novele Loi], que Nostre Sires maintient [en force et] en pooir 
ausi com li peres sostient l’enfant. [284-286] 
 
[Perveval, you saw two women, one of whom was riding a lion and the other a serpent, 
and this has (lit. is) great significance.  The woman who was on the lion signifies the 
New Law, Jesus Christ, faith, hope, belief, baptism.  This woman is the hard and firm 
rock on which Jesus said he would build his Holy Church, proclaiming “On this rock I 
will build my church.”  By this woman on the lion is meant the New Law, which Our 
Lord keeps in vigor and power just as a father looks after his child.] 
 
On a lexical level, the preponderance of the verb ‘estre’ is not insignificant ( ‘est 
senefiance’, ‘le lion qui est Jesucrist’, ‘cele dame est Foi...’). Through this verb a series 
of equivalences and identities are explained, in which abstract/concrete distinctions play 
no part (lion = foi, espoir, la Nouvelle Loi, la pierre). This paradigmatic designation of 
one thing by another is possible through an inherent similarity in the attributes of the two, 
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e.g., the woman is young and her lion is strong, in the same manner as faith, hope, and 
the rock (‘Peter’). 
The hermit completes his gloss by turning to the woman on the serpent. Here we 
find an almost exact symmetry between the first and second part of the gloss, the battle 
between good and evil, which finds its particular historical instantiation in the “battles” of 
New and Old Laws, Church and Synagogue, Christ and Devil, heresy and orthodoxy.  
 
- Mes ore me dites de l’autre qui chevauchoit le serpent, que de cele ne conoistroie je mie 
la senefiance, se vos ne m’en fesiez certein. 
[...] 
- Cele dame que tu veis le serpent chevauchier, c’est la Synagogue, la vielle Loi, [qui] 
fu arriere mise si tost com Jesucriz ot aportee avant la Novele Loi. Li serpenz qui la 
porte, c’est l’escriture mauvesement entendue et mauvesement esponse, ce est 
ypocresie, iresie, iniquité, pechié mortel, [c’est li anemis meismes… Sez tu de quel 
serpent ele se plaint ? Ele ne se pleint pas del serpent que tu oceis ier sor cele roche, 
ainz dit de celui serpent qu’ele chevauche, c’est li enemis. Et sez tu ou [tu] li feis tel 
duel don ele se pleint ? Tu li feis au point que li enemis te portoit quant tu venis a 
ceste [roche, a cele eure] que tu feis la croiz sor toi. (288) 
 
[“But now tell me about the other woman who was straddling the serpent, for I do not 
know the significance of this vision if you don’t explain it to me.”  
“The woman you saw straddling the serpent is the Synagogue, the Old Law, which was 
left behind when Jesus Christ had brought the New Law.  The serpent carrying her is 
Scripture that is poorly understood or poorly glossed, hypocrisy, heresy, iniquity, moral 
sin, the Enemy himself. Do you know which serpent she was bewailing?  It was not the 
serpent that you murdered on that rock, but rather the one she was riding, the Enemy.  
And do you know how you inflicted this injury of which she complains?  You injured her 
when the Enemy brought you to the rock at that time and you made the sign of the 
cross.”] 
 
Here the hermit underscores that there are two serpents, the one mentioned by the woman 
in speech (and the one really killed by Perceval) and the one on which she is seated, the 
first being a particular symbol and the latter a universal (Biblical) one. Despite the 
ontological difference between the reptiles, their ultimate referent is the same, explained 
here by a successive host of related nouns. The lion and serpent ultimately represent 
diametrically opposed forces, as evinced by the parallelism of both structure and 
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vocabulary [la nouvelle Loi, la foi, l’espoir, Jésus-Christ… l’ancienne Loi, l’hypocrisie, 
l’hérésie, l’Ennemi]. This is not mere synonymy, but rather the presentation of an 
ontology that consists of analogous realities.  In this case, the correspondence of these 
realities is based on Genesis, more specifically, the temptation of Adam and Eve by the 
serpent, from which the diabolical connotations of the serpent ensued. 163  It is not from 
the intrinsic qualities of the serpent that the correspondence is sealed, but rather a pre-
lapsarian history that vouchsafes this universal equivalence.  Perceval escapes this 
perilous situation only by making the sign of the cross.  Yet this event, as explained by 
the hermit, was proleptically announced by the woman on the serpent, who complained to 
Perceval of an evil inflicted on her.  According to the hermit, she displaced (to borrow 
Freud’s term) the ‘evil’ of the serpent-killing onto Perceval’s divine invocation. Unlike 
chronological prefiguration, the woman uses direct discourse to refer to an event that has 
yet to take place. While prefiguration had served to blur chronology in Chrétien’s 
Perceval, the woman’s prolepsis here suggests that the realities depicted in dreams cannot 
be treated temporally.164   
The notion of temporality is treated thematically with the distinction, found earlier 
in the Perlesvaus, between the Old and New Laws. The analogous grouping of Church 
and Synagogue found in both works seems not to have been associated with Judaism, for 
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 Strubel shows that a different line of interpretation than the ‘bestiary’ is required for the more 
anthropomorphic animals of medieval French literature.  “Le transfert est [...] bien préparée et l’observation 
familière ne fait pas oublier que ce coq n’est pas un individu, mais un type en qui se fondent les 
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reste collé à l’événement : le récit obéit évidemment à la logique narrative et nous habitons le présent 
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temporalité du type « eternel retour » sortent ici vainqueurs du conflit entre les deux." (141) 
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even Peter Damian had claimed more than a century prior that the Jews had almost 
ceased to exist.165  Helen Adolf assumes that the real target of the Perlesvaus is actually 
the Albigensians, and likewise posits that the Queste has stripped the binary of all 
militant connotations in accordance with a now-outmoded threat to orthodoxy and 
Christendom.166  Without stripping  the Old/New Law binary entirely of its militant 
connotations in the Perlesvaus,167 the Queste finds in this theme a pretext for guiding 
exegesis, where one event prefigures another by an extension of the Biblical allegoria in 
factis. This is most apparent in the sequence concerning the Tree of Life, which explains, 
through a long detour, the meanings of the spindles of different colors in the nef 
merveilleuse (marvelous ship). Following Robert de Boron, from which a part of this 
sequence is drawn, the Tree of Life inscribes the grail adventure (and consequently, 
knighthood) within biblical tradition dating back to pre-history.  Here the story of Cain 
and Abel (Old Law), linked genealogically to the Tree of Life through Adam and Eve, 
mirrors the crucifixion (New Law).  Similarities between the Testaments are thus used to 
echo actual plights within the grail narrative, and the Tree of Life is shown to be one of 
the originary providential substances within the Queste’s amplified testamentary history:      
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 Perlesvaus offers a similar model of penetrative reading to the Queste.  Its allegoresis is based  on 
affective, rather than logical, understanding. « Li hauz livres du Graal commence o non du Pere e du Fill e 
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God, from whom this high tale of the Grail proceeds.  All those who hear it must understand it, and forget 
all the wickedness in their hearts, for it will be very beneficial to all those who hear it with their heart]. 
(Perlesvaus, 127). The Perlesvaus, as well as Robert de Boron’s Estoire del Saint Graal in prose, makes 
extensive use of Trinitarian symbolism as a didactic tool (Valette, 86), yet they do not insist on the double 
sense of their adventures.     
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Et tot autresi com [Abel] avoit esté conceuz au jor de vendredi, si com la vraie Bouche le 
met avant, tot autresi fu il mort au jor de vendredi [par cel tesmoing meesmes]. La mort 
que Abel reçut en traïson a celui tans qu’il n’estoit [encore] que trois homes en terre 
senefie la mort au verai Crucefi, car par Abel fu il senefiez et par Caÿn fu senefié Judas 
par cui il reçut mort.  Et tot ausi come Caÿns salua [Abel] son frere et puis l’ocist, tot ausi 
fist Judas qui salua son seignor, et mort non mie de hautece, mes de senefiance. Car ausi 
com Seignor [au vendredi], non mie de sa main, mes par sa langue.  Et molt senefia bien 
Caÿn Judas de maint choses… (528) 
 
[And just as Abel had been conceived on a Friday, as told by the true Word,  he likewise 
died on a Friday by the same testimony.  The treacherous death blow dealt to Abel when 
there were but three men on earth signifies the death of Christ on the cross, for Abel 
signifies Jesus just as Cain signifies Judas.  And just as Cain greeted his brother Abel 
before killing him, so did Judas greet his Lord.  And their deaths are not the same in 
magnitude, but in significance.  For just like Abel, our Lord died on Friday, not by 
Judas’s hand but by his tongue.  Thus Cain signifies Judas in many respects…] 
   
In this case, senefiance and its paronyms designate historical correspondences. The 
historical events are linked by a common familial greeting and murder. While the two 
events share a common senefiance, they differ in hautece (degree or magnitude).168 The 
discrete events of the Old and New Testament thus participate in the same senefiance, 
which is ontologically (if not necessarily temporally) prior to their realization.  The 
hermit’s exegesis is thus a demonstration of divine providence in action.   
  The Queste does not always opt for direct, or tautological, signification, however, 
as many of the glosses are reliant on metaphorical representation.  By metaphor we mean 
the comparison of objects of different natures linked by a perceived similitude.  To render 
metaphor intelligible, we turn to the attributes of the compared objects in a process that 
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 Terminological and thematic similarities are used to describe the coming of Galahad, with whom the 
Christ comparison is even more explicit : “Car tot einsi com l’error et la folie s’en foï par la venue de lui et 
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l’en doit vostre venue comparer pres a la venue Jhesucrist, de semblance et non pas de hautece.] (158) 
(Italics are my own). [For just as error and madness were dispelled with his coming and the truth became 
apparent and manifest, so our Lord elected you from among all wordly knights to go off into foreign lands 
and to bring an end to those arduous adventures and to explain how they came about.  For this reason, your 
coming can rightly be compared to that of Jesus Christ, in similarity rather than magnitude.] 
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Todorov calls “identification by the predicate.”169   This means that from one noun we 
infer another by a similarity of properties or attributes between the two.  This similitude 
is not historically conditioned, nor is it a nominal one (e.g., punning, paronomasia), but 
rather is found when nouns are considered substances with intrinsic characteristics by 
which they gain contextual meaning.   This kind of exegesis owes considerably to 
Augustinian realism, as demonstrated by Lancelot’s failure to enter the grail castle and 
his receipt of a cryptically allegorical message whose significance is revealed by a 
hermit:   
 
- Et por Deu, sire, dites moi la senefiance de cez trois choses (pierre, fust, figuier) car 
onques n’oï chose que je desirrasse tant a savoir com ceste. [...] 
- Certes Lancelot, je ne [me] merveil mie se cez trois paroles vos ont esté dites.....En 
ce qu’il vos apela plus dur que pierre puet en une merveille entendre, que tote pierre 
est dure en sa nature [et meesmement l’une plus que l’autre]. Par la pierre ou l’en 
treuve durté puet en entendre le cuer del pecheor, qui tant s’est endormiz [et 
demourés] en son pechié  que ses cuers en est si adurciz qu’il ne puet amoloiez par 
feu ne par eve...Par cele entencion est li pechierres apelé pierre, par la [grant] durté 
que Nostre Sires treuve en lui [.......] 
Amertume est donc en toi si grant com la doçor i deust estre. Donc tu es semblable au 
fust mort et porri ou nule doçor n’est remese, fors amertume. Or est la tierce chose a 
mostrer coment tu soies plus nuz et plus despoilliez que fier. [De cel figuier], dont 
[on parole ici], il fet mencion en l’Evangile [la ou il parole del jor] de Pasque florie, 
qant Nostre Sires vint en Jerusalem sor l’asne, le jor que li enfant des Ebrex 
chantoient encontre sa venue le doz chant dont Sainte Yglise fet chascun an 
memoire...Et Nostre Sires [vint a l’arbre, et quant il le vit desgarni de fruit, il en fu 
ausi comme corrociés, dont il maudist l’arbre por ce qu’il ne portoit fruit....Or 
esagrde se tu porroies estre autel [ou plus nus et plus despoilliés que il ne fu]....Mes 
quant li Sainz Graax fu aportez devant toi, il te trova si desgarni qu’il ne trova en toi 
[ne] bone pensee ne bone volenté, mes vilain et ort et conchié de luxure te trova il, [et 
tot desgarni de feuilles et de fruit et de branches], ce est a dire de bones ovres. (218-
224, italics are my own) 
 
[“My lord, tell me the significance of these three things (stone, wood, fig tree) for I never 
heard anything that I desired to know as much as this.”   
“Of course, Lancelot.  I am hardly astonished by these three words that have been spoken 
to you.  When he called you harder than stone, you can consider it a great marvel, for 
                                                 
169
  "La relation entre la série-à-traduire et la traduction s’établit à travers une règle qu’on pourrait appeler 
l’ « identification par le prédicat ». Le pavillon est rond ; l’univers est rond ; donc le pavillon peut signifier 
l’univers. L’existence d’un prédicat commun permet aux deux sujets de devenir le signifiant l’un de l’autre.  
Ou encore : le soleil est lumineux ; Jésus-Christ est lumineux ; donc le soleil peut signifier Jésus-Christ." 
(Todorov, 134-135). 
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every stone is hard by nature.  By the rock in which hardness is found is meant the heart 
of a sinner, who has slumbered and remained in sin for so long that his heart can be 
softened by neither water nor fire. In this sense, the sinner is equated with stone, for God 
finds great hardness in him. […] Bitterness resides in you where sweetness should dwell. 
Thus you’re like the dead and rotten wood where no sweetness remains, only bitterness.  
Now the third thing to explain is how you are more bare and fallow than the fig tree.  The 
fig tree is mentioned in the Gospels when he speaks of the Flowery Easter, when our 
Lord came into Jerusalem on a donkey, the day that the children of the Hebrews were 
singing in honor of his coming and which the Holy Church has us memorize.  And our 
Lord came to the tree, and when he saw it barren of fruit, he was angered and cursed the 
tree for not bearing fruit.  Now ask yourself if you could be barer than this fig tree.  When 
the Holy Grail was brought before you, it found you so barren as to reveal neither good 
thought nor good will, but rather found you wicked and burning with lust. You were 
barren of leaves, fruit, and branches, namely, good deeds.”]  
 
Certain nouns (pierre, fust) and adjectives (desgarni, despoillies) are shown to extend 
their significations to Lancelot’s soul, with both nouns referring to adjectival qualities 
(hard, dry) and both adjectives referring to privation of a quality (stripped of ‘fruit’ or 
‘virtue’).170  In rhetorical terms, the hermit uses the figure of zeugma for the adjectives, 
for the ‘desgarni’ refers to both the fig tree (of leaves) and Lancelot (of good deeds).  By 
predicating a single adjective both concretely and abstractly, this zeugma lays bare the 
foundations of allegorical signification within the sequential order of language.  The case 
of the fig tree is somewhat different, for here the metaphor is amplified by a translatio of 
the biblical parable, and through this scriptural parallel an allegoria in factis is staged.  
Thus, Christian Providence (as demonstrated in the tree’s “timeless” historical etiology) 
and Platonic realism are both essential to the hermit’s exegesis.   
The author of the Queste also seems to have some knowledge of Neo-Platonist 
allegoresis, from which the notion of the integumentum/involucrum was derived.  These 
                                                 
170
 Cf. “Ces paroles qu’ele te dist ne sont pas sanz grant senefiance, car ele i entendi molt autre chose que 
tu n’i entendoies.  Li paveillons, qui ert roonz a la maniere de la circonstance del monde, senefie tot 
apertement le monde, qui ja ne sera sanz pechié.” (138)  [These words that she spoke to you are of great 
meaning, for she meant something quite different from what you understood.  The tent, round like the 
circumference of the world, clearly signifies the world, which will be without sin.] 
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fabulous narratives conceal deeper truths by means of pretty wrappings, and require 
penetrative readings.  Metaphors of interiority and exteriority are re-written in Christian 
terms, if we take the hermit’s explanation of Gawain’s failure as an example: “Tu es li 
velz arbres, qu’il n’a mes en toi ne fueille ne fruit. Car te porpenses tant, au moins, que 
Nostre Sires ait en toi eu la moole et l’escorce, puis que li enemis en a eu la fueille et le 
fruit.” (You are the old tree, which no longer bears leaf or fruit. Resolve at least to give to 
Our Lord the sap and the bark, since the enemy has taken the fruit and leaf). (412)  This 
husk and kernel metaphor privileged by Macrobius in his Somnio Scipionis is re-written 
as sap and bark, and puts us at quite a remove from the old binary of literality and 
figuration.  The privileging of the interior sense is a reflection of the superiority of the 
soul over the flesh, and also warns of the carnality that results from literalistic reading.   
The exegesis offered by the hermits and ladies in the Queste, which relies on 
Todorov’s “identification by the predicate”, is necessarily dependent on both grammar 
and logic, despite the primacy accorded to affective and intuitive understanding. The 
elected knights, being neither grammarians nor logicians, rely mostly on instinct as these 
adventures confound their senses. Unable to expound the gloss themselves, the knights 
must turn to hermits for their adventure’s proper gloss.  The hermits must translate 
sensory realities into intelligible ones, for to remain on the sensory level is the domain of 
literality, or, as it were, bad reading. This recurring motif of improper understanding 
explains why 146 out of 150 knights are destined to failure, as most are still attached to 
the surface/appearance of the adventure:    
 
Quant il ot ceste parole, si est tant liez que nul plus, com cil qui ne prent garde qui ce soit 
a cui il parole. Il quide [bien] que ce soit feme, mes non est, ainçois estoit li enemis qui le 
voloit decevoir et metre en tel point que s’ame fust perdue [a toz jors mes]. (266) 
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Quant tu veis cest brief, si te merveillas que ce pooit estre ; [et] maintenant te feri li 
enemis d’un de ses darz. Et ses tu de quel ? D’orgoil, car tu pensas que tu t’en istroies par 
ta proesce.  Melianz, fet li prodons, einsi fus tu deceuz par entendement, car li brief 
parloit de chevalerie celestiel, et tu entendoies de la seculer, par quoi tu entras en orgoil ; 
et par ce chaïs en pechié mortel. (172-174)  
 
[When (Perceval) hears these words, he is delighted, and does not pay attention to the 
person he is speaking to.  He thinks it’s a woman, but it’s not.  Rather it was the enemy 
who wished to deceive him and disturb his wits so that his soul would be lost forever.] 
 
[“When you saw this inscription, you wondered what it could be, and at that point the 
enemy shot you with one of his arrows.  Do you know which?  The arrow of pride, 
because you thought would emerge victorious by your knightly prowess.  Meliant,” the 
hermit continues, “you were thus deceived by the understanding/intellection, for the 
inscription spoke of heavenly knighthood, and you understood the worldly, at which 
point pride entered your heart, and you lapsed into mortal sin.”] 
 
Much of the Queste’s pedagogical efficacy relies on such examples of bad reading, which 
always have material consequences. In another adventure, Arthur’s knights sacrifice 
Perceval’s sister, whose virgin blood cures a princess from leprosy.  This in turn 
provokes God’s wrath, manifested in a disastrous storm, because it is later revealed by a 
hermit that the princess was actually a wayward sinner.  This sacrifice contravened the 
celestial hierarchy, in which pure flesh is deemed to be superior to any nobility. 
Reinforcing the link between reading and action, such examples of bad reading collapse 
into the notion of ‘sin’ and its correlates.  Here the text accords with Saint Augustine in 
suggesting that bad reading is that which exhorts not caritas, but cupiditas. Perceval’s 
lapse is sensory, for he relies on his sight and his sound instead of asking if the words of 
the damsel (the devil in disguise) were in accordance with Holy Scripture. Meliant’s 
misreading is, in contrast, is an intellectual one (par entendement).  By mistaking earthly 
for heavenly chivalry, Meliant “enters into pride” and “falls into mortal sin.” These turns 
of phrase betray, philosophically speaking, some allegiance to the Platonic notion of 
participation, and show that the concepts of reading and judgment are always ontological, 
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for proper reading is made dependent as much on the ontological polarities of good 
(virginity, New Law, Christ, celestial chivalry) and evil (lust, Old Law, Devil, earthly 
chivalry/pride) as on technical knowledge of exegesis.  Any notions of ethics, therefore, 
are subsidiary to an ontology. We are now worlds away from the ethics of Abelard, who 
had predicated sin on the intention (necessarily particular to the individual) rather than 
the act (universal). If the Queste appears to be an ethically charged work, this is in part 
because every adventure can be recast as a battle for the human soul, both individual (the 
reader, character) and universal (the fate of humanity).  The Queste’s adventures are 
therefore connected to salvation history, and consequently divine providence, but with 
both greater intricacy and subtlety than in the Perlesvaus, which had relegated all aspects 
of the adventures to the divine will.171 
 The Queste du Saint Graal, although reliant on logic and grammar for its glosses, 
owes little to Aristotelian or Scholastic predication.  Common substantives like water are 
glossed as ‘good’ (rather than simply ‘transparent’), further cementing the substantive 
aspect of moral signification.  Similarly, Galahad’s shield is providentially destined to 
him (“Messire Galaaz, metez a vostre col cel escu, qui onques ne fu fez se por vos non.” - 
Galahad, put your shield on your shoulders, for it was made for you alone” 142) by 
means of his participation in ‘the marvelous’:  Et por ce ne soit nus si hardiz qui a son col 
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 “Josephes nos tesmoigne que les samblanches des isles se muoient por les diverses aventures qui par le 
plaisir de Deu i avenoient, e si ne plot mie as chevaliers tant la queste des aventures se il nes trovasent 
diverses, car quant il avoient entré en .i. forest e en une isle o il avoient trové aucunne aventure, se il 
revenoient autre foiz si troveroient il recés e chasteaus e aventures d’autre maniere, que la peine ne li travax 
ne lor anuiast, et por ce que Dex voloit que la terre fust confermee de la Novele Loi." (Perlesvaus, 1. 
6615sq,  found in Valette,  93).  [Josephe recounts that the images of the islands were moving according to 
the various adventures which happened to them by God’s will.  And the quest for adventures would not 
have been as pleasing if they had not had variety, for when they had entered a forest or stumbled on an 
island where they found no adventure, if they came back a second time, they would find diversions and 
castles and adventures some other way, so that neither pains nor travails would bother them, and because 
God wished that the world be subjected to the New Law.] 
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le pende ce cil non a cui Dex l’a destiné. Si [i] a tele acheson que, tot einsi com en cest 
escu ont esté veues merveilles gregnors qu’en autres, tot ausi verra l’en plus merveilleuse 
proece [et] plus haute vie en lui qu’en autre chevalier. (150)  [And there for none was so 
bold as to hang the shield on his shoulders for God had not destined it to them. For, just 
as this shield has seen marvels greater than any others, so the greatest prowess and 
probity must be in evidence for its bearer.]  This shield has been the source of numerous 
marvels.  Its history, dating back to the age of Josephé and King Evelach, inscribes the 
object within the same lineage as that which links Galahad with Christ.172  Here the 
exegete relies on a double translatio.  The first is the spatial and historical transfer of the 
object, the second relies on realistic predication, by which the shield is tied to Galahad by 
the word (the most marvelous of shields for the most marvelous knight). The semantic 
drift between connotations of adjective (morally valorizing) and noun (suggesting the 
supernatural) are here disregarded; rather, the adjective and noun are made to designate 
the same reality. In this context, a certain Cratylism concerning words serves to further 
confirm the providential etiology of the shield and the illustrious lineage of its new 
owner.   
 
The Holy Grail 
 
 Of all substantives within this narrative, it is the grail itself which assumes the 
greatest importance. The philosophically minded Gilson suggests that this object must be 
the starting point for any interpretation of the text:  “Le premier point à fixer, c’est la 
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 Cf. E. Jane Burns, Arthurian Fictions, 61. “The explanations offered for the écu merveilleux, the 
Chastiaus as Puceles, and the nef merveilleuse form secondary narrative tales whose function is etiological: 
to document how events evolved from a distant point in time to their present state.” 
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signification du Graal lui-même.  Il est clair, en effet, que toute erreur, ou simplement 
tout manque de précision dans l’interprétation de ce symbole, risque de fausser le sens de 
l’œuvre entière."173  Like the shield and the marvelous ship, the grail is an etiological 
object used to collect Christ’s blood after the crucifixion.  It thus has a history which 
serves to explain the significance of British chivalric adventures more than three 
centuries after the Gospels.  This etiology is part of the grail’s senefiance, the ontological 
category that transcends history in favor of the omni-temporal or divine.      
In Chrétien’s romance, Perceval failed to ask the purpose of the grail.  By the time 
of the Queste, this is no longer a viable question, for the object’s Christological 
associations have been sealed by the various continuers of the Perceval as well as Robert 
de Boron.  Boron infuses Chrétien’s object with esoterism, as the grail is shown to be the 
vessel that collected the blood of Christ’s wounds after the crucifixion, then a book 
containing the holy secrets, and by an etymological pun, the source of agrément 
(pleasure), and perhaps by further extension, grace: 174 
  
Adonc est il errant couruz,  
A son veissel et si l’a pris,  
Et lau li sans couloit l’a mis,  
Qu’avis li fu que mieuz seroient 
Les goutes ki dedenz cherroient  
Qu’en liu ou mestre les peüst, 
Ja tant pener ne s’en seüst. 
A son veissel ha bien torchiés 
Les plaies, et bien nestoïes 
Celes des meins et dou costé,  
Des piez environ et en lé. [562-572] 
 
                                                 
173
  Etienne Gilson, “La mystique de la grâce dans la Queste del Saint Graal", 323.  
174
  The semantic slippage of ‘li gré’ and ‘la grace’ owes to the common root, the latin ‘gratia.’ The Queste 
borrows this etymology from Boron, yet offers a more providential explanation of nomination. [«...ce est 
l’escuele que onques hons mescreanz ne vit a qui ele ne grevast molt. Et por ce que ele a si servi a gré 
toutes genz doit ele estre apelee le Saint Graal.] (636) 
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[Then he approached his vessel and took it and placed it where the blood was flowing.  
He thought it would be better if the drops fell into a place where they could be collected, 
and so he took great pains to do so.  He scooped the wounds with the holy vessel, 
cleaning those on his hands and flank, his feet and around.]   
[...] 
Se je le grant livre n’avoie 
Ou les estoires sunt escrites,  
Par les granz clers feites et dites. 
La sunt li grant secré escrit 
Qu’en numme le Graal et dit. [932-936]. 
 
[[..] if I didn’t have the great book, where the stories, deeds and sayings are recounted by 
the great clerks.  There the great secrets are written which are called the Grail].   
 
- Et queu sera la renummee 
Dou veissel qui tant vous agree ? 
Dites nous, comment l’apele on 
Quant on le numme par son non ? » 
Petrus respont : « Nou quier celer : 
Qui a droit le vourra nummer  
Par droit Graal l’apelera : 
Car nus le Graal ne verra,  
Ce croi je, qu’il ne li agree : 
[....] 
Autre non ne greent il rien 
Fors tant que Graal eit a non.. [2653-2661, 2672-2673] 
 
[From where does this vessel that pleases you so derive its renown?  Tell us, what do they 
call it when they use its proper name?   Peter responds:  I will tell you openly.  He who 
wants to call it properly will call it the Grail, for there is no man who sees the Grail and is 
not delighted at the sight.   No other names suited it quite so well, hence the joyous name 
Grail.] 
 
Taken rhetorically, these multiple elaborations of the grail amount to an equivocation, but 
when viewed ontologically from a NeoPlatonic perspective of participation, we see that 
Boron is incrementally augmenting the divine reality to which the grail corresponds. 
L’estoire del grail recounts the exodus or translatio of the grail to the West by Joseph of 
Arimathea, while the account of the grail shows a translatio from thing to book/secrets to 
gre.  The term ‘graal’ had been used as early as the Roman d’Alexandre (c. 1160), and for 
Chrétien, it was certainly a universal, as indicated by the presence of an indefinite article 
(Un Graal entre ses .II. meins/ Une damoisele tenoit) (A damsel held a grail in her two 
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hands) [3157-3158].  By the time of Robert de Boron, it seems to have become a proper 
noun, capable of taking only the definite article. Boron’s romance paves the way for 
allegorical re-writings of the grail by fusing esoterism and exoterism, abstract and 
concrete, spiritual and material. Moreover, it includes an evocative depiction of the Last 
Supper, in which Eucharistic transubstantiation is shown to mirror the reality of the grail 
(containing the divine body, without the guise of bread or wine).     
 The Queste maintains and expands Boron’s descriptions by insisting on the grail 
as both a concrete and an abstract reality.  In one scene, a hermit explains to Gawain and 
Hector the meaning of Hector’s dream and the reason for their failure to see the grail:  
 
Vos montastes entre vos .ii. sor .ii. grant chevax, c’est en orgoil et en bobant, ce sont li 
dui cheval a l’enemi.  Puis disiez : « Alons querre ce que nos ne troverons ja, » ce est le 
Saint Graal, [les secrees choses Nostre Seignor, les repostailles qui ja ne vos seront 
descovertes, car vos n’estes pas dignes del vooir.]....Et quant il avoit une piece 
chevauchié, si venoit a une fontaine, la plus bele qu’il onques veïst, et descendoit por 
boivre ; et com il s’estoit abessiez, la fonteine se reponoit ; et quant il vooit qu’il n’en 
porroit point avoir, si retornoit la ou il estoit venuz. Fontaine si est de tel maniere qu’en 
ne la puet espuisier, ja tant n’en savra l’en oster : c’est li Sainz Graax, c’est la grace 
Nostre Seignor. [404-406] 
 
[When you set out on your two great steeds, it was with pride and self-deception.  Those 
were the two horses of the enemy.   Then you said: “Let’s see what we can find” and this 
is the Holy Grail, the secrets of our Lord, the mysteries which will not be revealed to you, 
for you are unworthy of beholding them.   And when he [Lancelot] had ridden a fair ways 
on his horse, he came to a fountain, the most beautiful he had ever seen.  But when he 
bent down to drink from it, the fountain vanished.  And when he saw that he would be 
unable to drink, he returned to whence he came.  The fountain is such that it can never be 
exhausted: it is the Holy Grail, the grace of our Lord.] 
   
The Queste further develops Robert de Boron’s ontological and etymological conflation 
in Hector’s dream, where we see the metaphor of Tantalus and the fountain (source) of 
both grace and divine secrets, which eludes the unworthy.  Evoking again the 
identification of the predicate, God’s grace, like the fountain of Tantalus, is inexhaustible.  
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The quest of the holy grail, as material (escuelle/veissel) and spiritual (fontaine/grace) 
substance, is therefore an ontological quest, while epistemology is treated as a matter of 
revelation (by hermits) and ethical prerequisites (purity of flesh).   
The revelation of the grail’s mysteries requires a further translatio of the vessel 
from West (Corbenic) back to East (Sarras), like a symmetric reversal of its original 
exodus recounted in the Estoire del Graal. Sarras is the grail’s “spiritual palace” which 
metonymically designates its oriental origins and a fitting place for the revelation of the 
divine (spiritual) secrets: “Mes encores ne l’as tu pas veu si apertement comme tu le 
verras.  Et sez tu ou ce sera ? En la cité de Sarraz, el palés esperitel.” (But you still 
haven’t seen it as openly as you will.  And do you know where this will come to pass?  In 
the city of Sarras, the Grail’s spiritual palace) [636]  Once restored to its place of origin, 
the grail can reveal the entirety of the divine secrets to Galahad, as prefigured at the 
castle of Corbenic. (120)175 The topos of the ineffable and secret further supports the 
esoteric nature of this quest, which renders intelligible realities sensible: “[Et] il tret 
tantost avant et regarde dedenz le saint Vessel. Et [si tost comme il ot regardé, si] 
comença a trenbler molt durement, si tost come la mortel char comença a regarder les 
esperitex choses.” [650] (Galahad stepped forward and looks inside the holy vessel. And 
as soon as he saw within, he began to tremble violently, as his mortal flesh started to 
behold divine realities.)  In contrast to the spiritual vision of the grail at Corbenic, 
Galahad’s vision straddles both material and spiritual. In the work’s closing theophany, a 
hand from on high takes the grail, the bleeding spear, and Galahad directly to heaven.  
                                                 
175
 The dialectic of overt and covert is further developed in reference to the the knights of the Fisher King: 
“Et ce n’avint onques mes en nule cort, se ne fu chiés lo Roi Pescheor que l’en apele lo Roi Mehaignié. 
Mes de tant sont il engignié qu’il ne le porent vooir apertement, ainçois lor en fu coverte la veraie 
senblance...” (p. 114 –  italics are my own).  
122 
 
Such an apotheosis was the goal of the Eucharistic sacrament, the ‘reality’ of which is 
here shown to be analogous to both the incarnation and the ascension.  For lack of a more 
specific designation, the ‘esperitex choses’ evoke contact with the divinity through 
analogy to material substance (Aristotle’s pros hen equivocation). Galahad’s spectacular 
apotheosis distinguishes him ethically from even the finest of Arthur’s knights (including 
Perceval and Bors), and yet, if one accepts the reality of the Eucharistic sacrament, a 
similar divine communion is a possibility for the whole of the Christian community.  
Galahad’s ascension thus models the sacrament in a grand, pictorial form, but the real, 
divine presence in this scene is not simply analogous to the sacrament, but identical with 
it.  The degradation of sensory knowledge is therefore necessary to ensure proper faith in 
the divine presence that is the Eucharist.    
In its optimistic ending, the work’s utopian impulse shines forth.  This didactic 
work seeks to initiate the reader into a spiritual transformation. Using Galahad as ideal 
exemplum, the individual soul can seek perfection by imitation.  By successive imitation 
and education, a new Christian community can be formed, which would distinguish itself 
through sexual purity and religious fervor.  In one sense, this utopia is already a reality: 
this community, though imperfect, is already existent and the (real) Eucharist pertains to 
the same substantial reality as the (literary) grail.  In another sense, the utopia is an 
emergent one, and one that is obtained through spiritual warfare and consistent 
preparation for the Eucharistic sacrament. This utopia would be predicated both on 
chastity and sensitive reading that relies on theological experts.  Even the more militant 
Perlesvaus does not accord so much didacticism to its account of the grail quest. If it is 
true that “the medievals seem to have read the Queste as a secular romance rather than as 
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a religious work”, then it seems that the didactic and exegetical thrust of the work has 
often been lost on readers, serving as both a testament to the coherence of the work’s 
literal sense and to the long-standing attempt to normalize the most aberrant work of the 
Lancelot en prose.176    
  
 
La Mort le Roi Artu – Fatalistic Determinism  
 
The Queste du Saint Graal is a hard act to follow. The reader who begins the 
Mort Artu must ask:  how could Arthur’s court, blessed as it was with a brilliant and 
unprecedented quest, ever decline?  Is it due to the absence of the divine body (grail) on 
earth resulting in the end of a miraculous age, which had been marked by supernatural 
occurrences and the lengthy exegesis of hermits?  If the narrative logic of the Queste 
relies both explicitly and implicitly on Christian providence, the same cannot be said of 
the concluding work of the Vulgate Cycle.  La Mort le Roi Artu picks up the narrative 
right where the Queste left off, namely with the return of Bort to Arthur’s court and 
mention of the grail adventures. La Mort completes our study of the Queste by virtue of 
its markedly different form of narrative determinism, and consequently, its tone and 
doctrinal perspective. The Christian emphasis on chastity and spiritual chivalry are 
notable absences from the narrative.  In addition,  La Mort le Roi Artu has a more 
intricate plot than the Queste, and despite the proleptic annunciation of the fall of 
Arthur’s kingdom, the Apocalyptic battle between Arthur and his stepson on the plains of 
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Salisbury is shown to result from the concatenation of a series of random but 
interconnected assaults on the kingdom’s integrity.  With this more complex plot and 
comparative reticence on theological issues, it is clear that we are not working from the 
same aesthetic or ideology as the author of the Queste.177  Alfred Adler posits that “the 
difference between [the two works] is one between two modes of thought, figuralism on 
the one hand, and the early phase of Aristotelianism.”178 And while the lexicon of the 
Mort Artu is perhaps even less Scholastic in flavor than that of the Queste, the tragic 
fatalism of the former is shown by the greater role played by Fortune and the absence of 
theological grace.179  
David Hult has argued that the invocations of Fortune, by Bors, Gawain, Arthur 
and Sagremor occur at moments of powerlessness and impotence and refer to subjective 
states within the characters rather than to an external force. Hult thus denies all realism 
with regard to this personification and sees it as an allegory of distancing oneself from 
one’s own action; in other words, invocations of an external fortune are merely the 
projections of an internal hubris.  Jean Frappier, by contrast, had viewed Fortune as an 
alibi for a cruel and fickle God, or rather, as a complementary force to Providence.180  
Hult’s reading allows for greater psychological depth while depriving Fortune of any 
philosophical overtones (except perhaps in the form of an implicit negation of divine 
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providence), while Frappier retains the externality of fortune and views it as essential to 
the narrative’s logic.  These positions, however antithetical, can be partially reconciled if 
we see Fortune not as a mental figment, but rather as a narrative account of the world’s 
vicissitudes, such as flourishing and decline, birth and death, love and scorn. Fortune 
therefore seems to be invoked when the latter term in these processes gains ascendency, 
so it can be considered as the negative aspects of these natural processes and therefore a 
subsidiary of fate/determinism. It is by this association with the negative term that 
Fortune assumes its psychological overtones, as exemplified in Bors’s warning to Queen 
Guenevere concerning her adultery:  “Dame, fet soi Boorz, c’est nostre grant domage a 
tot nostre parenté, et por ce si me poise molt durement que li aferes vait einsi, car tels i 
perdront  en vostre amor qui ne l’avront pas deservi; ne Fortune n’assembla onques 
l’amor de vos .ii. en tel manière come je la voi assemblee fors por le nostre grant 
domage.” (356) [“My lady,” says Bors, “your hatred of Lancelot is a great harm to our 
entire family, and so it saddens me greatly that the matte ris going so poorly, for many 
will suffer undeservedly for your love. As far as I see it, Fortune only arranged the love 
of you two to bring great harm upon us.”]  Since death and decline are universal 
inevitabilities, they are depicted as manifestations of a capricious fortune.   
This is in striking contrast to a scene in the Queste, where Lancelot’s departure 
grieves the queen, who resolves to let her lover go, assuaged only by the thought of 
divine providence: “Vos n’i alissiez ja mes, fete le, par ma volenté.   Mes puis qu’il est 
einsi que aller vos en convient, alez en la garde de Celui qui se lessa traveillier en la 
sainte Croiz por delivrer l’umain lignage de la pardurable mort, qui vos conduie a sauveté 
en toz les leus ou vos iroiz.” (130) [If I had my way, you would never leave.  But since it 
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is such that you must leave, go with Him who willingly suffered on the Holy Cross to 
deliver humanity from eternal death.  May He guide and lead you to safety wherever you 
go.] Here, the queen invokes divine providence to console herself, whereas Bors invokes 
Fortune to express his powerlessness when faced with Camelot’s decline.  The Queste 
and La Mort depict the psychology of hope and despair, respectively, by invocations to 
Providence and Fortune as existent realities, and not, pace Hult, “un leurre” [illusion] 
(44).     
 The distinction between external and psychic realities is still, as in the Queste, 
mostly moot in the Mort Artu, a fact which casts some doubt on Hult’s explanation of 
Fortune through psychology.  This is because the mind is shown to represent faithfully 
both present and future events, and this is especially clear during Arthur’s premonitory 
dream before the final battle of Salisbury, in which he finds himself cast down from 
Fortune’s wheel after seeing that his dominion has extended too long:  
 
Ele li demandoit: “Artur, ou es tu? – Dame, je sui sor une roe, mes je ne sai qex ele est.  –
C’est, fet ele, la roe de Fortune. » Lors li demandoit ; « Artu, que voiz tu ? – Dame, il me 
semble que je voi tot le monde. – Voirs est, fet ele, n’il n’i a graument chose dont tu 
n’aiest esté sires jusque ci ; et de tote terre, la circuite que tu voiz, as-tu esté li plus 
poissanz rois qui onques encores i fust.  Mes tel sont li orgoil terrien qu’il n’i a nul si haut 
assis qu’il ne coviegne chooir de la poesté del monde. » Lors le trebuchoit a terre si 
malement que au chooir li estoit avis qu’il estoit toz debrisié et que il perdoit tot lo pooir 
del cors et des menbres. Einsi vit li rois Artus en .ii. manieres sa meschaance, qui li estoit 
a avenir. (MRA, 802) 
 
[She asked him, “Arthur, where are you?” 
“My lady, I’m on a wheel, but I don’t know which one.   
“This,” she said, “is the wheel of fortune.” Then she asked, “Arthur, what do you see?” 
“My lady, it appears that I see the whole world.” 
“That is the truth.  There is hardly anything of which you haven’t been lord up to now.  
And of all the earth, the whole sphere you see before you, you have been the most 
powerful king ever to live.  But earthly vanity is such that there is none so well placed as 
not to fall from worldly power.”  
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Then she hurled him down to earth so harshly that, during his fall, he believed that he 
was coming undone and he was losing control over his body and members.  Thus King 
Arthur saw in two ways his future misfortune.] 
 
Arthur confesses his sins and explains his dream to the archbishop of Salisbury 
(alternately referred to as arcevesque and preudons, to reinforce the glossing continuity 
with the Queste), who counsels him to return to Dover and await reinforcements before 
confronting Mordred.  Arthur thus renounces the wisdom of his own premonitory dream 
as well as its sacred exegesis, for if he had not done so, the final destruction would not 
have been so inevitable.  Karen Pratt analyzes the tragic mode with the Mort, mostly with 
reference to Boethius’s discussion of Fortune, and shrewdly dodges the question of 
whether Fortune is an extension of Divine Providence or a psychological figment, instead 
concentrating on whether tragedy, as mode, forms a part of the work’s general ethos.181 
Pratt shows how the Boethian conception of Fortune in books I and II of the Consolatio 
(a negative, literary presentation) differs greatly from that of the last three books, where 
Fortune becomes the handmaiden of Providence and an instructive tool.  Since the first 
conception of Fortune seems to dominate the Mort, it seems that its use here indicates a 
more literary than theological or philosophical endeavor, and serves to augment the 
impact of the work’s dénouement.182 Less dogmatic about the purely psychic existence of 
Fortune than Hult, Pratt opts for an equivocation concerning Fortune’s proper ontology 
(literary, philosophical, or psychic) in keeping with the work’s theological vagueness.   
Arthur’s tendency toward misreading was brought to light earlier in the tale, when 
his earlier confirmation of Lancelot’s adultery with the queen by the frescoes in 
Morgan’s prison is conveniently forgotten when he returns to Camelot.  These frescoes, 
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in contrast to the Queste’s aventures, are the bearers of senefiance.  This senefiance is 
supplemented both by written captions and Morgan’s own veridical account of Lancelot’s 
adultery, and yet, this discovery leads to naught as Lancelot’s absence from the court puts 
the king’s jealous mind to rest.  In this context, senefiance is used in a more humdrum 
sense than in the Queste, where the term was without fail used theologically:  
 
Li rois comença a regarder tot entor lui, si voit les ymages et les portretures que Lanceloz 
del Lac i avaoit portretes tant com il avoit leenz demoré en la prison ; et li rois Artus si 
savoit bien tant de letres que il pooit bien .i. escrit ententre. Et quant il ot veü les letres 
des ymages qui devisoient les senefiances des portretures, si les comença lors a lire, et 
tant que il conut tot apertement que cele chambre estoit pointe des ovres Lancelot del 
Lac… (MRA, 334) 
 
[The king began to look around and saw the images and portraits that Lancelot of the 
Lake had painted there when in captivity. King Arthur was literate enough to understand 
the written word.  And when he saw the captions which explained the significance of the 
images, he began to read them, and thus he knew openly that this room was painted with 
the feats of Lancelot of the Lake.] 
  
The largest gap between the ideology of the Queste and that of the Mort is shown 
in the absence of a utopian impulse in the latter work.  Both works are indeed marked by 
forms of determinism, or predestination. Yet the Queste differs markedly in terms of the 
narrative freedom accorded to its author, for the holy grail is a medieval French 
invention. With its recent introduction into contemporary literary history, the quest is 
subject only to the whims and imaginations of Chrétien’s more overtly Christian 
successors. The skeletal action of the Mort, by contrast, is given by apocryphal historical 
chronicles (Monmouth, Wace) and written from a post-decline perspective. The greatest 
silence of the text concerns the continuation of the Christian community after Arthur’s 
death, and Lancelot’s final frocking as a priest, or Guenevere’s refuge in a convent, are 
less signs of the persistence of Christendom (both are decisions of practicality rather than 
spiritual conversions) than they are of a desire for stasis after years of turmoil.  While 
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Christian providence had brought about a last age of miracles and an apotheosis in the 
Queste, a fatalistic determinism yields a full-fledged eschatology and its aftermath in the 
Mort.  Jean de Meun’s Romance of the Rose, composed some forty years after the Mort 
Artu, will opt for a determinism that is referred to as providence. Curiously, the Rose’s 
materialistic (and carnal) rendering of this theological concept betrays a greater 
philosophical affinity with the Mort, even though the utopian impulse and double senses 
align it more with the Queste.   With such striking differences in tone, one wonders how a 
single author for both Mort and Queste could have ever been posited.  For even if one 
accepts the notion of a single architect for the entirety of the Vulgate, this architect would 
ensure only continuity of plot, rather than theme, tone, or purpose.  It is the Queste, then, 
that is the most unusual of the works considered here from a philosophical perspective, 
for it uses logic and exegesis to confirm the notion of theological providence and to 
rationalize the determinism of its own narrative structure.  The bleaker Mort Artu, 
however, does not emphasize providential senefiance at all: its fatalism is rather exposed 
by a carefully constructed plot, aided by fortuitous happenstances that subsequently feel 
inevitable. Falling within the genre of ‘romance tragedy’, Karen Pratt rightly gets to the 
crux of the Mort’s determinism, which “reflects the equivocal attitude of so many secular 
writers in the Middle Ages  towards the problem of explaining history and the rise and 
fall of great civilizations.”183 Following Boethius’s Lady Philosophy, this mutable 
Arthurian world is subject to all the constraints of Fate, and the Mort offers no 
providential explanation to mitigate its gloomy fatalism.  Written from the perspective of 
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post-decline, the inexorable fall of Arthur’s kingdom does not require any additional 
divine Providence to topple it.    
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Chapter 3 - Epistemology and Theories of Reading the Rose 
 
This study aims to shed new light on the governing ideology of the Rose.  To this 
end,  I will be examining Jean’s section from the perspective of the history of ideas, to 
the extent that these are both culturally and temporally specific, and yet mingled with a 
poetic and literary syncretism that, along with the use of allegory, is tendentiously 
employed to normalize even the most radical aspects of the work’s ideology. The most 
complete study on Scholasticism in the Rose is still that of Gérard Paré, whose Les Idées 
et les Lettres au XIIIe Siècle from 1947 still merits a close examination for its exhaustive 
erudition.  His assertion that “l’inspiration foncière du roman de Jean de Meun remonte à 
l’aristotélisme universitaire du 13e siècle"184 has indeed served as a guiding principle for 
this study. Jean’s section of the Rose has traditionally been considered to be more 
literalistic than the work of his predecessor Guillaume de Lorris, and the sheer volume of 
didacticism in Jean’s continuation lends more than ample support for this thesis.  But I 
would argue that this view needs to be tempered, because while literalistic in one sense, 
the allegorical mode of expression, including the common traits of exempla, 
personification and prosopopeia, integumental allegory and prefiguration still dominate 
Jean’s section, so the supposed literalism is only with respect to his use of scathing satire 
and his extensive philosophical and historical digressions (e.g. Nero used as exemplum of 
“fortune” rather than “evil”). Despite the vast differences of perspectives glimpsed in the 
Rose’s allegorical personifications, they all share a common tendency: namely to pass 
quickly from pure logic to ethics, the result of which is almost always comedic and often 
quite ambiguous. In order to reach any coherent sense of the Rose as a whole, we must 
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resort to the method used by the Scholastics themselves, namely (an attenuated version 
of) the dialectic through which we will uncover the ethical implications of the allegory.    
Allegory in the Rose is primarily dependent on realist abstractions in order to 
become intelligible. This can be seen easily in the naïve courtly realism of Guillaume, 
which treats states of mind and ethical categories as if they were objective realities. Yet 
our ‘modern’ narrative impulses seem to demand nominalistic readings that are about 
individuals caught in a plight that is primarily particular, such as when the Aeneid is read 
as the plight of an individual Aeneas. It is only by allegorical extension (from species to 
genus) that this same work can be read as a narrative capable of yielding universal 
Christian truths, with each plight of Aeneas reflecting a vicissitude in the human soul:  
“integumentum vero est genus demonstrationis sub fabulosa narratione veritatis claudens 
intellectum, unde et involucrum dicitur.” (An integument is a form of demonstration that 
wraps the understanding of the truth in a fabled narrative – that is why it is also called a 
wrapping.)185   
To treat the Rose as a particular lover’s narrative, on the other hand, is to 
subscribe tacitly to a nominalistic theory of narrative, as opposed to the paradigmatic or 
realistic conception.  This seems to be one of the greatest ideological tensions in 
contemporary criticism of the Rose.   I would argue that philosophical nominalism is only 
referenced in the most oblique manner, even in the figure of Faux Semblant, and that all 
other incidences of nominalism seem to belong to the more generalized poetic 
nominalism (often in the form of Euhemerism, as we shall see) which refuses to admit 
any objective reality to these abstract personifications, as words are considered in terms 
                                                 
185
 Quoted and translated by Reynolds, 141. from The Commentary on the First Six Books of the Aeneid 
Commonly Attributed to Bernardus Silvestris, eds. J.W. Jones and E.F. Jones, Lincoln, Nebraska and 
London, 1977, p. 3.  
133 
 
of their materiality.  In the final Nature/Genius section, what we have is an extreme form 
of realism whose basis is not Plato, but rather Aristotle, but with the NeoPlatonic spin 
bequeathed to him by the Islamic Peripatetics. By the mid-thirteenth century, nominalist 
arguments were becoming relegated exclusively to the domains of grammar and rhetoric 
rather than logic proper, their philosophical import having depreciated significantly by 
the middle of the thirteenth century. 186  In addition, Aristotle associated troping and 
allegory with poetics rather than logic, for he aspires to avoid these figure in his 
Organon.  It is a testament to the complexity of these later incarnations of Realism and 
Jean de Meun’s literary eclecticism that his philosophical vision is developed in such 
supple verse.  The rhetoric of his continuation, such as the repeated use of purely verbal 
troping, - punning, allegories teetering on literality, innuendo - reflects Jean’s virtuosity 
on the verbal, as well as conceptual level.  I would say that it is in this poetic, non-logical 
domain that Jean grants support to the nominalist detachment of a name from any 
Cratylic ‘essence’. 
While aiming to elucidate not only the meaning(s) of a text but its foundational 
ideology, I do not wish to posit that my own relation to the text is not itself ideological.  
The term dialectic denotes ultimate resolution and may to some degree, imply synthesis, 
perhaps even that dreaded teleology of ultimate meaning so favored by the Robertsonians 
or even the naturalistic adherents, who have both managed to provide coherent readings 
of the poem as a whole, yet whose conclusions are not mutually reconcilable. The other 
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extreme has opted to view the work as a polymorphous mass of intellectual 
heterogeneity, the work of a virtuoso aping different voices of his contemporary society, 
without any single voice gaining ascendancy. The principal deficiency of the latter 
position is that it does not take the dialectic into account and thus rejects any meaningful 
synthesis extracted from the din of polyphony. While the abuses of Scholasticism would 
be noted in later centuries, perhaps due to the early lack of  autonomy of philosophy from 
theology,  the dialectical methodology of Scholasticism was intended to vouchsafe the 
veracity of the argument;  the realists and nominalists were debating, so to speak, on 
whether to ground truth, ultimately, in subsistent universal species or in particulars. That 
being said, the truth-seeking methods of the Scholastics need not be shared by the poets, 
and courtly love dits and romans were not molded so exclusively on this dialectical 
practice. By recourse to allegorical signification, Jean shows his allegiance to a teleology, 
but this telos will take the form of an intellection (intellectio), to use the Scholastic term, 
rather than an explicit and systematic glossing.  In this attempt at a critical synthesis, I 
posit that the Rose establishes both implicit and explicit links between the question of 
universal genera and species, on the one hand, and that of the allegorical mode on the 
other.  In fact, in the new naturalistic and rationalistic context of Jean’s continuation, this 
appeal to universality will serve as the foundational tenet for why allegory is a viable 
mode for the transmission of truth.   And it is ultimately through the universals debate 
that the prominent Aristotelian (condemned) tenets emerge concerning divine providence, 
and I will demonstrate that this debate is used, both tendentiously and allegorically, to 
further Jean’s defense of such heresies.   
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Jean de Meun’s allegory is never quite as lucid and well-sustained as that of his 
predecessor, Guillaume de Lorris, and this is due in part to the greater preponderance of 
non-narrative allegory in Jean’s continuation. Paul Zumthor has identified three 
operational allegorical modes in the conjoined Rose:  the narrative, the didactic and the 
deictic, the first being the preponderant mode of Guillaume’s section, while the latter two 
dominate Jean’s section. Of these three modes, it is the didactic element of Jean de 
Meun’s poetry that I will focus on primarily, given that this is probably the source of 
greatest alienation with regards to modern readership of the Rose.  Contrasted with 
Guillaume de Lorris, one finds in Jean de Meun an immediate difference in the nature of 
his personifications. The poetic device of amplificatio is also used to great effect in 
Jean’s continuation, but to such an extent that this becomes also a dominant narrative 
motif of Jean de Meun’s narrative continuation. One of the major sources of this narrative 
amplification is the use of Aristotelianism, this particular sect serving as the bedrock of 
Jean de Meun’s logic and explaining the abundance of Scholastic neologisms in his 
vernacular from the very outset of his continuation (e.g. the use of ‘silogime’ and 
‘conclure’, respectively [4084,4086]).187  The flavor of the Paris university teachings 
abounds in Jean’s section of the Rose. The new climate surrounding the work’s 
composition is beginning to assume a greater theoretical and methodological rigor.  The 
new exegesis of Aristotle was making the previously rigid adherence to the trivium 
unfeasible.  As Gordon Leff notes, “rhetoric virtually disappeared, and with it grammar, 
as a guide to literary expression.  The study of grammar was now governed by its logical 
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aspects; literary usage was now subordinated, as incidental, to the discovery of the 
universal laws regulating human thought.”188 
 As the methodology of exegesis was changing rapidly due to the hasty 
incorporation of Aristotle in the curriculum, many orthodox clergy found this new fount 
of logical inspiration worrisome, especially the growing tendency for Aristotle’s logic to 
supplant the teachings of Scripture, or even the more attenuated suggestion that Scripture 
expounds the truths of Aristotle allegorically. This led to the climate of censorship, 
reaching its apex in the major condemnations of 1270 and 1277.  Like Al-Gazali, who 
had railed against the falsafa for their deistic and unorthodox tenets in the Arab world, 
the authors of the Latin condemnations, both far-reaching and prohibitive, lacked Saint 
Thomas’s conviction that faith and reason could be synthesized.  The example of 
Averroes here is key: unlike Avicenna, who provided a rationalistic explanation for much 
of the supernatural, including prophecy and miracles, Averroes did not accept Alfarabi’s 
subordination of religion to philosophy.  Refusing to grant the inverse, however, he 
advocated a greater autonomy among the various disciplines.  In a maneuver familiar to 
the Latin Averroists, Averroes was thereby able to proceed with his literal exegesis of 
Aristotle, all the while allowing for fideism concerning Revelation.189 The change in the 
curriculum at Paris, in 1255, which allowed for a much fuller Aristotelian corpus, meant 
that the original Organon, the primer, as it were, for dialectics, was now met with the 
equally daunting non-logical corpus (including ethics, poetics, and metaphysics), and not 
without a greater challenge to the prevailing theology.  As Leff has noted, Aristotle’s 
                                                 
188
 Leff, 169.  
189
 William of Ockham, the great 14th-century nominalist, would also appeal to a kind of omnific fideism 
based on the creed (Credo in unum Deum, Patrem omnipotentem) in order to support his notion that divine 
ideas limited God’s ultimate freedom and power.  See Gilson,  La Philosophie au Moyen Age, 653.  
137 
 
dialectical treatises were not such a danger in themselves, for dialectic presented no direct 
attack on theology, given that “dialectic depended upon explaining what was already 
there.”190 The same cannot be said of the Stagirite’s philosophy of nature and man. The 
presentation of the Arts syllabus meant that Aristotle’s work was considered a guide to 
knowledge on the same level as that of Scripture, in terms of its exposition of literal 
truths.  The increasing autonomy of the disciplines at this moment of ferment is what we 
will loosely call Latin Averroism, a topic to which we will return further on, for I see this 
as instrumental in Jean’s presentation of natural philosophy. The censorious climate with 
regard to heresy underscores to a further extent the audacity of Jean de Meun’s vulgar 
courtliness and theological speculations.191   
Jean de Meun has been considered a poor allegorist by at least one critic;192 but in 
the context of his other authorial talents (“satirist”, “philosopher”, “poet of nature”, etc.) 
and the explicit subject matter of the poem handed down from Guillaume de Lorris, these 
other modes are often elegantly interwoven into the fabric of the dream vision. Jean de 
Meun only emerges as somewhat digressive when held against the refined courtly 
standard of his predecessor.  In his Magister Amoris, Alastair Minnis contends that the 
employment of the satirical mode (necessarily literal), as well as the fact that the 
interpolation of Scholasticism into the Rose, with its technical precision, together 
necessitate the additional literalism of Jean de Meun’s section.. Minnis exposes the 
central stylistic dichotomy between integumental allegory and outspoken satire.  In terms 
of tone, judging by the Reason and Faux Semblant sections respectively, they could not 
be more different. Yet allegory and satire are likewise modes that presuppose truth, with 
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allegory containing satire as genus to species. Minnis is therefore judging allegory and 
satire as conventional styles rather than ontological modes, stating that “Jean was a plain-
style poet whose main (though by no means only) modes of procedure are narration and 
exemplification rather than enigmatic fable and allegory (‘personification allegory’ or 
prosopopeia being, of course, a different thing altogether, and fundamental to the poem). 
The language of the Rose is frequently outspoken, explicit, literal.” 193   Minnis’s 
conclusions are philologically based, by comparison with Jean de Meun’s translation of 
Boethius’s allegorical dream vision, a topic Minnis has addressed previously.194  But 
Minnis’s above parenthetical remark on the autonomy of personification and allegory 
seems a quibble, if only from an abstractive or cognitive perspective, as we can see in the 
further example that Minnis, following John Burrows, provides:  
Good working definitions of allegory (not prosopopoeia) and exemplification are offered 
in John Burrow’s cogent remarks: ‘These two modes often overlap in practice, but in 
theory there is a fundamental distinction between them. Exemplification treats facts or 
events (real or imagined) as examples which demonstrate some general truth; whereas 
allegory treats facts or events as metaphors which represent some truth or some other 
event.  Allegory requires the reader to translate; exemplification requires him to 
generalize’.”195  
 
By his insistence on the autonomy of exemplification and allegory, we are left with the sense that 
“translation” and “generalization” are themselves mutually exclusive as well.  As we saw in the 
first chapter, to generalize is to translate the action of a particular into something universal.  
While exemplification bears more in common with synecdoche than with metaphor, it cannot, at 
this time of the universals debate, be so readily assimilated into literal language.  Minnis does 
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demonstrate admirably, however, the increased tendency toward literalism in Jean de Meun’s 
section.  He cites the rising development of the modus exemplorum suppositivus – or the 
moralizing allegoresis -, along with history and tragedy, as revelatory of an increasing 
importance of the literal sense, but this is linked also to a decline in the spiritual sense of 
the Bible, based on a reduced number of glosses on the spiritual sense at this time.  While 
I believe the work does contain a more abstract, “spiritual” sense, the absence of a 
systematic gloss that would expound this sense is perhaps a matter of contemporary 
fashion.    
Because Jean de Meun has at his disposal a wide range of scholarship, it seems 
that he is familiar with all the most common modes of contemporaneous allegoresis.  The 
first which we will examine is the one that seems to be a literary version of nominalism 
known as Euhemerism. While it would be erroneous to say that the Euhemerists, who 
date from the fourth century BC, share the later nominalists’ philosophical tenets, both 
groups ground knowledge of abstract concepts (divinity in case of Euhemerists) in 
concrete particulars.  In his analysis of pagan myths, the Christian apologist of the third 
and fourth centuries Lactantius surmised in his Divinarum Institutionum that the pagan 
gods must have descended from particular people. 196   Euhemerism is a form of 
rationalism in that it provides concrete understandings of abstract texts, and it hampers 
any attempt to universalize divinities in the form of an abstract ‘essence’. But while 
rationalistic in accounting for concrete origins to myth, Euhemerism maintained an 
anthropomorphism as regards abstract properties by accounting for the deification of 
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human heroes. Almost all examples of Euhemerism in the Rose serve a comedic purpose, 
probably because it was not considered a philosophically adequate position at the time of 
Jean de Meun’s continuation (see p.3, n). One example of Euhemerism occurs when 
Reason presents herself as part of the courtly economy that she has just been warning 
against:  
 
 Et se tu les vues refuser,  
 N’est riens qui te puisse escuser 
 Que trop ne faces a blamer : 
 C’est que [tu] me vuelles amer,  
 Et que le dieu d’Amors despises 
 Et que Fortune riens ne prises.   
 Et se tu trop foibles te fais  
 A soutenir cest treble fais,  
 Je le sui preste d’alegier 
 Por porter le plus de legier.  
 Pren la premiere solement,  
 Et si te maintien sagement.  [6869-80]197 
 
[And if you wish to refuse [my requests] there will be nothing to excuse you, and you 
will be  subject to censure:  I ask that you love me, that you disdain the god of Love, and 
that you pay no  heed to Fortune.  And should you find yourself too weak to sustain this 
triple request, I am now ready to reduce the request in order to lighten your burden as far 
as possible: follow the first alone and maintain good conduct].   
 
Here the boundaries between courtly love and man’s love of his own faculty are being 
blurred as the allegory’s literal sense becomes antithetical to its allegorical sense: Reason, 
who had previously dealt censoriously with the lover’s courtly love quest, here plays the 
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role of a jealous lover and momentarily participates in the courtly love economy.  The 
text sanctions both readings simultaneously, but in both cases absurdities, resulting either 
from a parodic courtship from a female voice or the fetishism of a human faculty 
(reason), can be smoothed over by the equivocal nature of our terms, for only several 
lines after asking for his love, she says that whoever agrees with Reason “jamés par 
amors n’amera” [6885], thereby separating the concept of the verb ‘amer’(to love) from 
‘Amors’ (god of love, courtly love) .  To read Reason purely Euhemeristically would be 
the complete refusal of abstraction (Reason would be flesh and blood alone), her 
exhortations to stoic disdain for fortune would become no more than a self-contradictory 
plea for courtly love from a woman in heat. While Jean de Meun savors the humor of a 
male-female allegorical confrontation, the philosophical import is momentarily sacrificed 
for the sake of comedy.198 When talking about herself, she embodies the sexual economy 
she wanted the lover to eschew, thereby contradicting her almost innumerable caveats 
about the fickleness of Fortune. When she is read allegorically, however, her exhortations 
to the lover are nothing more than an appeal to his higher faculties.  This would be 
similar to those readings of the Song of Songs which completely de-eroticize the subject 
matter. Jean seems to be encouraging both allegorical and literal readings at the same 
time, resulting in either lofty abstraction or literal ribaldry. Lactantius conceded nothing 
to allegory: the narratives are lovely tales whose truth can be expounded by recourse to 
Euhemerism, which Minnis calls “a strategy of humanization.” 199  Nancy Regalado 
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suggests that Euhemerism and moral reinterpretation are the main routes by which the 
exegete tackled these texts from Antiquity.200  
Augustine opts for the latter in his De Doctrina Christiana, his manual for the 
decoding of figuration in the Bible, according to which classical texts served merely as 
rhetorical teaching tools. Allegory becomes the imperative if the literal reading of the 
Bible is seen to exhort carnality.  In the debate over the Romance of the Rose in the 
fourteenth century, neither defenders nor censors of the Rose invoked integumental 
analysis; rather, they drew their arguments from the authority of the dramatis personae of 
the Rose. As for whether Jean is responsible for such views, Christine de Pizan and Jean 
Gerson would say that the writer is responsible for all views expressed in the work.201 
Integumental analysis yielding to moral interpretation, therefore, seems to be something 
which, though fruitful, is more of a recent luxury accorded to the work. The most 
optimistic and devout of pan-allegorical readers (such as Robertson, Dahlberg, and 
Fleming) could conceivably read the entire work as a theological quest, and one whose 
more illicit elements can be glossed by recourse to an almost mystical equivalence 
between various forms of knowledge, especially divine and carnal, as has been a common 
tendency in the Christian mystics.  
  Jean’s Rose, as a monument of learning, is framed around one of the time 
treasured paradoxes of Christian teaching, namely how to ensure the propagation of 
species within the context of a highly regulated sexual ethics. His recourse to parody, 
satire as well as willed logical aporia, never actually manage to neutralize the force of his 
exposition of this obvious conundrum, which he later solves with a facilely vulgar 
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Aristotelianism in the dénouement. Guillaume’s Amor had supplied his “ten 
commandments” [2000-24] for the lover, thus replacing his Christian law with a new set 
of tenets, suitable for those who are ready for induction into his amorous, courtly sect.  
These commandments cannot quickly be dismissed as a demonstration of rhetorical 
virtuosity; rather these tenets, voiced in memorable rhyming couplets, are a courtly 
ethics, and perhaps the major aspect of Guillaume’s romance that require a revision in the 
ostensible form of continuation.  By expanding the scope of inquiry, Jean de Meun 
universalizes and refines Guillaume’s courtly ethics by adopting a providential 
framework for the poem’s interpretation.  
 In order to understand how the romance is to be read from a Scholastic and 
theological perspective, this chapter focuses on the characters Reason and Faux 
Semblant,  who offer complementary views on proper reading, both allegorical and 
literal. Furnished with their epistemological reflections on language, the reader is 
sufficiently ‘primed’ for the most contemporary ontology (and heresy) of Nature and 
Genius.   
 
Reason’s “proper” speech 
 
For the Robertsonians, Reason has been seen as the closest thing to, if not the, 
authorial voice, given that she is the only one who urges the lover to forsake his courtly 
quest.   The depiction of the soul’s descent into sin is given a moral tone by the merciless 
satire accorded to the lover’s words and deeds.  This argument is mostly cogent, for it 
emphasizes the internal consistency of Reason’s speech, albeit a consistency based on the 
sweeping implications of the Christian fall.  This reading, however, reduces the Fall to a 
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narrative for the explanation of concupiscence alone, while the ostensible reason for her 
mythographic interpolation was to describe the loss of primal justice. Her mythographic 
explanation of the Fall is the first indication that providential narratives will be examined 
primarily from pre-Christian Greek sources.     
 Reason had first appeared in Guillaume de Lorris’s section, offering a broadly 
Stoic alternative to Amor’s courtly sect. Guillaume’s Amors was a preaching a doctrine 
antithetical to the tenets of Stoicism, according to which emotions were cognitions that 
could be true or false, and whose only method of verification was reason. She reappears 
near the opening of Jean de Meun’s section, with a vast amplification of her previous 
concerns and erudition. Given her fetishism of the intellect, she naturally exhorts the 
lover to forsake the god of love and his rose quest since these allegiances subject the 
lover to fickle Fortune, for which she provides the notorious exempla of Manfred, 
Croesus and Nero.  Many of the elements of Stoicism are elaborated in Boethius’s 
Consolation of Philosophy, a work that Jean had translated, thus explaining the amusing 
commentary by Reason that it would be so nice to have this work available in the 
vernacular [5035-40]!  It is therefore fitting that they should get stuck not on a distinction 
(proper/gloss) that belongs to the tradition of Stoic grammar.  These terms of contention, 
proprietas and translatio, which had been used in authors like Cicero, Isidore of Seville 
and Diomedes, are exploited for maximum humor as Reason and the lover make of them 
their central equivocation. 202  The moral thrust of Reason’s argument fits in nicely with 
the ethics of Stoicism, so it seems to be a remarkable act of continuity to maintain their 
grammar, however infused with the wisdom of other sects it may be. 
                                                 
202
 Ineichen, Gustav, “Le discourse linguistique de Jean de Meun”, 250.  Ineichen also offers a critique of 
Poirion’s nominalist thesis, but on Augustinian grounds, (249), thereby explaining Fleming’s fondness for 
this interpretation.   
145 
 
  Reason begins a discussion of the perils of fortune, which some people love in 
itself, but which brings none of the lasting comfort associated with the love of Reason. 
When pressed for a demonstration of the superiority of love over justice, she begins her 
account by glossing the myth of Jupiter and Saturn, 203  during which she voices an 
uncourtly word [5537], earning her the reprehension of the lover [5701-5].  In this 
section, the lover plays the role of a courtly censor, imposing the ethics of his sect on his 
interlocutor, and not without some broad comedy, as an obscene pun on fellatio escapes 
“the mouth” of the censorious yet illogical lover [6928-31].204 Reason is thereby forced to 
defend her position by recourse to manifold Scholastic, ancient, Biblical and 
mythographic wisdom. She believes that the lover has accused her not of a barbarism, but 
rather a solecism, resulting in the mutual misunderstanding, or equivocation, of the 
meaning of ‘propre’, which Reason supplements with the theory of social habituation. 
The lover ultimately concedes her “proper” use of the words [7199-204] even though he 
cannot join her sect. The lover, in heat, forsakes Reason (reason) in favor of Cupid (lust), 
after a refusal to engage with Reason in her recommended sublimation of desire just as he 
unequivocally rejects her recommended program of allegorical reading [7160-4].205     
As the vernacular translator of Abelard’s Historia Calamitatum, Jean de Meun 
was no doubt aware of nominalist thinking and uses it to poetic effect, though mostly in 
the form of Euhemerism, although Poirion would disagree, finding in Reason an avatar of 
Abelardian signification. « Ce n’est pas forcer le texte, en tout cas, que de dire que Jean 
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de Meun n’est plus un « réaliste » au sens où l’entend la scolastique médiévale. Et l’on 
est alors tenté de le confronter à ce courant nominaliste qui se caractérise par l’opposition 
entre res et vox, la chose signifiée et le mot qui la signifie."(173)206 In the context of 
Reason’s “proper speech” however, I find this argument unconvincing because I can find 
nothing in her speech which would assert that words properly designate individuals.  
Furthermore, the analogy of vox and res to signifier and signified seems at best 
anachronistic, and at worst, a gross misrepresentation of the terms of the 12th-century 
universals debate: in other words, to make it simply a question of semiology suggests a 
tacit acceptance of nominalist theses.  And Poirion himself readily acknowledges the 
applicability of this scheme only to Raison’s speech: “C’est plutôt dans le discours de 
Nature qu’on retrouvera les éléments d’une théorie de l’intellect, en même temps qu’une 
théorie des espèces dont on semble considérer l’existence comme transcendant celle des 
individus."207  In purely literary terms, Poirion’s first quoted assertion is not without 
merit, for he justly seizes on Reason’s refusal to engage in equivocal speech, because she 
predicates «propre » only of words in their grammatical and logical sense.  The lover 
focuses on propriety in courtly terms, thus staging an extended narrative equivocation 
between linguistics and ethics that will continue to haunt the rest of the work.    
Reason’s target, however, is no longer the outmoded realism of Anselm or 
Guillaume de Champeaux, nor is she arguing against Guillaume’s courtly (and perhaps 
naïve) realism, but rather against the courtly ethics of censorship. In such a loaded debate 
mixing courtly ethics, philosophical questions of language, and obscenity, both literally 
and figuratively, Reason is able to expound a coherent theory of language that accounts 
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for both its utilitarian and spiritual aspects.  Poirion sees the castration metaphor as 
applicable to medieval realism itself, with the dismemberment of the Titan analogously 
suggesting a break between sign and referent.  As we saw in earlier, however, 
nominalism was a well-known position at this time in thirteenth century, though it 
seemed to have lost its philosophical credentials (p.131n).  In fact, Reason’s conceptual 
realism concerning the reproductive organs and their generative power will serve as the 
foundation for the more heretical logic concerning the species in the next chapter. Reason 
also accepts universal grammar, which posits a universal structure for all language, i.e., 
same in vernacular as in Latin.208  Bracketing off ontology from Reason’s disputatio, 
Poirion thereby limits the scope and importance of Reason’s speech to an outmoded 
philosophical debate. I contend, however, that her argument is always as ontological as it 
is epistemological, and she therefore accords with Nature and Genius far more than 
Poirion suggests.   
 Wetherbee helpfully acknowledges the most apparent contradiction in her 
speech: she espouses a natural love and even reproduction, but this is contradictory to her 
elaboration of “fallen” sexual relations, which seems to be sweeping and universal in its 
condemnation of amorous psychology. I would say that the lover’s inadequacy as a 
logician need not lead us to believe that Reason was equipped to deal with the already 
fallen lover.  Reason is confident of her victory well before the debate is over, when the 
lover believes he has pushed Reason into an aporia, preaching ‘hate’ in opposition to 
‘love’.  Reason invokes not allegory,  but satire, as the model (Horace) [5735], explaining 
that turning away from one vice should not entail its contrary vice [5737-51] a maneuver 
that still fails to convince the lover [5752].  Reason responds thus: “Tu n’as pas bien por 
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moi mater/ Cerchiés les livres anciens;/ Tu n’es pas bons logiciens." [5754-6] "You 
haven’t consulted the books of the masters of Antiquity that you would need to best me. 
You’re not a good logician.” The humor is, of course, that the lover was not actually 
engaging her in a disputatio, but merely rejecting her ‘advances’ because she has a foul 
mouth. 
Poirion qualifies the flavor of Reason’s speech as decidedly nominalist209, but 
Kathryn Lynch convincingly argues that this is unlikely, and she proposes that Reason is 
the abstracting principle!210  This seems a more apt formulation, especially when we 
consider her theory of language and integumental allegoresis, both relying on abstraction, 
and it also serves as a fitting Aristotelian antidote to the excessive (and moralistic) 
Augustinianism bequeathed to her by John Fleming in his Reason and the Lover.  Reason 
does in fact show that obscenity (an ethical category) is not an intrinsic property of the 
sign, but rather opts for a gloss that is both satirically vulgar and yet rooted in the realistic 
empiricism of Aristotle. Therefore, while Poirion and Dragonetti read this as an allegory 
of the literal sign, I would argue that it does not address that issue, even indirectly; rather, 
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it serves as a radical separation of ethics from semantics. While this separation 
necessarily entails other interpretive difficulties in Reason (i.e. her capacity, as universal 
faculty, to deal with the individual), these do not really contaminate her sign theory as 
such. In addition, she is borrowing from so many different traditions, those of Genesis, 
the Aristotelian, Augustinian. As John Fyler has argued, the tension between linguistic 
Cratylism and conventionalism need not necessarily be seen as dichotomous in the 
Middle Ages, for both beliefs seemed to exist simultaneously, though in different fields 
of discourse. 211  As we will see, Reason invokes Augustinianism for God’s primary 
imposition, and signification by ‘reasonable’ convention for man.   
It is in this perilous juggling act of different philosophical traditions that Reason’s 
account of (post-lapsarian) language seems most problematic. The rhyme pair that caused 
the initial offense (coilles and andoilles) was initially found in the satirical Roman de 
Renart (early branches c. 1170-80), used by Hersent in reference to the castration of her 
husband, Isengrin.212 But the Renart uses the word ‘coilles’ and its various paronyms as a 
recurring motif, though always in reference to the unwilling eunuch.  This implicit 
citation suggests satire to the versed audience, but Reason’s tour de force, so to speak, is 
to found a theory of language that is rooted in (generative) things. While John Fleming 
has somewhat tendentiously pointed out the Augustinian debt for Reason’s sign theory, 
and Wetherbee has seen her as reflecting on similar issues to Natura in Alain’s De 
Planctu, Gerard Paré has noted the Aristotelian flavor of her speech, relying on the 
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utilitarian nature of the sexual organ and its generative capacity as a justification for its 
inherent goodness. 213  I think the more explicit debt to Boethius (Philosophia) goes 
without saying, and perhaps the reason why critics have found equal support for both 
Platonic and Aristotelian foundations for Reason’s theory of language, given that 
Boethius was fully immersed in both of these ancient traditions.214   
Within Lady Reason’s ontology, every existent thing is good, and from this it 
follows that every literal designation of an existent entity must therefore also be viewed 
in a positive light: 
 Biaus amis, je puis bien nommer,  
 Sanz moi faire mal renomer 
 Proprement, par le propre non  
 Chose qui n’est se bonne non.   (6945-48, Poirion) 
  
[Handsome friend, I can indeed name properly/literally, with the proper name, any 
existent thing,  which is nothing but good, without falling into disrepute.]  
 
Here we see the glimpse of an Aristotelian notion of existence being equated with 
actuality, and consequently, a good, although here it is framed using the figure of litotes 
(chose qui n’est = something which is not/does not exist, se bonne non = if it is 
not/except good).  This logic has its roots in the Consolation of Philosophy, where in the 
discussion of Fortune, where actual existence is seen as superior to potential or non-
existence. And yet the expression “bad fortune” exists, and so the narrator asks Lady 
Philosophy to state her claim in a manner more in keeping with everyday usage.  She 
then proves that fortune all is good based on its instructive and morally edifying utility.215  
Reason follows her literary predecessor by glossing her terms with the language of the 
academy.  
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The first argument in her disputatio concerns the concept of imposition.  Raison 
claims to be the impositor of names, just as God is the creator of things:  
 
 Mes il vot que non lor trovasse 
 A mon plesir, et les nomasse  
 Proprement et communement  
 Pour croistre notre entendement ; (7091-94, Poirion).   
 
[But He wanted me to find names for them as I saw fit, and that I name them properly 
and commonly in order to increase our understanding.] 
 
 
Boethius seems to concur with imposition by reason: “Reason, too, when it looks at some 
universal, without using imagination or the senses, comprehends the imaginable and 
sensible objects of both.  Reason it is that so defines the universal concept.”216 This 
Aristotelian solution to the problem of language, signaled by the use of « a mon plesir », 
which is Aristotle’s characterization of the name being fixed conventionally (ad 
placitum).217  This Latin terminology for conventional signification is, to my knowledge, 
less connotative in Latin than the hedonistic undertones which lurk in Reason’s 
vernacular translatio; however, pleasure, in any sensual sense of the word cannot 
properly be predicated of immaterial reason. The fact that Reason, as prosopopeia, is 
shown to have a “will” of her own, almost verging on courtly, is broad Scholastic 
comedy. Reason is paradoxically fighting courtliness with a courtly, yet moralized, 
seduction.  
This conception follows, and indeed supplements, the Augustinian conception of 
God’s initial imposition (necessarily distinct from human imposition) found in 
Augustine’s De Genesi ad Litteram (7086-89), as we saw in the introduction: 
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 Tu, qui me requires de gloser,  
 Vues opposer? ançois opposes 
 Que, tout ait Diex faites les choses,  
 Au mains ne fist il pas le non,  
 Je te respon: espoir que non,  
 Au mains celi qu’eles ont ores,  
 Si les pot bien nommer lores 
 Quant il premierement cria 
 Tout le monde et quanqu’il y a [7082-90] 
 
[You wish to object to my arguments while requiring me to gloss? Before, you objected 
that, even if God did make things, at least he didn’t make the name.  I respond: perhaps 
not, at least the names  that things formerly had, and He was able to name them 
accordingly, when He first created the world and everything in it.] 
 
And while this is most certainly the first concession to Augustinianism, it is framed in 
contemporary Scholastic logic. The divine word is not the same as the human word, but 
rather analogous to it. Even Genesis (2 :19) supplements the divine word with a more 
rationalistic (humanistic) explanation for human language, as exemplified in Adam’s 
nomination of things. Unlike Adam, however, Reason is not a particular, and instead of 
declaring imposition to be the work of any individual, it follows that words were 
instituted by man’s universal reason. This is quite different from Abelard’s less idealized 
version of human imposition as summarized by John Marenbon: "Abelard holds that the 
reference words are given by their imposition is direct. When the impositor imposes the 
word 'dog' on the animal standing in front of him, he thereby makes it refer to every 
animal which does in fact belong to the same natural kind, even though he himself may 
have no clear idea of what are the defining features of it."218 By situating the word within 
a universal faculty, itself the source of our universal concepts, I find much less 
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contingency in the word than is apparent in Abelard’s account.219 Rather, it comes closer 
to Boethius’s more realistic elaboration of imposition as found in his second commentary 
on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione: “the human race, which flourishes by virtue of both 
reason and speech, imposed names.”220  
If Reason, then, is read as a particular damsel, however, as opposed to a universal 
faculty, then she becomes, like Adam, yet another possible particular ‘impositor’ in the 
long line of myths concerning nomination. Abelard did not wish to deny that the things of 
this world bore common natures, but merely that the name, in itself, did not reveal 
anything about such a nature.  In other words, he does not require the ‘first impositor’ to 
fully understand the nature of thing named. 221  ‘Raison la sage’ [6987] is surely the 
faculty that does know things not indeterminately, but determinately, based on their 
nature and common form. Reason presents language as a tool, whose value is ultimately 
positive: words have to be good because they designate things which are good, and the 
act of understanding, which brings potential knowledge into actuality, is effected by the 
                                                 
219
 Abelard drew his theory of the first impositor from Priscian - versed in both Greek and Latin and with 
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fundamental to his conception of the status, which corresponded neither to divine ideas nor to any essence.  
For further discussion of Stoic linguistics in Abelard,  see Bardzell, Jeffrey.  Speculative Grammar and 
Stoic Language Theory in Medieval Allegorical Narrative, esp. 70-79. Serge Lusignan has shown that, in 
Priscian’s Institutiones, the author cannot but point out that the article, a necessary part of speech in Greek, 
according to Stoic grammar, does not exist in Latin:  Parler Vulgairement, 25. Lusignan notes that 
Prician’s many commentators, most of whom were ignorant of Greek, conceived this phenomenon by 
turning to a language that accommodated the use of the article, namely in their respective vernaculars.     
220
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inherent goodness of language. To this end, Reason resorts to a theological, yet corporal, 
metaphor (reliques) for coilles.222    
 
 Se je nomme les nobles choses  
 Par plain texte, sanz metre gloses,  
 Que mes peres en paradis 
 Fist de ses propres mains jadis,  
 Et touz les autres instrumens  
 Qui sont pilers et argumens 
 A soutenir nature humainne,  
 Qui fust sans eus et casse et vainne.   
 Car volentiers, non pas envis,  
 Mist Diex  en coilles et en vis  
 Force et generacion 
 Par merveillouse entencion,  
 Por l’espece avoir toute vive  
 Par renouvelance nayve 
 [C’est par nessance rechaable 
 Et par chaance renessable, 
 Par quoi Diex les fait tant durer 
 Que la mort ne puet endurer.. 
 Aussi fist il as bestes mues  
 Qui par ce resont soutenues, 
 Car quant les unes bestes meurent,  
 Les formes es autres demeurent. [6957-78] 
 
[If I name the noble things with plain text, without glossing, it is because my Father in 
Heaven made them with His own hands long ago, along with all the other instruments, 
which are the  pillars and arguments to sustain the human nature, which is vain and 
futile without them.Willingly, and not begrudgingly, did God place power and 
generation223 in balls and shafts, by his  marvelous intention to keep the species alive 
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quant mis les nons as choses/ Que, si reprendre et blames oses,/ Coilles reliques appelasse,/ Et reliques 
coilles nomasse,/ Tu, qui si m’en mort et depiques,/ Me redeisses de reliques/ Que ce fust lais mos et 
vilains.. [7108-16, Poirion].  The use of the subjunctive here indicates a purely hypothetical circumstance, 
similar to Nature’s musings on the hypothetical linguistic capacities of animals. I think that the distinction 
between ‘conventional’ and ‘arbitrary’, respectively’ is clearly marked in the Rose, by the use of indicative 
versus subjunctive. The arbitrariness reason invokes here is more for the sake of comedy, and an extension 
of the discussion of connotation, than a philosophical statement about language.  The only space for such 
‘arbitrariness’ is in poetics, and by this I mean that an author can use metaphor, or “imposit” a figurative 
word on another, and this selection would be arbitrary with regard to a the choice, but I would add, loosely 
following Aristotle, that the great metaphors, in allowing us to perceive “similarity in dissimilars”, 
generates, by this very similarity, a retrospective feeling of necessity.  This particular metaphor is shocking 
in its conflation of the spiritual and the profane, but apt in that both “reliques” and “coilles” are designated 
as corporeal, and indeed corporal, matter invested with meaning.   
223
 Bernard Dod lists the surviving manuscripts of Aristotle’s De Generatione et Corruptione as follows : 
Three translations directly from the Greek : Anonymous (vetus) – 12th century- 118 surviving manuscripts; 
Gerard of Cremona – before 1187 – 8 surviving manuscripts; William of Moerbeke (?) – before 1274 – 190 
surviving manuscripts.  Averroes’s middle commentary was translated by Michael Scot, ca. 1220-35. 
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through simple reproduction (for it is by birth  susceptible to corruption [rechaable], 
and by chance susceptible to rebirth), through which God makes them live long enough 
so that death cannot prevail. He made the same things for the irrational animals, which 
are maintained by this same logic, for when some animals die, the common forms remain 
in the others.]   
 
Reason is already subjecting her proper speech to allegory, as these corporal members 
become the “pillars” and “instruments” by which the human race perpetuates itself.  At 
first glance, Reason seems to “gloss over” the central equivocation of the word ‘gloss’, 
thus mirroring the fate of its companion adjective ‘proper’. Following E. J. Ashworth, I 
am using ‘equivocation’ in the “non pejorative medieval sense, since it covers both the 
case of homonymy and polysemy.”224 At first finding it unfathomable that she could have 
committed a barbarism, she defends herself as if her crime were a solecism. The lover is 
treating the gloss as euphemism (concealment - ethical) while Reason’s lessons on 
glossing draw firstly on the other, and in Scholasticism, primary sense, where the gloss 
takes the form of an explication leading to intellection.  While the lover insists on a 
‘gloss’, he was asking for an euphemistic gloss rather than the literal (Scholastic) use tied 
to the medieval tradition of the lectio, namely to “interpret or indicate the meaning of a 
word, sentence or passage.”225  To gloss her uncouth terms, Reason demonstrates that the 
process of generation is the same even for irrational animals (bestes mues), before 
offering a realistic theory of the common form that survives any individual mortality.226  
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Reason’s theory of generation and corruption are here treated as physical phenomena, but 
in this maneuver, she is able to accord a morally positive valence to all of creation and 
language, while the lover argues in opposition based on the censorious morality laid 
down by Amors.  The lover, therefore, draws his arguments from authority while Reason 
bolsters her arguments from the natural order.   
In order to win the argument, Reason takes the traditional Aristotelian posture of 
showing that the lover’s reasoning is fallacious. Although the explicit reference to the 
source text for this kind of argument is not mentioned until the Faux Semblant section, 
Reason is drawing heavily on Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations, in which Aristotle 
explained how the Sophists (here the lover) tried to combat their opponents (Reason) by 
showing that their conclusions are inconsistent with tradition or the law (Amors’s 
commandments).227.  In sum, the lover cannot expose Reason’s reason as paradoxical 
(fallacious) because Reason, like Nature, has situated herself as above all linguistic 
tradition, and thence exempt from any particular ethics.  In order to account for the 
                                                                                                                                                 
task, namely the destruction of the entire species, for individuals/singulars know how to flee her grasp.  For 
if there were only one left, the common form would still survive.)  
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ethical valences of words, she invokes a theory of social conditioning (acoustumance) as 
the sole source of connotative speech.  The acoustumance theory would probably not 
have had drawn a substantial realist opposition, especially since it seems to be an 
exclusively social and ethical category.  It seems rather to be aimed at the kind of 
thinking that haunts the Cratylus, and continued in Isidore of Seville’s Etymologiae, for if 
some words, via a mystical resonance derive their meaning directly from the thing, then 
the connotation, as by-product of that essential meaning, will likewise depend on this 
primary association.  Following that logic, bad words are bad because the things they 
name are bad.  The lover cannot condemn the thing, instead insisting that the words are 
themselves ontologically separate, i.e., not created by God, and therefore wicked [6985-
6]. Connotation must be divorced from signification, if we are to understand Reasons’s 
words correctly. Augustine had already acknowledged the conventionality of language, 
signa data, as we saw in the introduction, a matter on which Augustine and Aristotle 
were in perfect accord.228  But while all words are conventional by definition for these 
last two thinkers, their connotations really do not belong to any logical category. Reason 
depicts such aspects of connotation as an ethical superfluity, even as regards designations 
of the genitalia: 
 
 Il convenoit que nonz eussent,  
 Ou genz nomer ne les seussent ; 
 Et por ce tex nonz lor meïmes 
 Qu’en les nomast par ceus meïmes. 
 Se fames nes nomment en France,  
 Ce n’est fors de acoustumance.  
 Car le propre non lor pleüst,  
 Qui acoustume lor eüst ;  
 Et se proprement les nomassent,  
 Ja certes de riens ne pechassent.  
 Acoustumance est trop poissans,  
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 Et se bien la sui cognoissans,  
 Mainte chose desplest novele 
 Qui par acoustumance est bele.  (7127-40) 
 
 
[It was fitting for [these things (coilles/viz)] to have names, otherwise people wouldn’t 
know what to call them.  And this is why we imposited such names, so that they could be 
called by these very names.  If women don’t utter such words in France, that is only 
because they are unaccustomed,  because they would surely like the proper name if they 
were accustomed.  And if they were to  name them properly, they would be committing 
no sin in doing so.  This social conditioning is  too powerful, and if I’m versed in this 
matter, many a new thing may cause displeasure, which  later gains beauty through 
habituation.]    
  
Reason places taste in the category of ‘fashion’ or Aristotle’s ‘habitus’, in contrast to the 
lover, who believes that connotation is an intrinsic attribute of the substance.  Her literal 
designation of the pudenda is also explicitly connected to ‘pleasure’ (here in the sensual 
sense), which links her more closely to the ethical valorization of this substantive (plesir 
or deliz) which we will address in the next chapter.    
Reason explains that she should not have to gloss a word that is being used 
allegorically, even though she extends the bounds to literal language over the course of 
her argument. Through the deliberate manipulation of bawdy speech, Reason explains 
how metaphors arise quite naturally even in more profane contexts. Her defense of 
speaking “properly” extends therefore even to vulgar metaphors:  
 
 Chascune qui les va nommant 
 Les apelle ne sai comment,  
 Borces, hernois, riens, piches, pines,  
 Aussi cum ce fussent espines ;  
 Mes quant les sentent bien joignans,  
 Ne les tiennent pas a poignans.  
 Or les nomment si cum eus suelent,  
 Quant proprement nommer nes vuelent.  
 Je ne lor en fere ja force,  
 Mes a rienz nulle ne m’efforce,  
 Quant riens vuel dire apertement,  
 Tant cum a parler proprement.  [7141-7152] 
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[Every woman who refers to them [coilles, viz] calls them as she pleases:  bags, 
harnesses, things, nuts, pricks, as if they were thorny, but when they feel them entering, 
they don’t consider them prickly.  Now they call them as they are accustomed to do so, 
when they don’t want to call them by their proper name.  I will not oblige them to name 
things properly.  But I strive, more than  anything, to speak properly when I want to state 
something openly.] 
 
 
Here, Reason compares harnais, bourses, obvious metaphorical slang, with her more 
‘proper’ coilles.  This is where her initial equivocation could eventually turn into 
sophistry.  While she seems to undermine her initial refusal to gloss terms, here she 
advocates (non-euphemistic) metaphorical designations, though these seem not to be 
rooted in a property of the thing, but rather in the specific contextualization of action 
(“bien joignans”). By this maneuver, Reason is able to show, unlike the lover, that 
vocabulary (and more specifically, literal versus figurative designation) varies naturally 
according to the context of enunciation. Because their in human reason, ultimately, all 
words are, by their nature, intrinsically exempt from obscenity. Since all created things 
are good insofar as they are actual, literal and allegorical (save perhaps euphemistic) 
designations likewise are presented as good and natural, far removed from the complex 
courtly ethics of censorship. David Hult notes that in Jean de Meun’s translation of 
Abelard’s Historia Calamitatum, he renders the male genitalia as “coilles”, an act which 
seems to suggest that this is the proper word for a plain-style poet.229  Reason’s choice 
words turn out to be a double vulgarization: the translation from Latin to the vernacular 
being the first, and the metonymic designation of man’s parts being a vulgarization of the 
Scholastic topic, which took autonomous substance (i.e. wholes) as their main field of 
inquiry.  For Reason, ‘proper’ translates as literal, whereas for the lover, ‘proper’ means 
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decorous. In the author’s later apologia, where he freely quotes Sallust (who wrote not 
love, but war, chronicles) to justify his “words being cousins to deeds”, we see that this 
author figure accords with Reason’s linguistic ethics:  
 
 Li dis doit le fait resembler; 
 Car les vois as choses voisines 
 Doivent estre a lor fais coisines. [15190-2] 
 
[The narrative must resemble the deed, for just as words [from Latin vox] are likenesses 
of things, they must be cousins to their deeds.] 
 
Jean may have also had, as Minnis shows us, another thinker in mind for this passage, 
one closer to the Rose’s more Scholastic concerns. Boethius’s Li Livres de Confort was 
translated by Jean himself:  “Il couvient que les paroles soient cousinez aus chosez dont il 
parlent”.”230  Both Lady Reason and the narrator, therefore, share the same insistence on 
representation using likenesses, a testament to the realistic assumptions that subtend this 
work’s linguistic ideology.       
Despite the high comedy of this mock-Scholastic disputatio, in which immaterial 
reason triumphs over the unschooled lover, Reason confesses that she did not even wish 
to linger over this point, one which she considered moot since she was speaking in the 
manner of parables.  The severed organs must be called by their proper name, because 
they are not real (mythical) and because, as Poirion, and especially Hult, have elegantly 
demonstrated, they are treated as autonomous wholes by virtue of castration.  In addition, 
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the myth was a ‘gloss’ on Justice, an abstract term that requires concrete exempla in order 
to become intelligible:  
 
 
 Si dist l’en bien en nos escoles 
 Maintes choses par paraboles  
 Qui mout sont beles a entendre.  
 Si ne doit l’en mie tout prendre 
 A la lettre, quanque l’en ot.  
 En ma parole autre sens ot,  
 Dont si briement parler voloie 
 Au mains quant de coilles parloie,  
 Que celi que tu i vues metre ; 
 Et qui bien entendroit la lettre,  
 Le sens verroit en l’escriture  
 Qui esclarsist la chose oscure.  
 La verité dedens repote 
 Seroit clere, s’ele ert espote ;  
 Bien l’entendras se bien repetes 
 Les integumens as poetes.  
 La verras une grant partie  
 Des secrés de philosophie. [7153-70] 
  
[Many things in our schools are recounted in parables which are very pleasing to the 
understanding.  And one should not take everything literally, however much the letter 
abounds, for in my words there was another sense than the one you wished to give to give 
them, a sense  which I wanted to discuss only briefly, at least when I was talking about 
balls.  And whoever understood the letter would see the true sense in Scripture which 
would clarify the obscure matter.   The truth nestled within would become clear if it were 
expounded.   You will understand it if you follow faithfully the integuments of the poets.  
There you will find a large portion of the secrets of philosophy.] 
 
 
Reason is quite clear in her defense of free speech, for censorship short-circuits the 
understanding. Reason’s obscene words were allegorical because of their mythical 
(unreal) context, though quite literal in that they designated a real context, namely the 
Fall, which would explain contemporary society’s disordered sexuality and sense of 
justice. What follows is that learning and philosophy, not love, should become the lover’s 
source of delit, or pleasure [7173-4], and this is the closest thing that Reason offers to the 
lover as a substitution for his beloved rose.  This passage, situated near the close of 
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Reason’s long speech, has often been used as a justification for panallegorical readings of 
the Rose, but I must agree with Minnis in his assessment that an integumental analysis of 
the work as a whole seems over-zealous, especially as the interpretations of myth become 
increasingly materialistic, and in the case of Ami and La Vieille, wholly Euhemeristic.231  
 I think that Minnis is arguing from a rather tenuous homology of obscenity and 
literalism when he says that Reason’s account of Saturn’s castration “may appropriately 
be described as ‘unflinchingly literal’.”232  Reason was talking about Saturn’s balls as the 
source of lust (Venus) which made man’s sexuality subject to Fortune.  In doing so, she 
endowed them with a censorious moral etiology that lies in sharp contrast to the positive 
valences she accords to their generative capacities. In this passage, therefore, Minnis 
shows his allegiance to the Amant (i.e., Reason contradicts herself), and this is where I 
disagree. Minnis seems to see the debate between Reason and the lover as the ethical 
justification for his employment of the satirical mode in the following sections, most 
notably in the case of Ami and la Vieille, both of whom exhibit similar ‘ribaldry’ to 
Reason’s, but which goes uncensored by their respective interlocutors, the lover and Bel 
Accueil. Even Minnis says that this outspokenness on Reason’s part, traditionally 
associated with satire, seems methodologically opposed to the integument, for allegory 
has been traditionally associated with more covert truths, while satire exposes 
shortcomings in a more overt and less lofty manner .233  Reason knows no obscenity, for 
as a purely social reality, it is not one of those simple intelligibles seized by this faculty. 
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As regards satire, Minnis notes the common tendency among satirists to proclaim that 
they were not slandering individuals, but rather people and vice in general.234 But this is 
to admit that satire relies on abstraction, though perhaps not the conceptual abstractions 
(conceits) required by integumental allegory.  The abstract nature of ‘vice’ is magnified 
in satire more than the humanity of its actants, like a metonymic reduction of man to his 
accidents (vice).  The main difference in the case of satire is that its referents are so rarely 
treated this abstractly, given the tendency of readers to search for the “real” (individual) 
target(s) when this mode is employed. Nonetheless, the satire has not really begun yet, 
only its ‘overt’ methodology. The fact that the lover did not understand Reason’s 
message does not mean that she did not deliver one.  Her final verdict is that allegorical 
speech, when aimed at producing an intellection, is reasonable and reflects reality just as 
well as literal designation, as she implies that correspondence is not between single words 
(i.e.  balls =  simply balls or simply generative power,  reminiscent of Aquinas’s “arm” of 
God in the introduction), but rather between words and sense, which is why she describes 
her (quasi-veridical) histories and myths as ‘paraboles’ (parables).   
While I have rejected the notion of any philosophical nominalism in the voice of 
Reason, some may assume that what will follow will be an endorsement of the more 
realistic view proposed by John Fleming’s Reason and the Lover, whose Augustinian 
analysis of Reason, and consequently, the entire poem, makes both conform entirely to 
the precepts of the early church father. I agree with Fleming’s assessment of her 
impeccable credentials, based on the iconographic representation of Reason’s Scriptural 
wisdom,235 and his analysis of ridicule to which the author subjects the lover.  However, 
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Fleming makes little of the comic potential of Reason and her poor self-presentation as an 
alternative ‘lover’. Her principal mistake, according to Averroes, would lie in not 
knowing her audience, and assuming that the less unversed lover would have access to 
her allegoresis.236 In other words, I think his argument tends to conflate Reason with 
Wisdom in a way that seems Scholastically problematic for the time, even if it may be 
true in Biblical lore. By following the Augustinian credentials of Reason alone, Fleming 
is able to vouchsafe the integrity of her moral vision and read the rest of the poem as an 
exemplum in malo, and this would make the whole section of Jean’s work that does not 
include Reason (roughly 14,000 verses) tantamount to a bleakly extended induction into 
vice. The Aristotelian reading manages to elude this ethical polarity, for Aristotle’s 
account of virtue may suggest something more complicated than reliance on reason 
alone. For in individuals, virtue is maintained by the “rule of right reason” (logos), in 
contrast to character and passion, and later Nature will proclaim that reason is one’s only 
guarantor of free will, without which we are subject to determinism.237 This eminence is 
not enough, in itself, however, to maintain the rectitude of society at large, for “reason 
may persuade to actions contrary to both nature and habit, and the problems of ethics and 
politics are determined by the fact that the good is achieved when nature, habit, and 
reason are in harmony.”238  In other words, Reason should not be considered ‘defeated’ 
simply because she fails to inspire the lover to forsake his quest: she has no sway over the 
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lover’s nature or habit, and her epistemology-laden discourse falls on the deaf ears of the 
more ‘ontologically-minded’ lover.  
Reason’s humorously philosophical digression demonstrates great conceptual 
virtuosity, and serves as a gloss, or a reading manual, to the integumental aspects of the 
Rose.  In the lover’s more concrete plight, however, Reason’s digressions on the 
vicissitudes of fortune seem to prefigure her fondness for equivocation demonstrated 
above on a more macrostructural level: that is to say that the stories of Nero, Croesus, and 
Manfred seem to bear on the lover’s situation only through the broad conceit whose 
tenuous predicate is “subject to Fortune”.  If I find there to be a fault with Reason, it is 
due to her very nature - she is so insistent on abstraction that her answers relate to the 
lover in ways that are purely intelligible rather than sensible. Reason Aristotelianizes, and 
in this sense, “demythologizes” the genitals, thus prefiguring a key point in the Rose’s 
satire of the mendicants who are linked allegorically to the self-mutilating Origen. This 
maneuver, predictably, amounts to a rationalistic killjoy for the languishing lover. By 
making all words good, Reason mocks courtly aesthetics and divorces ethics from 
semantics.  This is perhaps why the two categories become conflated yet again, with 
Aristotle once more as the source, in the denouement. 
 
Faux Semblant “at the University” 
 
 
The next figure who will fall under examination, Faux Semblant, is the most explicitly 
Scholastic of all the speech characters in the Rose.  Allegorically, he represents the 
absolute version of Ami’s and La Vieille’s duplicitous ethics, and more literally and 
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explicitly, he is tied to the satire of the mendicants, rapidly rising to prominence in the 
University of Paris from the mid-thirteenth century on. Like Reason, he is an over-
determined character, which is to say that he is being used symbolically to account for 
hypocrisy in all of its various avatars, be they Scholastic (mendicants), courtly (Amors), 
or satirical (Renart).  Ami had counseled the lover to placate Malebouche and to avail 
himself of dissimulation in order to dispense with the slanderer.  Because a feminine 
personification (hypocrisie) would not have been as effective for his polemic against the 
all-male mendicant friars, Jean de Meun has lifted a masculine personification from  his 
fellow poet Rutebeuf (himself a writer of anti-mendicant satirical poetry), Faux 
Semblant, a term that is even more vague, and consequently, more suggestive in its 
semantic polyvalence, while Barat (Fraud) and Hypocrisie become Faux Semblant’s 
parents [10982-3], as a means of combining all aspects of deceit into one entity.  This 
apocalyptic figure is one of the most complex of all speech figures of the Rose, because, 
despite his avowed preference for mendacity, the effectiveness of his speech depends on 
his telling the truth.  And while his ethics differ markedly from Reason’s, with his 
‘deceit’ and ‘concealment’ supplanting her ‘love’ and ‘justice’, he accords with her logic 
in some key ways, thereby providing a fuller context to her refutation of the lover’s 
courtly censorship.  
It should be noted that Faux Semblant’s character is introduced after a parody of a 
Biblical prophecy by Amors, following his famous introduction of Guillaume de Lorris 
(here as the amant) as following in the tradition of the classical Roman love poets in their 
treatment of the subject [10522-3].  The prophecy is both veridical and parodic: veridical 
because “from a certain perspective, the prophecy, in being read, is fulfilled ipso facto 
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and therefore takes on the semblance of truth”;239 and parodic, for as has been noted, the 
je – amant – auteur entails a polyphony that is hardly retained in the closing section of 
the Rose, when the ‘je’ seems to suggest all three simultaneously and indistinctly. This 
prophecy is used to show that the Rose conforms to providence as well, though here the 
concept is used analogously, since the source of the veridical prophecy is not a Christian 
prophet, but rather the pagan god of love: 
   
 Puis vendra Jehan Clopinel,  
 Au cuer joli, au cors inel,  
 Qui nestra sur Loire a Meun,  
 Qui a saoul et a geun 
 Me servira toute sa vie,  
 Sanz avarice et sanz envie,  
 Et sera si tres sages hon 
 Qu’il n’avra cure de Raison 
 Qui mes oignemenz het et blame,  
 Qui olent plus soef que bame. 
 Et s’il avient, comment qu’il aille,   
 Qu’il en aucune chose faille,  
 Car il n’est pas honz qui ne peche,  
 Touz jors a chascuns quelque teche,  
 Le cuer vers moi tant fin avra 
 Que touz jors a moi retorra ; 
 Quant en coupe se sentira,  
 Du forfet se repentira,  
 Il ne me vodra pas trichier.   
 Cis avra le romans si chier 
 Qu’il le vodra tout parfenir,  
 Se temps et leus l’en puet venir,  
 Car quant Guillaume cessera,  
 Jehanz le continuera,  
 Apres sa mort, que je ne mente,  
 Ans trespasses plus de quarante  (10565-90) 
 
[Then will come a certain Jean Clopinel, with a fair heart and a swift body, who will be 
born along the Loire in Meun, and who, whether satiated or on an empty stomach, will 
serve me his whole life, without avarice and without envy, and he will be a very wise 
man, who will pay no  heed to Reason, who hates and maligns my ointments, which 
smell sweeter than balm. And should it so happen that he fail/err/be lacking in something 
(for there is no man who does not sin, everyone always has some fault [lit. “stain”], he 
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will still show me such a fair heart, always turning back to me). When he feels guilty, he 
will repent for his misdeed, for he won’t want to deceive me.  He will hold the Roman in 
such high esteem that he will want to complete it entirely, if he finds the time and place 
for it.  For when Guillaume ends it, Jean will continue it, more than forty years after his 
death, if I’m not lying.] 
 
Here the prophecy is given not by a prophet, but the winged god of Love. The Lover’s 
quest was placed in peril by the death of Guillaume, but the new continuator is presented 
in the third person and said to continue the lineage of Amor’s avatars – Catullus, Gaulus, 
Ovid, and now Guillaume de Lorris.  Thus Jean is defined as an Ovidian magister amoris, 
to use Minnis’s term.  Amors’s final victory is anticipated in Jean’s faithful service of 
continuation as love poet.  This is a parodic self-introduction, for Jean is presented as a 
servant of Love, just like Guillaume, but Amor distinguishes them in their respective 
“categories” within the romance, for Amor “ends his speech with a double request of his 
barons: that Guillaume qua lover-protagonist be helped in his quest to win the rose and 
that Jean qua poet-narrator be helped in his “quest to write the romance.”240   Their 
identities are clearly separate, and yet they are engulfed in the same, now Testamentary 
typology. Individuals may perish (Guillaume, his Roman, Ovid) but through providential 
continuation (Jean’s Miroër aus Amoureus) [10651]), the species, or art of love, lives on.  
This pagan allegoria in factis reveals that continuation is perhaps a better way of 
understanding providential logic.      
While secular masters outnumbered mendicant friars at the University of Paris 
during the work’s composition, the latter were granted a certain amount of leeway in 
terms of professional ascension:  they were exempted from the Arts course and could 
proceed directly to the faculty of theology because they had their own schools for such 
preliminary training. In addition, their doctors were not answerable to the Chancellor, and 
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they remained active during the strike of the secular masters in 1229.241 Faux Semblant 
has adopted the guise of a mendicant friar, freshly frocked for his scathing polemic of the 
mendicant orders with all the virulence of Guillaume de Saint-Amour’s De Periculiis 
novissimorum temporum [11513], a pamphlet that earned the Church’s official 
condemnation in 1257, and a work that drew an attack from the Dominican St. Thomas 
Aquinas, Contra impugnantes Dei Cultum.242    Guillaume de Saint-Amour was also 
famous for his commentaries on two logical works by Aristotle, namely the Prior and 
Posterior Analytics, something which suggests that he was almost as renowned for his 
work on the Philosopher as he was for his exegesis and polemics. Saint-Amour continued 
his anti-mendicant leanings in much the same, indeed more erudite, manner in 1266 or 
1267 with his Collectiones catholicae et canonicae Scriturae ad defensionem 
ecclesiasticae hierarchie, which suggests that the controversy was alive and well during 
Jean’s continuation of the Rose.243   
While Faux Semblant’s polemic of the orders does not really evince integumental 
signification,244 he does make some implicit suggestions about deceit being a ‘real’ part 
of allegorical narrative, leading us to the obvious question of whether integumental 
allegory, or a narratio fabulosa, always deceives like a belle mensonge. As an abstract 
incarnation of deceit, Faux Semblant provides a serious worldly context for characters 
like Ami and La Vieille, who both used aspects of his teachings to effect (both ultimately 
unsuccessfully, despite “experience”) their own love quests.  Faux Semblant begins his 
attack on the mendicants by suggesting the complete disjunction of appearances from 
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reality. His mode of attack is not only the common topos of illusion versus reality, but 
also the cherished syllogism of the Peripatetics.  This is the second Scholastic allegory in 
the Rose, the first being Reason’s discussion with the lover about obscenity, while this 
one takes the form of a discussion of hypocrisy (ethical, social), yet clearly developed 
and modeled on the “sophistical” Scholastic (linguistic, philosophical). In both cases, an 
ethical category (propriety, hypocrisy) bifurcates into philosophical one (words/things in 
Reason, and sophisms in Faux Semblant). The Stoics had developed doctrines on the 
non-reality of appearance, but this was predicated on other philosophical premises not 
found in the Rose.  A better source of inspiration for Faux Semblant is the Sophist, the 
ancient Greek polymath intellectuals who earned a negative reputation (owing mostly to 
Plato and Aristotle) for their abstruse and often seemingly inconclusive arguments. 
Eluding absolute characterizations, Faux Semblant is both a Sophist and his logical 
adversary, showing a peculiar relationship to this sect that is based on simultaneous 
contraries, especially since his only act of sophistry is during his mock sacrament.  
This is why he turns to Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations, a work that had already 
been implicitly evoked in Reason’s refutations against the lover, and an obvious manual 
for a practitioner of deceit. The Refutations outlines possible errors in argumentation, 
especially those errors of language which tend to obscure the nature of reality. Some 
errors are attributed to poor usage (not because language refers ultimately to individuals), 
and others to mistaken intellection of a thing’s nature. 245  Fallacies are the work’s 
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ultimate target, but also to be avoided are paradoxes, which in the logic of the 
Refutations,  result almost inevitably from the juxtaposition of two antithetical theses, one 
or both of which must rest on a false premise. More than any other of Aristotle’s logical 
treatises, the Refutations presents arguments strategically, which gets allegorically 
translated as renardie [11523], or ruse: 
 
A rule specially appropriate for showing up a fallacy is the sophistic rule, that one should 
draw the answerer on to the kind of statements against which one is well supplied with 
arguments: this can be done both properly and improperly, as was said before.' Again, to 
draw a paradoxical statement, look and see to what school of philosophers the person 
arguing with you belongs, and then question him as to some point wherein their doctrine 
is paradoxical to most people: for with every school there is some point of that kind. It is 
an elementary rule in these matters to have a collection of the special 'theses' of the 
various schools among your propositions. The solution recommended as appropriate here, 
too, is to point out that the paradox does not come about because of the argument: 
whereas this is what his opponent always really wants.246  
 
 Faux Semblant feels assured that no one understood Aristotle’s manual in the 
first place, making it even more apt for his purposes. Its importance as a battleground for 
the logical, as opposed to the rhetorical, analysis of grammar in the preceding century is 
summed up nicely by Suzanne Reynolds: “While twelfth-century commentaries on 
Aristotle’s Sophistici elenchi sought to describe the semantic structure of ambiguity, the 
rhetorical tradition took a more judgmental view.”247  Faux Semblant will bear on the 
side of semantics when invoking the arguments of the Refutations, but Jean de Meun 
cannot resist the metaphorical opportunities presented by this weapon against sophistry. 
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(3) that which depends upon ignorance of what 'refutation' is:  
(4) that which depends upon the consequent:  
(5) that which depends upon assuming the original conclusion:  
(6) stating as cause what is not the cause:  
(7) the making of more than one question into one.  
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The tool that Faux Semblant uses for his ‘trenchant’ critique is a razor, here used 
allegorically, or more specifically, ambiguously, in the form of Aristotle’s dialectical 
razor, a use that prefigures the literal designation of the razor as a tangible object:  
 
 
 Ne sont religieus ne monde;  
 Il font un argument au monde 
 Ou conclusion a honteuse :  
 Cis a robe religieuse,  
 Donques est il religieus.  
 Cis argumens est trop fïeus,  
 Il ne vaut pas un coutel troine :  
 La robe ne fait pas le moine.   
 Ne porquant nus n’i set respondre,  
 Tant face haut sa teste tondre,  
 Voire rere au rasoir d’Elanches  
 Qui barat trenche en .xiii. branches ; 
 Nus ne set si bien distinter  
 Qu’il en ose un seul mot tinter.   [11051-64] 
 
[They are neither religious nor pure.  They proffer on the world an argument with a 
shameful conclusion: this man wears a habit, therefore he is religious.  This argument is 
entirely specious, not worth even a privet blade: the habit does not make the monk.   And 
yet, no one knows how to refute this,  however high he shaves his head, or even shaves 
with the razor of [Aristotle’s] Sophistical Refutations, which divides [lit. slices] fraud into 
thirteen branches; no one knows, in  sufficient depth, how to distinguish (between 
these branches) enough to dare utter (resonate) a single  word.]    
 
Barat, Faux Semblant’s father, previously glossed as ‘fraud’ or ‘deceit’, is associated here 
explicitly with Aristotle, but the term is used here as being synonymous with sophistry, a 
circumscription which is more specifically academic than the Old French word implies. 
Aristotle’s manual of refutations was, by all means, an ethical document, insofar as it 
advocated action against sophistic (false/deceptive) argumentation, but it was more 
frequently associated with pure logic, as based on its position in the medieval Organon. It 
dealt directly with the mechanics of argumentation and the reliability of its foundational 
premises.  What we have, then, is a work of logic used in the service of satire which, by 
definition, entails an ethical condemnation.  The translatio of ethics onto logic is a staple 
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of the ideology in the Rose, for this tactic will be exploited to the maximum in the 
Nature/Genius section, and this lesson is, as we saw, the inversion of Reason’s divorce of 
ethics from semantics. Here logical fallacy and ethical fraud are rendered equivalent 
semantically, while allegorically hypocrisy (Faux Semblant, or his mother) and fraud 
(Baraz) had been equated genealogically. 
Faux Semblant continually warns the reader not to trust him, as exemplified in the 
now common proverb “La robe ne fet pas le moine”. The habit would always be 
considered a conventional, rather than natural sign, for the monk’s habit is manmade. 
Ascribing meaning to it, especially one that is highly connotative, is clearly the province 
of poetry. For example, a habit’s purpose is not to deceive people of one’s identity, rather 
it is to frock a clergyman. Outer garments and adornments are completely accidental to 
substance and therefore have no bearing on identity. When used to deceive, the habit is 
being used metaphorically, and it is this sense that Faux Semblant tries to impose on it by 
allegorical contextualization (Nature working in her forge, Reason descending from her 
tower, the [false] mendicant preaching in his habit).  The maxim is of course perfectly 
acceptable to any Aristotelian, for no substance (monk) could ever be defined by his 
accidents (habit – ‘habiz’ in some manuscripts, here ‘robe’).  Faux Semblant seems to 
suggest visually, if not intellectually, that the mendicant frock is associated with deceit. 
What is perhaps most curious is that the almost fabliaux anti-clericalism manifests itself 
as being a quite serious reflection on the nature of the sign, as is common with sartorial 
metaphors, e.g. text/textile. The thrust of the satire depends on sound contemporary 
linguistic logic.  
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 Despite his apparent nihilism, Faux Semblant does not deny that there is a way 
out of an endless misunderstanding, though it would require the very manual that he 
formerly said no one understood (Sophistical Refutations).  All judgments based on 
appearances will be treated as sophisms, and by this we mean, broadly speaking, the 
collapse of logic into rhetoric. By increasing his use of technical vocabulary, the way out 
of Faux Semblant’s sophistic syllogisms is very thorny indeed: 
 
 Mes ja ne verrés d’aparence 
 Conclurre bonne consequence 
 En nul argument que l’en face,  
 Se default existence efface ;  
 Tous jors i troverés sophime 
 Qui la consequence envenime,  
 Se vous avés sotilité 
 D’entendre la duplicité.  [12139-46] 
 
[But you will never see a sound consequence concluded from an appearance in any 
argument that you encounter, if an error erases existence. You will always find a sophism 
to vitiate the consequence, if you have enough subtlety to understand the duplicity.] 
 
This also provides a further context for the lover’s false syllogisms, outlined by Marc-René 
Jung, including one in which the lover finds fault with himself for his current state 
because the god of love, insofar as he a god, must be exempt from vice [4185-94].248 By 
relying on appearances and homonymy, the lover resorts to sophistic logic, which in turn 
necessitates the appearance of Faux Semblant.  
As the vehicle of satire, Faux Semblant must establish unassailable authority for 
his polemics.  To this end, he uses both Scripture (to attack mendicancy) and Aristotle 
(against fallacies) to allow for a realm of truth, without which his ‘lies’ would be 
meaningless. Kevin Brownlee has noted that as regards the Bible, “here Faux Semblant 
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speaks the ‘truth’.  His Biblical interpretations are valid,” 249  especially when used 
(Matthew, 23:2) to combat the buttressing ideology of mendicants. Furthermore, in this 
bitingly satirical section, our shape-shifter makes it clear that these examples are to be 
understood in the literal sense:  
 
 Se povreté le va grevant,  
 Bien puet, si cum j’ai dit devant,  
 Mendier tant qu’il puisse ouvrer  
 Por ses estevoirs recouvrer,  
 Mes qu’il ovre de mains itiex,  
 Non pas de mains espiritiex, 
 Mes de mains de cors proprement,  
 Sanz metre double entendement.  [11475-82] 
 
[If poverty continues to beset him, he can, as I’ve said before, beg until he’s able to 
resume work in order to provide for his basic needs.  But he must work with these very 
hands – not spiritual hands, but corporeal hands in the proper sense – without adding a 
double sense to my words.] 
 
This literalism finds further support in Faux Semblant’s reference to the gospels 
(Matthew, 7:15) [11123-32], the proverbial wolf in sheep’s clothing. 250   Belin and 
Isengrin from the satirical Roman de Renart are made to conform to a Biblical truth,  
thereby ennobling this more ribald genre.   
Following this purported defense of literalism, Faux Semblant ironically 
supplements, with an exemplum in malo (if we presume that this is scathing satire), 
Reason’s integumans aus poetes. He applies this exegetic principle to a religious 
controversy involving the publication of the (Joachimite) Franciscan Evangile Parduarle 
by Gerard de Borgo, thus reminding us that the mendicants themselves were not immune 
to heresy. The Joachimites were a millenarian offshoot of the Franciscans who believed 
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that the Apocalypse, predicted for 1260, was impending and that it would be followed by 
a Utopian reign of the Holy Spirit.  The Joachimites were renowned for their highly 
abstruse exegesis based on complex integuments.  Many of their tenets were deemed 
heretical, some of Joachim’s tenets being refuted as early as 1215, and Gerard was 
sentenced to prison in 1263 after a commission of Cardinals, set up by Pope Alexander 
IV, condemned this very book.  
 
 Il est ensi escrit ou libre 
 Qui ce raconte et segnefie : 
 Tant cum Pierres ait seignorie 
 Ne puet Jehanz monstrer sa force.  
 Or vous ai dit du sens l’escorce  
 Qui fait l’intencion repondre ;  
 Mes or en vueil la mole espondre.  
 Par Pierre vuet le pape entendre 
 Et les clers seculers comprendre 
 [….] 
 Et par Jehan, les prescheors 
 Qui diront qu’il n’est loi tenable 
 Fors l’Evangile pardurable.  [11854-62, 11866-68] 
 
[Thus it is written in the book which recounts these things and which signifies the 
following: As  long as Peter has lordship, John cannot show his strength.  I have told 
you the husk of the sense, which conceals the deeper meaning, but now I want to 
explicate the kernel.  By Peter are meant the Pope and the secular clerks, and by John, 
those preachers who will say there is no tenable law except for the Evangelium Eternum.] 
 
By this almost truistic example of integumental reading, Faux Semblant mocks the value 
of abstruse allegory but for his own polemical purposes, especially since this omni-
temporal form of allegoresis (exegesis) is used for the service of a very contemporaneous 
controversy. By adopting an exegetical gloss for this Joachimite tract, Faux Semblant is 
using the privileged mode of reading scripture on a heretical text, or in Poirion’s terms, 
“un texte dont on dénonce l’imposture.”251 While the author of the tract shares a name 
with the author of the text, there is no simple conclusion to be drawn by the suggestive 
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conflation of the Joachimite and Jean de Meun:  if one ascribes heresy to Faux Semblant, 
one should remember that this figure endorses a papist view (the pope himself in league 
with the ‘secular clerks’) in contrast with this fringe sect of Franciscans. Poirion suggests 
that the heresy undermines the allegory here, both in this particular section and as a 
whole. It is also possible to see the occurrence of the obverse, however, if we posit that 
the allegorical mode remains intact, in which case it is orthodoxy that is called into 
question. The latter seems to be the more tenable with regard to the Rose as a whole. This 
is the introduction of (recent) history and heresy into the Rose; Jean de Meun’s gambit, so 
to speak, is to frame any potential heresy within the voice of this evil character, as if to 
attenuate the virulence of his polemics. Just as Reason found no shame in uttering her 
obscenity, Faux Semblant does not scruple to proclaim his heresies aloud.   
If the deceit of the integument is here depicted as a negative reversal of the belle 
mensonge, the reason may be due to the over-development of logic and rhetoric that we 
find in this character. Unlike Reason’s more timeless logic and allegoresis,  Faux 
Semblant’s logic smacks of greater contemporary influence, most notably from the 
university. “Paris was also the centre for the study of semantic theory and ‘speculative’ or 
‘modistic’ grammar, the so-called modi significandi; most of the key thinkers taught or 
had been taught there.”252 Following Nicholas of Paris, Howard Bloch suggests that this 
is where the Scholastics developed a more modern (as opposed to Augustinian) 
“universal grammar.”253 The rise of the modistae entailed a reduced autonomy of logic 
and grammar, in such a way that the latter could now be universalized within the former. 
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But the modistic grammarians were also constrained by the fact that their 
“epistemological reflection” could “only deal with words [semocinalis] accidentally.”254 
This is also the period where the modist Franciscan Roger Bacon (an Arts Master in Paris 
in the 1250s, writing well before the peak of Aristotelian censorship) also developed an 
influential theory of signs, rejecting both Aristotle and Boethius in favor of direct 
signification of words and things, and making a fruitful distinction between abstraction 
and separation that was retained by Aquinas.255 Bacon accepts the notion of imposition in 
a more realistic manner than Abelard, for he makes imposition belong to recognizing the 
inherent likeness amongst objects of the same kind.  But he also recognizes a further 
imposition than this initial designation, "a less deliberate, more implicit sort, by which a 
word gains the power of referring to other objects too.”256 Bacon thus suggests, without 
recourse to nominalism, that polysemy is yet another reality of the sign (sophism = fraud, 
‘coilles/viz’ = ‘force et generacion’, razor = dialectic, etc.). Bacon seems to have been 
inspired by some of Alfarabi’s work, which had fused Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism 
into a kind of mega-realism, where both emanation and abstraction were inextricably 
linked by the various properties of the Agent Intellect, which both delivers the common 
form to individuals as it renders them perceptible and/or intelligible.  With these rising 
currents in logical and linguistic thought, Faux Semblant advocates a linguistic usage that 
is literal, free of broad integuments, and yet one that preserves the sign’s polysemy.   
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It is this property of the sign (here the ‘habit’) that Faux Semblant is later able to 
exploit (with Malebouche) to deadly consequences: 
 
 Sanz faille, traitre sui gié 
 Et por traitre m’a Diex jugié.  
 Parjur sui, mes ce que j’afin   
 Set l’en envis jusqu’en la fin (11169-72) 
 
 [Without fail, I am a traitor, and God has deemed me thus. I am a perjurer, but one barely 
 suspects what I complete until it’s too late.] 
 
These statements lead us directly to some of the greatest challenges presented to logic by 
the rise of grammar, i.e., the liar paradox and other insolubilia,257 where grammatical 
possibilities yield no semantic content (e.g. “I’m lying”). Faux Semblant’s name can 
designate both a noun and a gerund (“semblance” and “seeming”), making him the most 
contingent character in the entire Rose, the only one of the speech characters with this 
status.  The paradoxical nature of a statement such as “I’m lying” can be easily remedied 
by an appeal to a more universalizing use of the present, as in “I lie” or by appeal to a 
specific context. Thus the apparent paradox of “This statement is false” becomes more 
intelligible when a referent is given: “This statement is false: 2 x 2 = 5.”  There were 
several approaches to dealing with such insolubilia258:  the first emerges around 1125, 
known as cassation or nullification, meaning that the insoluble “says nothing”; the 
second, drawing on a passage from the Sophistical Refutations, treats insolubles as a 
branch of logical fallacies, but Spade notes that insolubles fit awkwardly in this category; 
the transcasus theory which, also based on the Refutations, treats these as meaningful 
when the present tense is extended semantically. Faux Semblant’s words are therefore 
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caught in the deviations within meanings that are a by-product of the clash between 
grammar and semantics. The liar paradox seems to be central to Faux Semblant’s 
character: he is an allegory of the one who says “I’m lying,” yet to take the entirety of 
Faux Semblant’s discourse as ironic has the devastating potential to collapse the satirical 
thrust of his speech. Aristotle warned in his Sophistical Refutations that taking speech or 
language as the basis of inquiry often leads to deception, for the likenesses inherent in 
language trump the likenesses of the things signified.259 Faux Semblant, the treacherous 
perjurer, serves as the poetic incarnation of these insolubilia, just as Barat (Fraud) 
embodies the totality of possible sophisms.   
  As we have seen before, Faux Semblant complicates matters further by telling the 
truth in key places. His continued profession of hypocrisy does not prevent him from 
making a speech full of veridical statements. In fact, until the overt duplicity in his 
“confessing” Malebouche through rhetorical subterfuge (a sophism that had at least been 
anticipated/prefigured by references to the Renart – “Renart mange son confesseur”), an 
Arts master who shared Faux Semblant’s antipathy towards the mendicants might read 
the entirety of Faux Semblant’s speech as veridical, but even those who ascribe to such 
univocality may be dismayed to find that their speech character is a shape-changing 
Proteus who can assume any form necessary in order to deceive:  
 
 Mes tant est fort la decevance 
 Que trop est grief l’apercevance,  
 Car Protheüs, qui se soloit  
 Muer en tout quanqu’il voloit 
 Ne sot onc tant barat ne guile 
 Comme je faiz, car onc en vile 
 N’entrai ou fusse congneüs,  
 Tant i fusse oïz ne veüs. 
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 Je sai bien mon habit changier,  
 Prendre l’un et l’autre estrangier. [11179-11188] 
 
[But so great is the deceit that to notice it would be too difficult, for Proteus, who often 
transformed into whatever he wanted, never knew as much about fraud and guile as I do, 
for I would never go into town where I would be recognized, for there I would be seen 
and heard so often. I also know how change my habit, assuming one as I discard the 
other.]  
 
What follows is an enumeration [11189-11216] of his various human avatars, suggesting 
indeed the bleak omnipresence of hypocrisy in society at large, reflected allegorically in 
both Scholastic and vernacular (Renart, Rutebeuf) incarnations.    
    Even though Faux Semblant is exposing the fraud or sophistry of the mendicants, 
his skill in ruse means that he is also perfectly suited to concealment.  It is this 
concealment, leading to a misreading by Malebouche, which eventually proves fatal:   
 
 Samblant ravoit il bien veü 
 Mes faus ne l’ot pas conneü.    
 Faus iert il, mais de fauceté  
 Ne l’eüst il jamais reté 
 Car le semblant si fort ovroit  
 Que la fauceté li covroit.  [12119-24] 
 
[He (Malebouche) had clearly seen the Semblance again, but he did not recognize it as 
false.  He was indeed false, but Malebouche would never have accused him of falseness, 
because he worked the semblance so as to conceal its falseness].   
  
This is the prelude to the most violent scene in the Rose, where Faux Semblant, 
pretending to lead a sincerely penitent [12362-3] Malebouche through confession to 
absolution, strangles him and removes his tongue with a literal razor (the first had been 
allegorically associated with Aristotle’s logic), before burying him in a ditch, thereby 
leaving Malebouche’s portion of the fortification unguarded.  As Sarah Kay has 
eloquently noted, “this grisly scene is an accomplished piece of allegorical writing, 
indicating that the most effective way to combat jealousy is to silence slander by means 
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of hypocrisy (Faux Semblant) and sexual deceit (Abstinence Contrainte).”260 This should 
serve as a reminder of the complex interplay between these abstract nouns on a semantic 
and conceptual level reminiscent of Prudentius.  On the level of plot, he thus plays the 
censor to Malebouche’s wholly veridical (at least in Rose) reports.  
 Faux Semblant is most assuredly a wicked character, and this is part of the 
effectiveness of Jean’s satire of the mendicants. Having firmly established his diabolical 
foundations,  Faux Semblant introduces eschatology into the work, thereby assimilating 
the Rose into a providential history whose meaning is guaranteed by the divine act of 
prefiguration. Richard Emmerson and Ronald B. Herzman discuss the apocalyptic 
imagery associated with Faux Semblant, noting that such imagery has its sources in 
Guillaume de Saint Amour’s De Periculiis.261  The evidence they present for the 
association of Faux Semblant with the Antichrist is cogent, as is their following salutary 
remark: “Modern scholars have tended to see that quarrel as history rather than 
eschatology.  We submit that the split is a modern one, and that it is both history and 
eschatology at the same time.”262 The fourfold method of reading Scripture was also 
based on reading history as providential, in which the anagoge reflected the (future) 
history of the end of days. I would only wish to temper this observation with another: 
namely, that Aristotelian time may be as relevant to Jean’s conception as the providential 
time of Scripture. If the model is the historical (providential) allegoria in factis, this 
“Antichrist” could be the symbol of the end of the moral, in anticipation of the anagogical 
sense, which will presumably follow in Nature and Genius.  Herzman and Emmerson 
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therefore make this eschatology a part of real history with a specific chronology. Such a 
providential reading would inevitably (though I must exempt Emmerson and Herzman 
from this possible heresy of mine) conflate the symbolic value of the Rose with that of 
Christian gospel and would serve to further concretize the real contemporary referents of 
this allegorical dream vision.  As we will see in the next chapter, however, the Rose 
offers a gloss on the sense of ‘eternity’ which hampers any attempt to categorize 
allegorical referents within any chronological history. 
Even Faux Semblant gets subsumed into Genius’s universal plan at the end, 
making Faux Semblant’s demonstrations of dialectic [razor] seem like moments of pure 
poetic and Scholastic decadence. The Lover prays for these incarnations of hypocrisy that 
helped him, even as he  realizes that, by their union,  Abstinence Contrainte and Faux 
Semblant are about to become parents to the Antichrist [14739-53].  If there were 
extensive apocalyptic allusion in the De Periculiis, it finds a literal realization here 
through the extended satire of the “diabolical” mendicants. Faux Semblant is the greatest 
enemy of integumental allegory in the Rose, but his literalism is often oblique, 
polysemous, and deceptive.  While Lady Reason had used allegorical integuments in 
order to increase one’s understanding (intellection), the more literalistic Faux Semblant, 
on the other hand, obscures his meaning by resorting to the most contemporary linguistic 
and logical technology. Rather than supplanting Reason’s integumental programme of 
reading, he complements it with a more modern flavor. These personifications, unlikely 
allies as they may be, provide us with our first lessons in Scholastic terminology, 
argumentation, multiple senses (both in verbis and in factis), making them our principle 
guides in reading the romance through a Scholastic lens.  
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Naturalism, Generation, and Deliz: an allegory of the Species 
 
Omnes homines natura scire desiderant.  -By nature, all men desire to know.  – Aristotle, Latin 
translation by William of Moerbeke. 
  
 If Reason’s foul mouth shocked both lover and reader early on in Jean de Meun’s 
continuation, her terms find a more complete glossing in the final section.  Together, 
Nature and Genius will complement Reason’s disputatio, retrospectively showing her 
anatomical terms to be fully apposite to Jean’s project.  From her forge, Nature rails 
against man in a mock-confession to her priest Genius.  In this diatribe, man is 
considered in the most realistic and scientific way possible, namely as a species of 
animal.  When man’s universal responsibility to propagate and continue the species is 
jeopardized, Nature and Genius align themselves with Cupid, with the double purpose of 
bringing the lover’s quest to fruition and to maintain the natural order.  But while all 
other species of animals reproduce naturally and are in no danger of extinction, individual 
men are given the faculty of reason, thus exempting them from universal determinism.  
This chapter will focus on the new ontological schema that Jean de Meun provides, and 
we will locate precisely the various forms of determinism to which man is subject.   This 
new conception of the natural order is still glossed with the Christian term ‘providence’ 
(pourvoyance), although this term is corroborated not by Revelation or Christian history, 
but rather by the continual process of generation and corruption affecting all animate 
species.       
If Reason and Faux Semblant provided the epistemology (theories of reading) for 
understanding the Rose, it falls on Nature and Genius to furnish the most complete 
exposition of Jean de Meun’s ontology.  These last prosopopeias elaborate a more 
substantive conception of the universe, and Nature begins her diatribe against one 
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substantive species in particular, man, by considering his ethical fulfillment of duty 
(propagation) in the same manner as all other animate species.  By shifting out of the 
courtly garden of Deduit and turning to Nature working in her forge, tirelessly 
maintaining the world by keeping all species alive, this section supplants our more 
limited courtly setting with a universal one.  The emphasis on man as species entails one 
of the most radical ethical corollaries, namely, that man’s behavior should be in 
accordance with his being a rational animal, or, thinking substance that reproduced 
naturally. Nature’s tirade against man therefore bolsters her argument by clarifying the 
various forms of determinism to which man is subjected, and framing this under the 
common Scholastic question of divine foreknowledge and future contingency. Through 
an elaborate conceit, Nature revises the definition of divine providence, locating it within 
the material process of the continual renewal of the species.  Once this new providential 
universe is expounded, we see that the work’s shockingly obscene ending is a necessary 
one for Jean de Meun’s radical, and indeed heretical, theological perspective.     
Nature and Genius signal an implicit citation of the De Planctu Naturae by Alain 
de Lille,  preparing us for a return to Christian ethics after an extended anti-allegorical 
and materialistic development in Ami, Faux Semblant and La Vieille, though the 
naturalism prevalent in certain Chartrian allegories is accentuated still further with more 
rationalistic foundations. The allegories of Chartres, especially in the case of Bernard 
Sylvester and Alain de Lille, brought about a spiritual transformation of pagan myths. I 
argue that the key source texts are not only the Chartrian allegories, however, but also, as 
Paré notes, the naturalistic theories found in the tracts of Boethius of Dacia and Siger of 
Brabant. This is just to point out that in the Scholastic climate of Paris, the Chartrian 
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allegories, which relied on a NeoPlatonic theory of emanationism which was ascribed to 
Aristotle by all of the Islamic falsafa with the exception of Averroes (this would be 
unknown to Latin medievals).  This convergence of various naturalisms in the thirteenth 
century meant that they could have been interpreting the Chartrian allegories in more 
rationalistic and less evocative manner than had been the case in the prior century.263  If 
anything, this adds to the audacity of the project.  For a full understanding of the Rose, 
and its syncretic manipulation of both ancient and contemporary sources, we must 
disregard as fallacious Zumthor’s statement that the sum total of Jean’s learning reveals a 
“university culture which was fairly broad, not very original, and already old-fashioned 
towards 1280.”264 
Over and above the Chartrian tradition looms the Timaeus of Plato.  This work 
was the only work of Plato’s available directly in the thirteenth century and it was of 
particular interests for the Ecole de Chartres.  Plato had condemned poetry in the 
Republic, yet in his deeply philosophical moments he often turns toward myth to 
overcome the cognitive hurdles, marking the beginning of apophatics. The same is the 
case for Alain de Lille in both his Anticlaudianus and his De Planctu Naturae.  As in the 
case of the parable, here the literal sense has no historical truth; rather truth is located 
within their similarity to real (universal) narratives or conflicts. “As Alan said of the 
Anticlaudianus, ‘the sweetness of the literal sense’ is meant to sooth the ears of boys, 
while the ‘moral instruction’ will ‘inspire the mind on the road to perfection.’  Most 
important and elevated of all, however, is the ‘sharper subtlety of the allegory’, which is 
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designed to ‘whet the advanced intellect’.” 265   Here the convergence between the 
question of universal genera and species, on the one hand, and allegory, on the other, 
finds its greatest expression in the Chartrian figure of Genius.266  As they straddle the 
bounds between literature and philosophy, we will have to examine the speeches of 
Nature and Genius on their own terms while remaining cognizant of the wider 
contemporary context: “During the twelfth century the difference between, say, the 
school of Chartres and the Paris schools, or between the Victorines and individual 
thinkers like Alan of Lille, is clear to see, to say nothing of divisions in the schools 
themselves. Theories drawn from the Timaeus mingle with the theory of abstraction and 
the atomic theory.  Diversity is the keynote.  In the thirteenth century the philosophical 
aspect becomes uppermost.”267  It should not surprise, therefore, to find nature arguing 
her point with a syncretism that verges on digressiveness.  
  Jean’s Nature is only a Chartrian on the surface, for despite the obvious 
intertextuality, there is a striking difference in tone and argumentation. Wetherbee 
concords in this matter, for he characterizes Jean’s “debt” to the Chartrians as being 
“primarily a matter of highly complex poetic allusion, rather than adherence to their 
philosophical ideals.”268 This is where we see the most complete transformation, or even 
inversion, of the paratext:   
Ensi s’acordent ce me semble 
 Genius et Nature ensemble.  
 Si dist Salemons toute vois,  
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 Puis que par la verité vois,  
 Que hons bien eürés seroit  
 Qui bonne fame troveroit. [18147-52] 
 
 [And so it seems that Nature and Genius are in accordance on this matter (i.e. women’s 
 deceit). And yet, as Solomon said, since you can only see what is true, namely that happy 
 would be the man who found a good woman.]   
 
Wetherbee sees this as a mockery of the values of the De Planctu, for here we learn that 
Genius, in addition to being Nature’s confessor, has also found in her a mistress.269 Thus, 
the anti-sacramental satire continues, and is indeed exploited to quite different ends in 
this section. The ontology of the De Planctu hinged on a NeoPlatonic emanationist 
sceheme of the universe, first elaborated by Plotinus in his Enneads, but found again in 
Alfabari, slightly modified by Avicenna, and finally fully rejected by Averroes (unknown 
to Latin medievals). 270  On the one hand, Alain’s sexual ethics do not stray from 
orthodoxy, making the De Planctu an odd choice for implicit citation.  
With regard to its naturalistic ontology, on the other, the Rose differs little from 
its Chartrian predecessor. As Paré noted, “la crue de l’aristotélisme du XIIIe siècle a 
intensément développé ce naturalisme: ce fut une véritable ivresse. Jean de Meung 
participe à cet esprit conquérant." 271  Alain’s suggestively poetic, if not allegorical, 
cosmology, now found rationalistic, and indeed, literal underpinnings in the works of 
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Aristotle’s Arab commentators. I would venture that it is the Averroism at the 
contemporary Arts Faculty in Paris that is the ultimate source of all the central heresies 
that dominate.272  The preponderance of Averroism was noted first by Paré, in his Idées et 
Lettres, but this was given a fuller, and indeed more radical, exposition the following 
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year by Franz Walter Müller.273  This aspect of Jean de Meun’s thought has unfortunately 
been underplayed by critics in the intervening years.  Here I must respectfully disagree 
with Kathryn Lynch’s assumption that “there does not seem to be any Averroism at play 
in the Rose.”274  Unconvinced by Mary Katherine Tillman’s article on this topic, itself 
inspired heavily by Müller, Lynch assumes this aspect of Rose scholarship to be a critical 
figment.275 Her equation of Averroism with nominalism is patently false, which makes 
her rejection of Tillman’s thesis equally problematic, for without recourse to the Arabs 
and Aristotle, Jean de Meun’s faith in astral determinism would have no rationalistic 
foundations.  Although more sober and illuminating than her predecessor, Lynch is still 
marked by the strong influence of John Fleming’s Augustinianism.  To my mind, this 
leads to a misreading of the tone of the poem, perhaps more regrettable since her analysis 
of Reason is extremely cogent.     
In a provocative article, Stuart MacClintock takes great pains to reject the term 
“Latin Averroism,” but for our purposes and the sake of conciseness, I will be employing 
this term metonymically to designate the particular Aristotelianism at the University 
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which smacked of Arabic influence.276 In an effort to give a glimpse of possible reasons 
for the difficulties involved in interpretations of both Averroes and Aristotle,  
MacKlintock notes the similarities between Neo-Platonism and allegory, in such a way 
that, when the 13th century comes into contact with Aristotle, they were insensitive to the 
aspects of language and thought as processes, insisting “rather on the position that nature 
and discourse exactly reduplicate each other; this meant that elements of discourse were 
made into real existing entities.”277 In other words, the Averroistic Aristotle that the Latin 
West received had already undergone an allegorization, by which verbs and processes are 
rendered as autonomous substances. This no doubt owes something to the divergent 
lexical and syntactical structures of Greek and Arabic, a fact which Alfarabi makes quite 
apparent in his treatment of genera and species.278 But this also means that both scientific 
and allegorical aspects of Aristotle’s philosophy were rendered similarly in this 
translation movement, to the extent that the parameters between the two seems to have 
become, at this time, exceptionally blurry.  
For good or ill, Latin Averroism has been associated with that “double truth,” 
though this seems to be the negative characterization of the Averroists by St. Thomas 
Aquinas in his De Unitate Intellectus.  Their glosses of Aristotle made an attempt at 
literal exposition, rather than an effort to reconcile the Philosopher with the faith.  And if 
one reads Boethius of Dacia’s On the Supreme Good, in which he exalts philosophy as 
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the highest of moral callings, one notices the undeniable influence of the Arab 
Peripatetics.279   In the Latin West, they never enjoyed the liberty for such tenets as 
“Scripture expresses allegorically the literal truths of philosophy” as we would find in 
Alfarabi or Avicenna (perhaps also in Averroes, but rather than subordinating theology to 
philosophy, he argues for complete autonomy of the disciplines). It is true, however, that 
their literal expositions of the Philosopher must have been quite unsettling, given the 
status of “Philosopher” he enjoyed at the university after 1255. Siger of Brabant notes in 
his conclusion to the De Anima Intellectiva (having clearly digested Aquinas’s 
opposition): “Therefore I say that because of the difficulty of the premises and of certain 
other matters, I have long been in doubt as to what the method of natural reason should 
hold in this problem [the intellective soul being unique with respect to the species], and 
what the Philosopher felt in this matter; and in the case of such doubt the Faith must be 
adhered to, as transcending all human reason. (et in tali dubio fidei adhaerendum est, 
quae omnem rationem humanam superat)”.280   Siger’s concession to orthodoxy here 
comes only after having reiterated (from his commentary on De Anima five years prior) 
his logical arguments for the inverse,  almost as if to ask his reader not to believe what 
has clearly been demonstrated.    
The term heresy has a very concrete sense in the age of censorship surrounding 
the composition of the Rose, and for this we must turn to the official Condemnations of 
1270, and the even more sweeping set dating from 1277.281 These condemnations provide 
                                                 
279
 Boethius of Dacia, On the Supreme Good, or on the Life of the Philosopher, in Medieval Philosophy 
(Blackwell, 2007) 353-8.  
280
 Siger of Brabant, De Anima Intellectiva, cited in MacKlintock I, 192.    
281
 Bishop Etienne Tempier aims the condemnation mostly at the Arts Masters of Paris, duly 
acknowledging that they may not be the authors of these theses, but even as propagators of such thought 
they are deemed reprehensible.  All references from “Selections from the Condemnation of 1277” in 
Medieval Philosophy, ed. Kilma (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007-2009) 180-189.  The only individual work 
194 
 
a fuller context for both the use of citation and the fondness for showing censorious logic 
to be allegorically akin to prudish, courtly taboo. Based on the severity of the 
consequences for heresy at this time, Paré infers that the work must have been completed 
before the date of the condemnation of 1277. The publication of the earlier condemnation 
of 1270 meant a more precarious situation for any philosophical venture,  but Tempier’s 
list of 13 philosophical theses seemed ineffectual in silencing Siger of Brabant, who 
continued to write with only the most “perfunctory submission to the Bishop’s 
strictures.” 282  This situation led to a definitive schism concerning the “literal” 
interpretation of Aristotle, lasting from 1272 to 1275. 283  1270 is also the year of 
Aquinas’s famous tract (to be discussed further on) seeking to prove that Aristotle held 
the individuation of every particular human soul, against the Averroistic position which 
maintained a separable active-passive intellect (i.e. intellection and intelligibles remain 
external to the individual). Even Aquinas’s teachings, traditionally deemed more 
orthodox than those of the Averroists, are not spared censorship in 1277, as twenty of his 
own theses are added to the Condemnations. The Latin Averroists placed great faith in 
human reason and also ascribed to Aristotle the eternity of the world, the denial of 
individual mortality, limitations on man’s free will and a revised definition of divine 
providence, all of which figure in Nature’s and Genius’s speech. Salim Kemal has 
demonstrated that the Islamic Aristotelians (Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes) relied on 
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a much more logical interpretation of the Poetics, thereby explaining its frequent 
appearance in the Arab Organon.284 He has also shown that the Arabs made much of the 
syllogistic structure of poetry, allegory, and even metaphorical language, a tendency that 
is clearly in evidence in Jean de Meun’s continuation of the Rose.285   
The consequences of accepting Averroism are undoubtedly dangerous to 
Christian doctrine, but one could say that Genius’s heresies are a comedic take on 
Averroism, perhaps as a direct consequence of his analysis of ‘man’ in the most 
naturalistic of settings, unaided by reason.  This naturalism, which maps all action onto 
the single polarity of generation and sterility, seems to be the main justification for the 
Rose’s ending. The most dangerous aspects of Averroes’s thought can be glimpsed in the 
following summary: Averroes had been more interested in the common ability of man to 
understand, rather than “particularity of individual acts of understanding”, and in 
addition, “that in salvation the human individual is essentially depersonalized.”286 Paré 
suggested that the climate changed immediately after the second condemnation, but 
MacKlintock and Marenbon disagree, arguing instead that the Aristotelian exegesis 
continued “undeterred” for the last quarter of the thirteenth century. 287  The 
condemnations were aimed at literal propositions written in Latin. With the proviso, then, 
that these heresies never find a literal exposition within the Rose, we will see that, on the 
allegorical level, the work draws heavily on the Averroistic ideology of the universal 
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soul, the eternity of the world, astrological determinism, and the possibility of free 
will.288     
In order to prepare us for the ending, which will continue to rely on Scholastic 
models for ethics, Nature introduces one of the key Scholastic disputationes in order to 
account for both Providence and man’s responsibility for his actions. There can be no 
question that the inclusion of this particular disputatio in the poem pertains to ethics and 
will directly bear on the conclusion of the work. This discussion is also found in another 
work that Jean de Meun himself translated, the De Consolatione Philsophiae of Boethius, 
who himself was already theologizing chapter nine of Aristotle’s De Interpretatione. 
Thus this translatio was, in a sense, an allegorization, for the implications of Aristotle’s 
thought become quite different in a Christian providential universe, and by a providential 
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against them. 
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universe, it is with the caution that individual free will is in no way hindered. In the case 
of Boethius, the discussion was a fusion of Aristotelian logic and Stoic ethics - an earnest 
consolation for a writer during his incarceration - , whereas Jean frames the discussion in 
Nature’s bathetic lament. This is no doubt a parodic inversion, for Nature is criticized for 
her womanly garrulity and her crying [16312-3], again signaling the temptation to read 
the work through the lens of Euhemerism. 
Nature’s question is a medieval commonplace, spanning from Boethius, to 
Anselm, Abelard, Peter Lombard, Bonaventure, and Aquinas, to name only a few: 
namely, does God’s providence determine all action, and, its corollary, can man be said 
to have free will if God is omniscient (and by extension, omnipotent)?  These questions 
provide some of the most sustained argumentation within the work, and a remarkable 
flair on Jean de Meun’s part for rendering this jargon in the vernacular. Daniel Heller-
Roazen discusses this section with great erudition, noting the virtual absence of sustained 
critical commentary on this section with the exception of Paré and Helder, despite the 
fact that “in this distribution of its arguments, the passage is logically and rigorously 
constructed.” 289   Heller-Roazen shows that Nature preserves contingency over 
determinism, having carefully weighed all the arguments in favor the latter. His analysis 
aims to preserve as much contingency as possible by relegating Nature’s “miroer 
pardurable” (17475) to God’s supplement, which in turn needs to be polished (by God 
himself) in order for proper functioning. The mirror is the first explicit allegory in this 
lectio sequence, precisely at the moment where Nature is seeking to define her terms. 
Heller-Roazen argues that Jean violates the precept of divine simplicity by suggesting he 
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is working with an instrument. This image has its roots in the text of Boethius: “[God] 
looks out from the watch-tower of Providence, sees what suits each person, and applies to 
him whatever He knows is suitable.”290 Here, the mirror seems to be glossing that last 
piece of the puzzle that would have defined simple and conditional necessity more 
precisely. Nature argues that truth and necessity are not interchangeable, given that 
necessity can be used equivocally (simple and conditional):  
 
 Certes il diroit chose voire,  
 Mes non pas chose necessoire ;  
 Car comment qu’il l’ait ains veüe,  
 La chose n’est pas avenue 
 Par necessaire avenement,  
 Mes par possible seulement ;  
 Car s’il est qui bien i regart,  
 C’est necessité en regart,  
 Et non par necessité simple,  
 Si que ce ne vaut une guimple : 
 « Et se chose a venir est vaire,  
 Donc est ce chose necessaire », 
 Car tele verité possible 
 Ne puet pas estre convertible 
 Avec simple necessité 
 Si comme simple verité : 
 Si ne puet tex raison passer 
 Por franche volenté casser.  (17221-38) 
 
[Of course he would be speaking a true fact, but not one which was necessary, because, 
however he foresaw it, the fact did not occur by necessary succession, but only by 
possible succession.  For if we examine the matter carefully, this is conditional necessity 
and not  simple (i.e. absolute) necessity, and thus the following argument is not worth a 
wimple: “And if the event to come is true, then it was necessary”, for such possible truth 
cannot be convertible with simple necessity, just like the case of simple truth.  Thus you 
cannot use this as a reason to eradicate free will.]291    
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 In order to preserve man’s free will, she has to secure some aspect of man that will not 
be subject to conditional necessity.292 The question of determinism had been an issue 
since Augustine,  but the writings of the Islamic Peripatetics, including Avicenna, all 
seem to adopt a deterministic interpretation of Aristotle, that was bolstered by their more 
complete metaphysics, in addition to the De Interpretatione, where the question of 
linguistic determinism is framed more explicitly (book 9). It is also useful to remember 
that they had also inherited a very NeoPlatonic Aristotle. The Liber de Causis was 
attributed to the Philosopher until Aquinas finally vouched for its being an apocryphal 
NeoPlatonic (Proclus mingled with Pseudo-Dionysius) misattribution.  I believe that the 
insertion of this topic is carefully chosen and deliberate, given the almost unanimous 
Scholastic deference to Aristotle, because the challenge to the individual’s free will was 
becoming more concrete with the apparent backing of the Islamic Peripatetics.  In true 
Scholastic fashion, Nature argues that the problem is not one of concepts, for both free 
will and Providence are compatible, but one of terms, for the polysemy surrounding 
‘necessity’ obscures the ultimate compatibility of these theological realities.  My only 
reservation with Heller-Roazen’s analysis is that, after a discussion of all the various 
inscriptions of contingency, he ascribes a single determinate significance to the debate, 
thereby collapsing all ideology into poetics: “Decomposed and recomposed by the 
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arguments of the romance, the quaestio de futuribus contingentibus shows itself, in the 
end, to concern a fact of literary composition alone. […] Here, […] the poem shows itself 
for that it is: a work dedicated, through its language, its form, its rhetoric, and its 
organization, to an exploration of the many forms of its own possibility and actuality.” 
(Heller-Roazen, 131).  I think there are certainly implications for the Rose itself as a 
work, but here the significance extends well beyond the context of the poet gazing at his 
unfinished work.  As we shall see, the orthodox solution to this question offered by 
Boethius is being used tendentiously to prepare us for the new ethical manifesto of 
Nature and Genius.  
 Heller-Roazen draws his conclusion in favor of contingency by maintaining a 
close textual (and Scholastic) analysis of the debate’s terminology.  What his discussion 
avoids almost altogether is the question of ontology, where the most “medieval” aspects 
of Jean de Meun’s thought are in evidence.   It is my contention, however, that this 
universal ontology provides an additional explanation the prevailing determinism in this 
section.  And while much of the Nature section is directed against superstition, we find 
that his ontology includes faith in astrology, as the movement of the heavenly spheres are 
said to influence sublunary events.  Astral determinism should more properly be ascribed 
to Avicenna, for it was the Baghdad Peripatetic who translated the NeoPlatonic hierarchy 
of Intelligences into an astronomical scheme in which every existent flows necessarily 
from the Necessary Being through a series of intermediaries.293 And it is indeed Avicenna 
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rather than Averroes that Siger of Brabant follows in establishing the intelligences as 
intermediaries between God and his creation that accounts for the influence of the 
heavenly bodies in human affairs.294 And this, now rationalistic, foundation for astrology 
may mean that Reason’s myth about Jupiter, Saturn and Venus conforms to both 
allegorical and astrological truth (i.e. Saturn’s “moons” having been intercepted by 
Jupiter’s orbit): 
 
 S’el n’avoit la clarté joieuse 
 Des cors du ciel reflamboians,  
 Parmi l’air oscur et raians,  
 Qui tornoient en lor esperes,  
 Si cum l’establi Diex li peres.  
 La font entre’eus lor armonies,  
 Qui sont cause des melodies 
 Et des diversités de tons  
 Que par acordance metons  
 En toutes manieres de chant  
 N’est riens qui [par] celes ne chant.  
 Et muent par lor influances 
 Les accidens et les sustances 
 Des choses qui sont sous la lune. [16944-57]  
 
 [If she (Night) did not possess the joyous brightness of the flaming heavenly bodies, 
 radiating among the dark air, and which turn in their spheres, as established by God the 
 Father. There they make their harmonies amongst themselves which are the causes of the 
 melodies and the diversity of tones, whose accordance (hear chords) we place in all kinds 
 of song.  There is nothing which sings except through these movements.  And they 
 transmute through their influence the accidents and substances of all sublunary things.] 
 
The allegory of the spheres and their harmony, inaudible to human ears, also becomes the 
source of all song.  This is indeed one of the most Neo-Platonic passages in the entirety 
of the Rose.  What follows is a hylomorphic account of material composition drawn from 
Aristotle (De Generatione et Corruptione) [16958-74]. Nature looks to the radiating 
intelligences of the spheres as the determiners of created substances.  The only means to 
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achieve free will without falling prey to astral determinism is through his use of a non-
material faculty, namely Reason:  
 
 Car quant de sa propre nature,  
 Contre bien et contre droiture,  
 Se vuet homme ou fame atorner,  
 Raison l’en puet bien destorner 
 Por qu’il la croie solement.  
 Lors ira la chose autrement 
 Car autrement puet il bien estre,  
 Quoi que facent li cors celestre,  
 Qui mout ont grant pooir, sanz faille,   
 Por quoi Raison n’encontre n’aille.  
 Mes n’ont pooir contre Riason,  
 Car bien set chascuns sages hon 
 Qu’il n’est pas de Raison mestre 
 N’il ne la firent mie nestre. [17087-17100] 
 
[For when a man or woman wishes to turn away from his or her proper nature, against the 
good or against moral rectitude, Reason can turn him back, if only they believe her.  For 
the matter will then proceed differently, for it can always be otherwise, whatever the 
celestial bodies may do (and these, without fail, show their great power) if they are not 
hindered by Reason. But they have no power over Reason, for every wise man knows 
that he is not the master of Reason, and neither did he give birth to her].   
 
While the attribution of Reason to God himself is no doubt orthodox (“God-given 
reason”)295, there is a very clear implication as well that humans are not the source of 
their reason, and neither are they sovereign to it; rather it is a tool to be implemented, and 
indeed the only tool by which man finds exemption from determinism. While the 
Averroists would have agreed that reasoning takes place via bodily faculties, they would 
situate the actual intelligibles, and consequently, knowledge, as operating from the 
outside.  And this is connected to their conception of the soul, and in the case of the 
Averroists, or more specifically, Avicenna’s [sic] active intellect, which is not 
individuated in man, but rather external to him; according to this tenet, man’s various 
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faculties of thought (common to all animals) are individuated by their matter, but the 
intelligibles are never found within the faculties themselves. This theory also paved the 
way for a realistic conceptualism with regard to universal genera and species, now wholly 
conceptual and reflecting the nature of existent things. 
This separation of Reason from man is immediately followed by a return to the 
question of future contingents and providence, and Jean’s solution ends up, in quite 
typical Scholastic fashion, rendering the notions of eternity and temporality moot in the 
divine order:  
 
 Mes de sodre la question 
 Comment predestination 
 Et la divine prescience, 
 Plene de toute proveance, 
 Puet estre o volenté delivre, 
 Fors est a genz laiz a decrivre ; 
 Et qui vodroit la chose emprendre, 
 Trop lor seroit fort a entendre, 
 Qui lor avroit neïs solues 
 Les raisons encontre meües. 
 Mes il est voirs, quoi qu’il lor semble, 
 Que s’entresoffrent bien ensemble. [17101-12] 
 
 [To resolve the question of how predestination and divine prescience, full of all 
 foreknowledge, can exist alongside free will, is a difficult matter to explain to the laity.  
 And whoever wished to embark on this matter would find it too difficult to understand 
 whoever had resolved the matter with the opposing arguments. But it is true, no matter 
 what it seems, that divine foreknowledge and free will get on rather well together.] 
 
 C’est la predestinacion, 
 C’est la prescience devine, 
 Qui tout set et rienz ne devine, 
 Qui seult as gens sa grace estendre 
 Quant el les voit a bien entendre ; 
 Ne n’a pas por ce sozplanté 
 Pooir de franche volenté. 
 Tuit homme euvrent par franc voloir, 
 Soit por joïr, ou por doloir. 
 C’est sa presente vision ; 
 Car qui la diffinicion 
 De pardurableté deslie, 
 Ce est possession de vie 
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 Qui par fin ne puet estre prise 
 Trestoute ensemble sans devise. [17484-98] 
 
[This is predestination, this is divine prescience, which knows everything and guesses at 
nothing, which can extend its grace to those it sees who intend to do good, and which 
does not, on this account, supplant the power of free will.  Every man works through his 
free will, for either joy or suffering.  [Divine prescience] is God’s present vision, for 
whoever manages to discern the definition of ‘eternity’ is in possession of life which 
cannot be brought to an end, for everything is considered together simultaneously]. 
 
As Paré notes, “God’s eternal instant has neither past nor future: it is only present.”296 
This definition, originating in Boethius’s Consolatio, provided a sound (and orthodox!) 
solution to this thorny Scholastic problem, for it is even evoked with approbation by St. 
Thomas Aquinas.  It can be said that the eternity (non-creation) of the world is not 
explicitly stated in the Rose, for Nature endorses creation ex nihilo [16741-50] with a 
description that  closely resembles the demiurge or Plato’s Timaeus. But we must 
remember that even Aristotle describes his eternal universe using the language of 
temporality, and so his First Mover is ontologically, but not temporally, prior to his 
intermediaries. Boethius had allowed Eternity to be a category for God, albeit one that is 
only loosely connected to temporality: “Eternity then is the complete, simultaneous and 
perfect possession of everlasting life; this will be clear from a comparison with creatures 
that exist in time.”297 What this means is that temporality becomes a ‘human’ term and 
only predicated equivocally of the Divine, which ‘sees’ everything as an eternal present. 
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Nature’s first disputatio on the question of divine foreknowledge is later revisited 
in a work of Platonic allegoresis (in which Plato is made to voice an Aristotelian theory 
of forms), but further glosses the meaning of eternity:  
 
 Dont je fais tel conclusion: 
 Puis que vous commençates estre 
 Par la volenté vostre mestre 
 Dont fait estes et engendré  
 Par quoi je vous tienz et tendré,  
 N’este pas de mortalité 
 Ne de corruption quité 
 Du tout, que touz ne vous veïsses 
 Morir se je ne vous tenisse.  
 Par nature morir porrés 
 Mes par mon vuel je ne morrés,  
 Car mon voloir a seignorie 
 Sus les liens de vostre vie,  
 Qui les compositions tiennent 
 Dont pardurabletés vous viennent.  
 C’est la sentence de la lettre 
 Que Platon vot en livre metre. [19098-19114] 
 
[From this I draw the following conclusion:  Since you came into being through the will 
of your Master, by whom you were made and created, and it is to this will that I hold and 
will continue to hold you.  You are not at all exempt from mortality and corruption, and 
you would all regard yourselves as immortal if I did not hold you to his will. By nature 
you are  mortal, but by my will you will not die, for my will has lordship over the bonds 
(of the  Fates) of your life, which hold the compositions from which your eternality 
originates.  This is the sententia (meaning) of the letter that Plato wanted to put in his 
book.] 
 
Nature’s exegesis of Plato’s Timaeus, handed down through the Calcidius translation, 
suggests that the eternality of man resides in his material form rather than his soul. God 
made man’s intellect (entendement) [19146] before giving it to him.  The reading of Plato 
is heavily Christianized, and this is hardly exceptional. But in addition to prefiguring 
Christian theological truth, Plato is made to conform to a new set of scientific knowledge 
as his Timaeus now imparts the wisdom of Aristotle.  If we remember that in Plato, the 
source of man’s immortality lay in his connection to the immaterial realm of forms, quite 
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different from (material) immortality via composicions.  Nature’s point is that we are 
eternal in virtue of our form/composition and our capacity to generate likenesses.   
After this discussion comes a caution about the limits of Plato’s theological 
knowledge, for he could have had no conception of the divine triunity, nor of the Virgin 
birth. In regards to this last miracle, Nature herself admits that it occurred without her 
help and she frankly does not understand miracles [19161-2], thereby suggesting a willful 
separation of theology from natural science, a maneuver that had been prefigured by 
Avicenna and Averroes. But immediately following the establishment of a rigid 
demarcation between the natural and the divine, Nature begins to talk about the 
prophecies concerning the coming of Christ, beginning with Virgil’s Bucolics (IV, 7-10) 
[19169-70]. Unlike Siger and Boethius of Dacia, Jean establishes viable parameters 
between the various subjects of inquiry in order to flout them.   
After elaborating the ineffability topos, claiming how Art can never equal Nature, 
Nature herself brings up a particular topic that is at the very margins of her science, 
namely alchemy, that singular ‘artificial’ process that effects the transmutation of species.  
Alchemy (transformation of base metals into gold) had previously been refuted by Al-
Kindi, Avicenna, and Averroes, even though the Latin West attributed the Arabic 
manuals of alchemy to Avicenna himself. 298  The topic is examined with abundant 
technical and Scholastic vocabulary, resulting in extreme ambiguity (equivocation) as 
these alchemical terms find resonance with other fields of inquiry:  
 Ou d’arquemie tant aprengne 
 Que touz metauz en colors tengne 
 Qu’el se porroit ançois tuer 
 Que les especes remuer,  
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 Se tant ne fait que les ramene  
 A lor matire premerene ; 
 Et ouvre tant cum el vivra,  
 Ja tant Nature n’aconsivra.  
 Et se tant se voloit pener 
 Que les y peüst ramener,  
 Si le faudroit, espoir, science  
 De venir a tel atrempance,  
 Quant el feroit son elixir,  
 Dont la forme devroit issir,  
 Qui devise entr’eus les sustances 
 Par especiaus differences,  
 Si cum il pert au definir,  
 Qui bien en set a chief venir.  
 [….] 
 Car comment qu’il aut des espieces,  
 Au mains les singulieres pieces,  
 Qu’en sensibles ovres sont mises,  
 Sont muables en tant de guises,  
 Que pueent lor compleccions 
 Par diverses digestions,  
 Si changier entre’eus que cis changes  
 Les met sous especes estranges 
 Et lor toust l’espece premiere. [16065-82, 16087-95] 
 
[He should learn so much about alchemy that he should be able to dye the metals 
different colors.  But he could kill himself before converting the species, unless he were 
to bring them back to their prime matter.  However long he works at it, he will not be 
able to equal nature.  And if he really wanted to struggle, such that he thought he could 
bring metals back into such a state, he would perhaps lack the knowledge to come to such 
a perfect mixture, so that when he sets out to make his elixir, from which there would 
emerge the form which divides substances according to their specific differentiae, as it 
pertains to the  definition, for him who knows how to bring this transformation to 
completion.(…)  For whatever the case may be for the species, particulars, when 
subjected to careful work, are  subject to change in so many respects that they, through 
various alterations, exchange their ‘complexions’ in such a way that it removes the first 
species and categorizes it under  another.]   
 
Nature seems to be straddling both sides of the issue here, for alchemy is presented both 
as an ars veritable (16084), but this is after a suggestion that alchemy was the science of 
dyeing metals, or in other words, changing their accidents. If Nature’s assessment of 
alchemy seems somewhat contradictory (if alchemy is a true art, then shouldn’t the 
species transmute?), there is a way out of this conundrum, if we see it as a reflection on 
logic and poetics; within the mind, the various genera and species can commute with 
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each other, thus making this passage metaphorically refer to metaphor itself.  After 
elaborating the various avatars of this trope (which involve some permutation on genera 
and species), the Philosopher states confidently: “But the greatest thing by far is to be a 
master of metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be learnt from others; and it is also a 
sign of genius, since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in 
dissimilars.”299  Here C.S. Lewis proves instructive: “By abstaining from all technical 
details and giving only the root idea of that science, which is all that a layman can be 
expected to learn, gives also, as it happens, just that part of the alchemical idea which is 
truly imaginative.”300 
Further supporting the interconnected nature of language and alchemy, Jean 
warns that false alchemical science is yet another form of sophistry:  
 
 Car de fin argent font or nestre 
 Cil qui d’arquemie sont mestre  
 […] 
 Et les autres metaus desnuent  
 De lor formes cil qui les muent 
 En fin argent par medecines 
 Blanches et tresperçans et fines.  
 Mes ce ne feroient cil mie 
 Qui ovrent de sofisterie ; 
 Travaillent tant cum il vivront,  
 Ja Nature n’aconsivront. [16135-36, 16141-48] 
 
[For those who are masters of alchemy can give rise to gold from fine silver, and those 
who transmute substances strip the other metals of their (common) forms in order to 
create fine silver by white, translucent and fine ointments.  But they would not be able to 
achieve this if they were working by sophistry.  Even if they worked for the rest of their 
days, they would never be able to equal Nature.] 
 
Like the Sophist who proffers false arguments based on appearance, the false alchemist 
strives to disguise the real nature of things through dyeing.  The limitations of the human 
                                                 
299
 Aristotle, Poetics, 22.   
300
 Lewis, Allegory of Love, 143.  
209 
 
artisan are contrasted with the more amazing power of Nature. And while the topic of 
Eucharistic transubstantiation is never explored explicitly, the implications of this 
discussion of alchemy no doubt extend to this most “substantial” sacrament.  In this 
allegorical context, it becomes impossible to ascribe primacy to science, metaphor, or 
sacrament, the last of which finds no logical foundations in Aristotle or Averroes. Given 
the implicit attack on holy orders, marriage, and confession, it would be hard to read this 
mini-treatise on alchemy as a confirmation of sacramental efficacy, especially since the 
more literal “science” (alchemy) as depicted here is, at best, rendered equivocally.     
Nature continues her substantive explanation of natural phenomena when she 
turns to the topic of dreams, a reminder of our allegorical setting. It is Nature who 
explicitly rejects the previous authority of Guillaume de Lorris on this matter 
(Macrobius) who had defended the validity of premonitory dreams. Nature suggests 
instead a more naturalistic and less spiritual account of dreams:  
 
 Et ce n’est fors trufle et mençonge,  
 Ausinc cum de l’omme qui songe,  
 Qui voit, ce cuide, en lor presences,  
 Les espirituex sustances 
 Si cum fist Scipion jadis ;  [18363-67] 
 
 [And it is nothing but illusion and lies, just as in the case of the man who dreams, who 
 believes he sees the spiritual substances in their physical manifestation, just as did Scipio 
 of yore].   
   
Nature implies that the spiritual substance would not be visible, therefore vision cannot 
be predicated of any non-corporeal entity. The derision to which Nature subjects Scipio 
may be aimed at more than just Macrobius’s theory of premonitory dreams, according to 
which spiritual substances become visible; her target may have also been the anti-
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Aristotelian diatribe that Macrobius launches against the Peripatetics in book 15 of the 
Somnio Scipionis.  This constitutes a rejection of the authority that Guillaume had laid 
out for his dream vision.  It now seems that Macrobius would hardly endorse a courtly 
love vision as a “somnium” (or allegorical, prophetic dream), but this was Guillaume’s 
“mistake”.301 At this time, Macrobius represents an outmoded nature of reading dreams 
that relied on a less sophisticated Platonic realism as well as mystical oneirics.  Instead, 
Aristotle’s somatic and rationalistic account of dreams is made to account for Scipio’s 
delusions.  It can be yet seen as another ‘act of castration’ on Jean’s part, by reducing the 
explicit authority of his precursor to a crackpot.302   Minnis argues that the Aristotelian, 
rationalistic interpretation of dreams was picked up by the Latin Averroist Boethius of 
Dacia, who relegated the supposedly prophetic dream to matters of coincidence: “the 
event would have happened even if there had been no appearance similar to it in a 
dream.”303  
 
Genius’s Eternal World 
   
Genius is the homonymous figure of Alain’s De Planctu and also a parody of his 
Chartrian avatar. Despite the comedy of this section, Genius provides the clearest and 
most sustained example of the Rose’s Utopian impulse, wherein man’s sexual practices 
are in accordance with his nature and not fettered by religious or sacramental ideology.  
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His zeal for generation is exemplified in his literalizing treatment of the myth of Jupiter 
and Saturn,  here resulting in the appearance of the word ‘coilles’ twelve times, though 
sometimes paronymously (escoillier), in fewer than fifty lines [20036-80], thereby 
insisting on the ensuing sterility of Saturn, as man. This seems to be a Euhemeristic 
reading of the myth (Jupiter and Saturn as real individuals), but Genius has combined it 
with a moral interpretation in which castration is made equivalent to the ultimate evil, 
and hence all real and mythographic figures are recast in terms of production or sterility. 
Wetherbee, following Jauss, remarks on  the “unflinching literalism” of “Genius and La 
Vieille” with regard to sexuality in comparison with Raison’s citing of Plato and 
“recourse to integumanz”, and he finds in this evidence of how Jean “de-allegorizes his 
materials”. 304  Genius thus continues Reason’s anatomical frankness, yet without 
suggesting a secondary sense to his words. And yet, it is through this literalism that the 
poem’s ultimate gloss emerges.   
Earlier in his article, Wetherbee states “It is Genius who provides a full allegorical 
context for the laws of conduct which Raison had offered to the Lover.  It is he who 
elaborates on the myth of the castration of Saturn, showing how Jupiter’s violent act 
ushered in the world of necessity, yet did so in the name of a false, willful delit.”305 
Genius uses literality (initially) in the service of his tendentiously naturalistic allegory. 
As he is associated with a Christian, NeoPlatonic, and Aristotelian “good” (creation), 
Genius falls outside the church’s conception of grace and personal immortality,  and this 
ignorance should be supposed by the very term ‘Genius’.306 The comic capacities of any 
allegory of the “procreative instinct” are, of course, exploited to their maximum. I agree 
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with Wetherbee’s assessment that “[Genius] is unaware that Grace is a necessary 
supplement to those innate capacities which are his only resource.”307 Unlike Reason, 
Genius uses ‘coilles’ literally, therefore, the myth of Saturn’s castration as an exemplum 
of castration itself.  By his very nature as the generative principle, Genius constantly 
universalizes, thereby making the species consistently commute with any individual. He 
longs for a world (Golden Age) where creation is at the forefront, but his speech proceeds 
as if man had never fallen, as if there were no need for grace, and as if his only 
immortality is to be found by extending one’s lineage.  As a consequence, the fall is re-
written as a fall from potency, not from grace.  
By metaphorical extension, Genius also represents the faculty of imagination, the 
mind’s production of images being analogous to the reproductive capacities of the 
species.  In Boethius, the imagination was transcended by reason, because the latter was 
able to proceed from the shape (figura) given by the imagination to the species.308  His 
concept of generation is conveniently extended to all of its semantic fields – textual, 
reproductive, agricultural, artisanal, to name only the most common. Genius complicates 
matters because he introduces the allegory of the penis/pen to the vagina/page, the 
hammer to the anvil, and the plough to the field [19561-19582], all utilitarian metaphors, 
suggesting that writing is not masturbatory or auto-erotic (in other words it does not 
supplement), but rather is analogous to procreative coitus.  The propagation of the species 
becomes associated with the analogous propagation of the text, and the pen must, like the 
organs of generation, be capable of generating likenesses.  The moral injunction is 
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loosened somewhat by the allegorical extension of ‘generation’, but those who forsake all 
its forms are subject to condemnation:  
 
 Vis les puisse l’en enfoïr 
 Quant les ostis osent foïr 
 Que Diex de sa main entailla,  
 Quant a ma dame les bailla, 
 Et por ce les li vot baillier 
 Qu’el seüst autex entaillier 
 Por donner estres pardurables  
 As creatures corrumpables.  [19575-82] 
 
[If only we could bury them alive when they dare forsake the tools that God made with 
His own hands and gave them to my lady [Nature].  And he gave them to her so that she 
might be able to make such tools in order to give everlasting being to corruptible 
creatures].   
 
Despite the plain metaphors, the allegorical sense is clear: immortality is being explored 
from a more materialist perspective.  This is not the eternality evoked by Boethius in his 
Consolatione, but rather the newly emergent Aristotelian ‘science’ which made eternality 
a natural phenomenon, perceptible in the continual renewal of the species.  
In this matter, Boethius accords nicely, especially in his greater orthodoxy, with 
the Averroism of Siger of Brabant, whose most extended discussion of the question of 
universals appears in his tract De aeternitate mundi. The doctrine of the eternal world 
was particularly damaging to that of Providence, for without creation and an ultimate 
telos, it becomes impossible to view any orderly linear history within a divine plan.  This 
tract shows, yet again, how the key philosophical heresies of the day are being argued 
with the terms ‘genera’ and ‘species’, a phenomenon explained and contextualized in 
Siger’s tract by Alain de Libera:  
 
Le contexte est caractéristique des thèmes attribués aux partisans latins d’Averroès : 
l’éternité du monde, c’est-à-dire aussi l’éternité du temps, du ciel et des espèces et celle 
des universaux, n’est pas extrinsèque. Pour deux raisons : (a) une raison philosophique 
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générale – la question des régularités nomologiques est liée conceptuellement au 
problème des universaux ; (b) une raison spécifiquement médiévale, qui tient à la manière 
dont est conduite la discussion.  Pour les partisans de la création du monde : (majeure) 
l’espèce humaine, comme toute espèce naturelle (c’est-à-dire soumise à génération et 
corruption) a commencé d’être absolument et universellement parlant (penitus et 
universaliter).  Or (mineure) l’espèce humaine (et toute espèce d’individus en général ) 
est telle que n’importe quel individu de cette espèce a commencé d’être sans avoir été 
auparavant.  Donc (conclusion) toute espèce de ce genre est « nouvelle » (a eu un 
commencement absolu dans le temps) et a commencé d’être sans avoir été auparavant.309  
 
 
This is the conclusion that Siger struggles against (namely, that man, or any member of 
the species, came into being ex nihilo without having existed before), because, following 
Aristotle, he can find no way of accounting for the emergence of the species either in 
time or absolutely. The analysis of temporality is inextricably linked to that of ontology 
and succession. Siger is of course aware of a logically sound “nominalism” which would 
posit the species “coming into being within a determinate individual”, but he ultimately 
rejects that argument in favor of a more “philosophical” position according to which the 
“human species came into being by accident, by the generation of one individual before 
another ad infinitum, and not in a single determinate individual, who would not have been 
before.”310 Due to the Statute of 1272 which banned the teaching of any thesis contrary to 
the faith where the Artists and Theologians shared an area of inquiry, Siger could not 
bring any arguments to justify this last position, instead returning to the premises behind 
the universal, where he elaborates a cautiously Averroistic thesis according to which 
universals are simply things intellected, hence in the soul and necessarily universal in 
thought. Pressing the question of universals, in this particular university context,  to their 
logical conclusions can lead to demonstration of the world’s eternity or monospychism, 
both now heretical, and both subject to severe censorship.  
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Nonetheless, such positions do find their logical support within the Rose, and for 
this Genius re-directs his venom once again to the sterile mendicant orders, whose 
precept of chastity, in exchange for grace, would lead to the disappearance of the species 
if universalized. Creation, propagation and continuation, insofar as they manifest the 
superiority of actuality over potentiality, become taken as absolute goods. Siger’s 
arguments for the eternity of the world were framed on the question of succession.   If the 
species can be originated (a tenet that an Averroist would deny), then it can surely 
likewise become extinct if man eschews his own nature.  The satire reaches its most 
audacious point here, for if the world is not eternal, then clerical celibacy will lie in 
opposition to divine providence, and would therefore be based on a theological heresy: 
 
 Mout ovrent mal, et bien le semble,  
 Car se tretuit li homme ensemble 
 Seissante ans foïr les voloient,  
 Jamés homme n’engendreroient.  
 Et se ce plait a Dieu, sans faille 
 Dont vuet il que li mondes faille. [19583-88] 
 [...] 
 S’il noviaux hommes ne faisoit,  
 Se refaire les li plaisoit,  
 Ou ceus feïst resusciter 
 Por la terrie arrier habiter ; 
 Et se cil virge se tenoient  
 Soixante ans, de rechief faudroient, 
 Si que, se ce li devoit plaire,  
 Tous jors les auroit a refaire.  
 Et s’il ert qui dire vousist  
 Que Diex le voloir en tousist 
 A l’un par grace, a l’autre non,  
 Por ce qu’il a si bon renon 
 N’onques ne cessa de bien faire,  
 Dont li deveroit il bien plaire 
 Que chascuns autretel feïst  
 Si qu’autel grace en li meïst ; 
 Si ravrai ma conclusion 
 Que tout n’aille a perdicion.  
 Je ne sai pas a ce respondre, 
 Ne foi ne vuet creance apondre,  
 Car Diex a lor commencement 
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 Les aime touz uniement  
 Et donne raisonnables ames 
 Aussic as hommes cum as fames 
 Si croi qu’il vodroit de chascune,  
 Non pas tant seulement de l’une,  
 Que le meillor chemin tenist 
 Par quoi plus tost a li venist. 
 S’il vuet donques que vierge vive 
 Aucuns por ce que miex le sive,  
 Des autres por quoi nel vorra ? 
 Quele raison l’en destorra ? 
 Dont semble il qu’il ne li chausist 
 Se generacion fausist.  [19591-624] 
 
[They are working for evil, it seems, for if all men together wished to shun their tools for 
sixty years, they would never engender any man.  And if this pleases God, then he surely 
wishes the world to vanish. Unless he made a new man (if remaking one of them pleased 
Him) or if He resurrected the Ancients so that they might again dwell on earth.  But if 
these men remained virgins for sixty years, once again they would vanish, so that if it 
pleased  Him, he would constantly have to remake them.  And if there were an objector 
who wished to say that God removed desire from one man by grace, and not the other, 
because of his  great reputation (he never ceased to do good), then he should be happy to 
see each man do the same so that God will grant him such grace. And again I will have 
my conclusion: that everything would go to perdition. I don’t know how to respond to 
this conclusion, and the  faith does not wish to expound this belief.  For God loves them 
all equally when they are born and gives rational souls to both men and women.  And I 
believe that he wants every woman, and not just one, to follow the best path in order to 
reach Him sooner.  If He wants  therefore for men to live as virgins, some in order to 
better follow Him, why will he not want the same for all others?  What reason would 
convince him otherwise?  It seems that  that it matters little to Him whether or not 
generation ceased to occur.] 
 
By commuting man, metonymically in the form of his ‘generative parts’, with the 
species, Genius has drawn on one of the most basic forms of metaphor, species (here the 
individual) to genus (here the species).311 Genius’s question is similar to the one posed in 
Siger’s De Aeternitate Mundi, namely, could we exist without our capacity to reproduce, 
and is this logic not universally applicable to all animate species? Sarah Kay brings us 
right to the center of the controversy, calling Genius’s address to the army “one of the 
most problematic parts of the Rose.” Within his speech one finds “outrageous 
miscegenation of sex and theology in the promise that the individual can achieve union 
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with the Godhead through reproduction.  In addition, there is quite egregious confusion 
of the particular with the universal.  Immortality is the concern of the individual, whereas 
reproductive sex enables the perpetuation of the species.”312  And this is precisely the 
crux of the Averroistic interpretation of the Rose. If this logic, here contextualized in the 
continued satire of clerical celibacy, were followed to its ultimate conclusion, that 
problem which “faith does not wish to expound,” we could see the eternity of the species 
(by extension, world), not simply as a spiritual reality, but as a natural, material one. The 
eternal world conundrum, here presented in the form of a satirical translatio, entailed a 
series of dangerous consequences for the faith, just as it had done previously for the Arab 
philosophers.  
In this universal process of generation, which requires the active participation of 
individuals, man is framed more in terms of his genus, animalia, directed toward his 
natural appetite. This provides an equally humorous, if less satirical, context for the 
words of la Vieille, who equated Nature with an instinctive determinism when discussing 
young men who vow celibacy for clerical life:  
 
 Mes Nature ne puet mentir 
 Qui franchise li fait sentir,  
 Car Oraces neïs raconte,  
 Qui bien set que tel chose monte,  
 Qui vodroit une forche prendre 
 Por soi de Nature deffendre 
 Et la boutast ensus de soi,  
 Revendroit elle, bien le soi.  
 Touz jors Nature retorra,  
 Ja por habit ne demorra.  
 Que vaut ce? toute creature 
 Vuet returner a sa nature,  
 Ja nou lera por violence 
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 De force ne de convenance. [14017-30] 
 
[But Nature cannot lie, she who makes men feel freedom, for Horace, who knew how 
precious freedom was, once told us that if someone wanted to take up a pitchfork, 
swinging it above himself to defend himself from Nature, she will always come back, 
never to be deterred by a habit. What does this mean?  That every creature wishes to 
return to his nature, which it will never forsake, despite violence, brute force, or 
convention].    
 
La Vieille recognizes that her instincts are shared by the animals [14053-90], which is 
how she has rationalized her own dissolute past; her ideology has led her to believe that 
man’s ‘naturel appetit’ [14089] is not subject to control by Reason.  This is an example 
of la Vieille’s vulgar realism, or as it were, a crude biologism, which parodically 
universalizes every maxim in the service of self-interest.  In resorting to the logic of 
species, la Vieille offers scientific backing, based on common observation, to defend 
fornication. Her ethics, while so satirical in isolation, are subject to a new relativism as 
the notion of the individual self becomes moot in Genius’s and Nature’s universal plan.  
  And this brings us back to the question of immortality, which in Christian terms, 
was the survival of the immaterial soul. In this respect, medieval Christianity and Islam 
were united, at least from an “orthodox” perspective, but this did not mean that there 
were not rationalistic attempts to imagine the afterlife in a less spiritual fashion.  While 
Avicenna had made a concession for the afterlife via absorption into the active Intellect, 
Averroes believed that man’s immortality lay in the separate Intellect, entirely 
depersonalized and retaining no memory, while the species, with its common form, was 
naturally immortal.313 And this seems to accord with Nature’s characterization of man’s 
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immortality [15911-76], namely through man’s cheating of Death by successive 
generation, ensuring the perpetuation of the “forme commune”[15974], a discussion 
which includes Avicenna [15961], who, as individual, could not escape death despite his 
skill as a physician.  To begin his sermon, Genius establishes Nature’s position in a 
deistic, astrologically ruled universe [19505-42], an introduction that reveals the 
dominance of Avicenna’s theory of the emanating intellects. Despite a rhetorical 
concession to the world’s “coming into being” (Puis que cis mondes vint en estre – 
19518), we find no equivalent of an artisanal creation as depicted in Genesis. In Genius’s 
sermon, then, a scientific naturalism is proselytized through a comedic, and thoroughly 
anti-sacramental religious symbolism.   
This conflation of spiritual and material immortality was already prefigured in 
Nature’s discussion of nobility, an attribute that she refuses to confer upon Alexander the 
Great, who is himself conflated with Christ triumphant and the randy lover: 
 
 Dist il, tant fu d’orgoil destrois,  
 Que cis mondes ert si estrois 
 Qu’il s’i pooit envis torner,  
 N’il n’i voloit plus sejorner,  
 Ains pensoit d’autre monde querre 
 Por commencier novele guerre,  
 Et s’en aloit enfer brisier 
 Por soi faire par tout prisier ; 
 Dont tretuit de poor tramblerent 
 Li dieu d’enfer, car il cuiderent,  
 Quant je le lor dis, que ce fust  
 Cis qui par le baston de fust,  
 Por les ames par pechié mortes,  
 Devoit d’enfer brisier les portes 
 Et lor grant orgueil eschacier 
 Por ses amis d’enfer chacier. [18771-86] 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
cette disposition disparaîtra avec l’existence du corps." Histoire de la Philosophie I, vol. 2 ed. Parain, 
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[(Alexander), so consumed by pride, said that the world was too small, that he could 
barely  turn back to it, that he didn’t want to stay there any longer, instead he wanted to 
find another world to begin a new war, and that he was going to annihilate hell in order to 
earn the esteem of everyone.  And this made the gods of the underworld tremble, for they 
thought, when I told them of his plan, that it was he who was supposed to tear down the 
gates of hell with his wooden staff for those souls who had died by sin, and purge them of 
their great pride, in order to deliver his friends from hell.] 
 
Here it is not the cross which demolishes the gates of hell, but rather a wooden staff, later 
glossed more licentiously as the poem draws to its conclusion.  As we have seen 
previously, Euhemeristic mythology, Biblical and Hellenic history are willfully conflated.  
I mention Euhemerism because this is a depiction of its emergence: Alexander, proud of 
his many conquests and absolute power, begins to flirt with the idea of his own divinity.  
That which escapes his power absolutely is the afterlife, as theological a concept in 
ancient Greece as in Christendom. This theological term ‘enfer’ is used equivocally here 
as it refers to analogous ‘realities’ within Hellenic and Christian civilizations. This 
passage seems to be a comedic inversion of one of the passages in the Metaphysics where 
Aristotle describes how the heavenly movers/intelligences were deified by their ancestors 
and handed down in the form of myth, something “we must regard as an inspired 
utterance, and reflect that, while probably each art and science has often been developed 
as far as possible and has again perished, these opinions have been preserved like relics 
until the present.”314 Etienne Gilson has noted how Averroes could have justified his 
apparent deism by recourse to this passage in Aristotle, 315  making it a particularly 
dangerous passage for instruction during the time of official censorship beginning in 
1270 and reaching its zenith in 1277. The orders are reversed between Aristotle and Jean 
de Meun (heaven(s) to hell, heavenly intelligence to mortal Alexander), for Aristotle 
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explains how the species imposited these divine names for the eternal intelligences, 
Alexander’s individual apotheosis is merely the whim of his imagination and is doomed 
to failure. His story is an exemplum of false deification and a reminder that the 
reproductive organs (wooden staff) are man’s sole connection to immortality.       
 When Genius retells the myth of Pygmalion and Galatea [20817-21183], we are 
confronted with an example in bono of the transformative power of desire to animate the 
inanimate.  But this recasting of the Ovidian myth, in which Galatea is given the role of a 
speaking subject and object of desire, for she is, unlike the rose, a speaking and actively 
desiring subject; what is more, she uses a non-embellished speech to signify desire 
literally and without trappings.316 As artist, Pygmalion resembles the poet Jean, who 
loves his Rose, and as lover, he represents the lover Guillaume whose first exemplum of 
Narcissus [1439-1506], directed at women, yielded a fatally sterile result. As regards the 
more fruitful coupling of Pygamlion and Galatea, however, Jean de Meun is too skilled 
with comedy to give us a purely in bono exemplum. According to Marc-René Jung, 
myths can represent a typology which the character is experiencing (sensus allegoricus), 
and this seems the most credible explanation for its insertion here. 317  Hill reads 
Pygmalion, pace Gunn, as an exemplum of folly, so this must surely be a continuation of 
parody. Jean’s version exploits the comedic potential of Pygmalion much more than the 
Ovide Moralisé, as Hill demonstrates in his article. But even within the narration of the 
myth here, the folly of Pygmalion is comedic, while the concupiscence of the lovers is 
condoned by valorization of this vice’s generative capacities [21184], especially when 
contrasted with the sterile, and by allegorical extension, fatal self-love of Narcissus, 
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recalled again by Genius [20874-88]. Once again, there seems to be two allegorical 
referents to Pygmalion’s sculpture – the rose and the Rose, established through the earlier 
equivalence of coitus and writing. These myths often reflect fabliaux values but with firm 
logical and philosophical backing.  
If Jean de Meun showed some difficulty in keeping his rhetoric separate from his 
ethics, he finds a sound justification in Aristotle, for the latter’s ethics are often found in 
peculiar places, i.e., in works other than his two books dedicated explicitly to the subject 
(Nicomachean and Eudamion)  After Aristotle’s first sentence of the Rhetoric, 
establishing the discipline as “the counterpart of dialectic”,318 the Philosopher proceeds to 
define the art in utilitarian terms, with “persuasion” being at the forefront of his 
discussion.  Besides being a manual on good usage, the Rhetoric seems to be a 
preliminary to law, politics and ethics.319  In Rhetoric, 1.5, Aristotle underlines a tenet 
about human nature that is, for the most part, compatible with any materialistic and 
teleological ethics: “It may be said that every individual man and all men in common aim 
at a certain end which determines what they choose and what they avoid.  This end, to 
sum it up briefly, is happiness and its constituents.”320 To situate happiness as the telos of 
human action was condemned in Augustine’s later ethical teachings. This goal is not only 
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presented as natural to man, but also as desirable.321  He goes on: “Health, beauty, and the 
like, as being bodily excellences and productive of many other good things: for instance, 
health is productive both of pleasure and of life, and therefore is thought the greatest of 
goods, since these two things which it causes, pleasure and life, are two of the things 
most highly prized by ordinary people.”322  This is why “Nature, for Aristotle, is an 
insufficient premise for practical matters, for men are not ‘naturally’ good but are also 
subject to reason and habit.  Therefore art and education complement nature in ensuring 
good action.”323  
If we think back to Reason and Faux Semblant, who had underlined the 
importance of the Sophistical Refutations, we can again see how Aristotle sought to 
disentangle ethics from tradition (not the case of the Sophists) in contradistinction to the 
philosopher who uses “nature and truth”. Aristotle shows that oppositions between law 
and nature do not result in paradoxes, because this would imply that they belong to the 
same field of inquiry.  Indeed, Jean de Meun furthers the claim of the Refutations by 
“failing to generate” a paradox between Nature and the Law, for, quite simply, Nature is 
the Law of God, thus transcending mortal laws. The Fall, both Biblically and 
mythographically, provided the reason for both man’s carnality and the necessity to 
police it, but it provided a temporal explanation to an omnitemporal trait of the species. 
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Aristotle does not write from the perspective of the Fall, and can therefore suggest that 
the goal of happiness (or beatitude for the Christian Peripatetics) is not only achievable 
but desirable in this lifetime, and it is here that the challenge to Christian ethics becomes 
most apparent. 
After Genius concludes his sermon to an enthralled audience, the poem’s narrator 
addresses youth, in terms that are remarkably similar to the carpe diem motif found at the 
beginning of the De Amore by Andreas Capellanus (the only work explicitly condemned 
in 1277), thereby fusing a theme found in the poetry of Catullus and Ovid with 
Aristotelian logic:  
 
 Et s’il vous plest a ce flechir 
 Vos cuers por plus tost enrichir,  
 Ou vous qui delit y savés, 
 Se regart au delit avés,  
 Bien poés ce chemin tracier 
 Por vous deduire et solacier. 
 [….] 
 Croie m’en qui m’en vodra croire,  
 Qu’il fait bon de tout essaier  
 Por soi miex es biens esagier, 
 […] 
 Et set loer et set blamer 
 Liquel sont dous, li quel amer,  
 Car de plusors en a goutés.  
 […] 
 N’onc nus ne sot quel chose est aise 
 S’il n’ot avant apris mesaise,  
 Ne n’est pas dignes d’aise avoir 
 Qui ne vuet mesaise savoir ;  
 Et qui bien ne la set souffrir,  
 Nus ne li devroit aise offrir.  
 Aussi va des contraires choses,  
 Les unes sont des autres gloses ;  
 Et qui l’une en vuet defenir,  
 De l’autre li doit sovenir,  
 Ou ja par nulle entencion  
 N’i metra diffinicion ; 
 Car qui des deus n’a connoissance 
 Ja n’i metera difference,  
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 Sanz quoi ne puet venir en place 
 Diffinicion que l’en face. [21539-44, 21550-52, 21559-61, 21567-82] 
 
[And if you wish to submit your hearts to this logic in order to enrich your hearts at an 
earlier age, or those of you who have found pleasure there, if you are inclined to pleasure, 
you can take this path to delight and gratify yourselves. (…) Believe me if you will: it is 
good to try everything, so that one can take greater pleasure in such goods. (…) And he 
knows how to find merit or fault, which things are sweet and which are bitter, for he has 
partaken of many. (…)  No one ever discovered what happiness was if he had not 
previously learned of unhappiness, nor is he worthy of happiness if he does not wish to 
know unhappiness. And if he is unable to bear unhappiness, no one should offer 
happiness to him.And so it goes for contrary things, which are glosses of each other.  And 
if you wish to define one, you must remember the other, otherwise you will not be able to 
form a definition regardless of your intention.  For whoever lacks knowledge of both will 
not be able to identify the specific differentia, without which the corresponding definition 
can never emerge.]  
 
 
The epistemological imperative supersedes any kind of ethics.  By this maneuver, carnal 
knowledge, being a species of knowledge, is a good that requires actualization. 
Aristotle’s Topics and Categories are being wrested from grammar and utilized 
tendentiously for a new ethical manifesto, reminding us of Wittgenstein’s claim that his 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was a guide to ethics. Like Alain’s Nature, Jean’s 
narrator is arguing an ethical position based on the need to know substances. Although 
the philosophical underpinnings are hardly the same, we see here that Jean de Meun 
shares with the writer of the Queste a conflation of ontology and epistemology. Rather 
than seizing on linguistic violations as a reflection of man’s fallen nature as Alain had 
done, Jean de Meun will use grammatical contraries as an injunction to know 
‘substantive’ pleasure. The definition of a substance, for Aristotle, was the capacity to 
admit of contraries while remaining numerically one.324 While ‘pleasure’ is an accident 
of substance rather than a substance proper, the narrator tendentiously shows that 
contraries are not only essential for knowing language, but also for knowing things, such 
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as delit.325 Here we can see how Aristotle’s logic, when translated or allegorized from 
semantics to ethics, result in a more crude relativism in the latter than the former.  
I contend that this argument must be taken seriously as an ethical justification for 
the poem’s conclusion. “It is widely known that the study of literature and the study of 
ethics are intimately allied in the medieval commentary tradition, and that literature is 
defined, in theory at least, by its ethical credentials.”326 It even seems that Jean de Meun 
recognizes the sophistic nature of his logic, for just before this passage he tells us that old 
ladies (birds), so skilled in ruse, can only sometimes be taken in by their younger suitors’ 
(birdcatcher’s) sophisms [21498] or their “figures of diction” [21500].327 But even if we 
are being lulled into an extended sophism, this particular sophism is to serve as the 
ethical basis for the poem’s conclusion and the natural order.328 While Jean does not offer 
a systematic gloss the poem, this will be the last appearance of the word ‘glose’,329 here 
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used in a technical and ‘revelatory’, rather than euphemistic, sense. In these 
circumstances, I think this might be the closest thing we have to that oft-promised gloss 
of the entire work.  And this reminds us of the chronological - a teleological historian 
might say logical - successors of the Aristotelians, the Stoics and the Epicureans. While 
the former developed reason to achieve impassivity to the world, the latter tried rather to 
cultivate their greatest good: pleasure.  Both of them drifted from Aristotle in that they 
did not posit thought as immaterial. If Reason used Boethius to explore a more Stoic 
resignation in the face of Fortune’s vicissitudes, the narrator offers a vulgar 
Epicureanism, in the guise of Aristotelianism, to contextualize his conclusion.330            
 
Conclusion 
 
In the Scholastic terminology, the work’s ending/climax represents Aristotle’s 
generative entelechy, the fertilization of the rose signaling the triumph of actuality over 
what was formerly only potential. While it seems that he has used Averroistic naturalism 
to condone the plucking of the rose, unquestionably sinful by Christian standards and 
obscene by courtly standards, he has also used it to endorse the virtue of creation. This 
ending was prefigured literally both by Guillaume [3502-04]331  and by Jean [10599-
602], but there is of course something quite unseemly about the realization of these 
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prophecies. As Kevin Brownlee has noted regarding the context of Guillaume’s work, 
“the representation of this amorous success would presumptuously violate courtly rules 
and would invalidate the poem’s status as an extended erotic speech act considered 
extradiegetically.” (195)332 This amorous success makes manifest the teleology laid down 
by Guillaume, but which the former poet could not, in his courtly framework, articulate at 
the literal level. As regards courtly ethics, then, this ending is sheer heresy.    
The closing scene of the Rose is clearly a virtuoso piece of allegorical writing, 
though it is equally possible to see this obscene allegory as only a slightly ennobled form 
of innuendo. It should be noted that, in accordance with the commandments of the God of 
Love, all obscenities are glossed in the cueillette. The most ribald moment in the Rose is 
specifically a moment when Jean has favored metaphor, in keeping with Cupid’s 
command to bowdlerize offensive terms.  The ‘deflowering’ of the rose is an “extended 
ornatus”, or extended metaphor, but the “univocal allegory includes no sensus 
allegoricus”.333  Kevin Brownlee has analyzed the ending rhetorically, glimpsing in the 
pilgrim’s journey [21346-21365] the preponderance of metaphor, which eventually yields 
to a “radical metonymy” [21601-50] as the generative parts are treated as autonomous 
wholes, irrespective of their agent.334  In other words, this discourse is metaphorical with 
regard to the organs themselves (rendered in religious and horticultural imagery), but 
metonymic with regard to the integrity of the human body.  The effect of this rhetorical 
shift is in keeping with the ethos of Genius and Nature, who saw the fate of the species as 
essentially depersonalized. It is also, while no doubt virtuoso, far less complicated than 
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the abstruse metaphors of fallen relations that no doubt delighted the more prurient 
readers of the De Planctu.  Alain’s depictions of fallen relations are grammatical  (there 
is a grammar to sex just as there is to language, both subsidiary to God’s grammar) and 
therefore abstract, whereas Jean depicts coitus with concrete and sacred metaphors 
(pilgrim’s staff, relic bag, narrow slit in sanctuary), thereby replacing Alain’s abstract, 
Platonic allegory with a vulgarized sacramental one.  And while Ovid and Catullus had 
set a precedent for this kind of scurrilous verse, they did not prefigure the kind of 
sacramental iconoclasm in evidence in the Rose’s conclusion.  
I must agree with Hill in saying that a “good” (in the act of generation) has arisen 
from man’s fallen sexuality, even if the concept of that “good” has eluded the lover.335 
Having sought mere fornication with the rose, the lover unwittingly engages in an act of 
generative coitus and leaves her pregnant: 
 Car je voloie tout cerchier 
 Jusques au fons du boutonet,  
 Si cum moi semble que bon est. 
 Et fis lors si meller les grenes 
 Que se desmellassent a penes,  
 Si que tout le boutonnet tendre 
 En fis eslargir et estendre. [21724-30] 
 
 [For I wanted to search deeply for everything up to the back of the bud, as it seemed good 
 to me.  And then I mixed the seeds which barely separated, and I made the whole tender 
 bud expand and stretch.]336 
 
 The lover’s ignorance of the inherent ‘good’ of his act makes perfect sense, given his 
earlier rejection of Reason, and her injunction to read allegorically and love more 
generally [5441-48]. At the end, he has, quite unintentionally, followed Reason’s 
sanction of procreative love (engendreüre [5773]), yet he seems to be lacking, given his 
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reaction, that added component of “amour naturel”, namely the cure de nourriture 
[5774], both of which were exempt from blame and praise by virtue of their stemming 
from nature.  On the generative front, Reason accords nicely with Genius in her support 
of procreative sexuality. The lover, however, does not manage to follow Reason’s 
sanctions to  amer generaument [5447] with the amor du commun [5450], but rather 
remained steadfast to his master, Cupid, that is to say, in the courtly fetishism of the 
individual. This is because desire and pleasure, formerly explained by the Fall, are treated 
here as a biological fact. In forsaking reason (Mes de Raison ne me sovint,/ Qui tant en 
moi gasta de pene [21760-61], But I didn’t recall Reason, who wasted so much effort on 
me) 337 , the lover has abandoned his specific differentia ‘rational’, and is therefore 
reduced to his genus, animalia, for which he thanks Venus and Cupid, both of whom are 
conventionally associated with man’s carnal desires as opposed to reproduction.338  
The tendency in medieval philosophy, following the NeoPlatonic philosopher 
Plotinus, is to nominalize the word ‘good’ as ‘a good’, and thus Aristotle the act of 
creation is a perfection (the potentially living has been actualized in conception). This 
pregnancy occurs without the lover’s consent or understanding (g’y forfis  for spilling the 
seed [21731] ). In other words, the good of the species sometimes depends on the ill of its 
particulars.339 This is perhaps the ultimate inversion of the ethics of the De Planctu, for 
the ending of the Rose suggests that the divine act of generation occurs even in the most 
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desacralized of generative acts (fornicatio). We have no reason within the Rose to assume 
that the lover’s ethics ever transcends the duplicitous sanctions set forth by Ami.  But this 
matters little in this particular context, since the lover’s deed is here presented as 
transcending any individual ethics.  Even Boethius, a Christian, seems to draw almost 
Leibnitzian ethical conclusions in book four of the Consolatio: “It is only the power of 
God to which evils may also be good, when by their proper use He elicits some good 
result. For a certain order embraces all things, and anything which departs from the order 
planned and assigned to it, only falls back into order, albeit a different order, so as not to 
allow anything to chance in the realm of Providence.”340 Even if we did not suppose the 
more rationalistic determinism of his university contemporaries, Jean could find ample 
support for a highly deterministic and, indeed, optimistic relativism in the Christian work 
of Boethius.  From this perspective, the ending operates not on irony, but Providence, 
written with a capital precisely because the divine is confirmed by the natural order of 
continual generation and corruption.    
  In the context of censorship, the allegorical and often seemingly digressive nature 
of the poem serves to obscure and generalize much of its more radically naturalistic 
thrust, as we see in Paré’s gloss of the work: “Ses doctrines spéculatives semblent un jeu 
d’enfant à côté des audaces d’un Siger de Brabant; et même son naturalisme moral, assez 
vague en comparaison de celui d’un Boèce de Dacie."341 While Paré takes great pains to 
contextualize Jean’s university Aristotelianism, one of the consequences is that he 
normalizes it too much.  The frequent citing of Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great are 
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more interesting because they show an affinity for a common source (Aristotle) in 
contemporary culture. 342   While fully aware of heterodoxy within the Rose, his 
conclusions on the author are too sober and restrained, based on the evidence that he 
himself mounts.  In one sense, he may be right:  Jean may have been quite a normal, 
bourgeois realist of his time, with some “fringe doctrines” interspersed, but this seems to 
disregard the extent to which the Rose foregrounds its own heresy, a category that is 
constantly deflected onto the presuppositions of courtly love and the monastic ideals of 
the mendicants.  In contrast with Paré, I find Jean de Meun’s Averroism to be even more 
radical than Siger’s, because in the latter’s De Anima Intellectiva, he explicitly denies the 
conclusions to which “reason” (i.e. Aristotle’s logic) led him (concerning the unicity of 
the intellect) in favor of Christian faith.  In Jean de Meun, the hierarchy is plainly 
reversed as Catholic sacramentalism (the frocking of Genius) is used as a guarantor of the 
work’s “theological” truth.  
 The frenzied climax yields an intellection of the work based on a common 
homology of intellectual and carnal knowledge, both of which reach their simultaneous 
entelechy. For the Averroists, the separate material intellect is, along with our capacity to 
reproduce, our only access to immortality, though it still differs radically from the 
Christian conception of the immortal soul. This brings us to Aristotle’s most 
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 Paré, ibid: 12: “Pour les commentaires scolastiques, j’ai beaucoup utilisé Albert le Grant.  La raison en 
est qu’il est un excellent témoin des principales idéologies qui se sont rencontrées au 13e siècle en 
Occident, et que la plupart des thèmes philosophiques que développe Jean de Meun sont longuement 
exposés dans ses oeuvres."  It may be useful to note that this book is issued from Publications de L’institut 
d’études médiévale  Albert-le-Grand, for the justification presented here meshes oddly with his conclusions 
about Jean de Meun below. Albert, althoguh a Dominacan (read mendicant), was one of the great pioneers 
of a “purer” Aristotelianism in the Middle Ages.  He was the master of St. Thomas, the latter was more 
optimistic about applying reason to faith.  Jean de Meun relates to them both insofar as they are all 
Aristotelians, but his is, of course, more closely connected to the Averroistic interpretation of Aristotle than 
either of the above mendicants, something which the author himself recognizes, 342: “[Jean] participle à la 
mentalité realiste des bourgeois de son époque, plus particulièrement à l'esprit raisonneur et souvent 
frondeur des maîtres contemporains de l’Université de Paris. " (Italics are my own) 
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controversial passage on this very subject, one which polarized St. Thomas Aquinas 
against the Averroists and which retains some of its enigmatic quality still to this day:  
Actual knowledge is identical with its object: in the individual, potential knowledge is in  
time prior to actual knowledge, but absolutely it is not prior even in time.  It does not 
sometimes think and sometimes not think.  When separated it is alone just what it is, and 
this alone is immortal and eternal (we do not remember because, while this is impassible, 
passive thought is perishable); and without this nothing thinks.343   
 
Barnes’s translation of the nous poietikos,344 or intellectus agens, brings us right to the 
heart of this controversy.345 While ‘knowledge’ is certainly not a common personification 
in “literal” English, the disembodied ‘agent intellect’ is a substantive that, when a subject 
for a predicate, quickly resembles a personification allegory. For when given a 
rationalistic (albeit highly NeoPlatonic) explanation by the likes of Avicenna, and as 
McKlintock suggested, the highly “substantive” translation of these works from the 
Arabic to the Latin may have made this now allegorical theory of the intellects seem like 
a fit tool for explaining reality ad litteram.  This tendency provoked the ire of St. 
Thomas, who wrote De Unitate Intellectus (contra Averroistas), a work coterminous with 
the first condemnation of 1270 and about which Jon Marenbon has said:   
Aquinas, who is normally a balanced, respectful participant in argument, takes an 
unusually scornful attitude.  He seems to have been stung by the Arts Masters’ claims 
that the Latins had misunderstood Aristotle’s doctrine of the intellect […] Aquinas also 
attacks another sort of presumption: he complains that the Arts Masters have treated 
subjects which are matters of revelation and so beyond their competence, alluding to the 
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 Aristotle, De Anima. 3.5.  
344
 Greek terminology found in Kuksewicz, Z.  “The potential and the agent intellect” (595) in CHLMP, 
595-602. 
345
 Barnes still finds Aristotle’s characterization of thought in the De Anima to be both paradoxical and 
“obscure”: “The special status of thought depends upon the view that thinking does not involve any 
corporeal activity.  But how can Aristotle hold such a view?  His general account of the soul makes it plain 
that thinking is something done by ‘natural organic bodies’, and his particular analysis of the nature of 
thought makes thinking dependent upon imagination and hence upon perception.” Aristotle: Short 
Intoduction, 109. 
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question of whether the souls of the damned are tortured by corporeal fire in Hell, treated 
by Siger in his commentary on On the Soul in a skeptical manner.”346  
 
Aquinas said that Aristotle’s remark on the intellectus agens is in reference to the 
intellective human soul as the actualized form of the substantial body, eventually 
separated from the body in death and living eternally, thus bringing the Philosopher into 
accordance with Christian doctrine, and indeed Themistius and Algazali (also quite 
tendentiously in the case of Avicenna). By contrast, he scathingly dubs Averroes “not so 
much a Peripatetic as a perverter (depravator) of Peripatetic philosophy.”347 And the 
principle reason for this tract is stated in the first caput, and one that was addressed in 
Nature’s discussion of divine foreknowledge and contingency, namely, how responsible 
is man for his own actions? The Averroists did not share the belief in the individuation of 
the human soul (as regards the immaterial aspect of the soul that contemplates intelligible 
concepts), because Averroes had demonstrated, using Aristotle’s logic, that if it were 
individuated, knowledge would only be particular rather than universal, thus this belief 
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 Marenbon, 264.  Though a staunch opponent of Siger, Aquinas opposed the Averroists mostly for their 
doctrine of the soul,  but his zeal for Aristotle meant that many of his theses were also subject to censure in 
the second condemnation .  Although a mendicant, and indeed far more orthodox than Jean de Meun, the 
two are also united with respect to their defense against heresy, something which comes to the fore in his 
tract of the same year, dealing with the other major Averroist controversy, De Aeternitate Mundi. It must be 
said that Aquinas finds no rational arguments against the eternity of the world, rather the truth was laid 
down by revelation. In his philosophical interrogation on the world’s eternity “[Aquinas] is very keen to 
emphasize that, in the sort of questions he is considering, to give the wrong answer is not heretical, just as it 
is not heretical to say that God can alter the past, although it is, Aquinas believes, untrue.” (Marenbon, 260) 
But there is no question Aquinas would not have approved of Jean de Meun’s light treatment of Scripture,  
Indeed, Jean de Meun’s “hellfire and brimstone” account of hell is reserved for ‘sterile’ men in at the close 
of Nature’s speech, where a number of Biblical and mythological forms of torture intermingle humorously 
[19270-19322]. In this sense, Jean de Meun’s work seems more overtly subversive than the philosophical 
tracts of Siger.  
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 Aquinas, De Unitate Intellectus, caput 2: « Haec autem praemisimus, non quasi volentes ex 
philosophorum auctoritatibus reprobare suprapositum errorem, sed ut ostendamus, quod non soli Latini, 
quorum verba quibusdam non sapiunt, sed etiam Graeci et Arabes hoc senserunt, quod intellectus sit pars 
vel potentia seu virtus animae quae est corporis forma. Unde miror ex quibus Peripateticis hunc errorem se 
assumpsisse glorientur, nisi forte quia minus volunt cum ceteris Peripateticis recte sapere, quam cum 
Averroe oberrare, qui non tam fuit Peripateticus, quam philosophiae Peripateticae depravator. » 
(http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/iopera.html) Italics mine.   
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was always a logical one, and only remotely psychological. It is now clear that Aristotle’s 
natural philosophy and philosophy of mind, when combined with his abstruse 
metaphysics and ontology of the universal, yielded numerous insoluble heresies for this 
generation of thinkers.  
When the work ends, what remains is the actualized knowledge gained from the 
Rose, which, in the naturalistic leanings of its author, will become, like procreative 
generation, a means of achieving immortality. This remark would also clarify just why 
and how the Rose seems to de-allegorize its materials; it is precisely because his 
Aristotelianism is still indebted to the “science” of the intellects which reads more like 
theological allegory in our own time. Although the allegory may obscure the level of 
reality Jean de Meun actually granted to the personifications in the Rose, he does seem to 
forsake individual psychology in favor of objective knowledge. Jean de Meun’s 
contemporaries at the Arts Faculty were accused of heresy, perhaps in part due to 
quibbles arising perhaps not directly from their individual thought, but from the 
transmission of their authority via translation, where, in the case of Greek or Arabic into 
Latin, treatises on the mind may have evolved into ‘separable’ allegories. It seems to me 
that this strain of Arab Aristotelianism may be, to borrow Jameson’s term, a “vanishing 
mediator” between the logic and the ethics of the Rose.  And this naturalistic and 
rationalistic theology has given rise to an extremely bizarre allegory, one that literalizes 
and vulgarizes its source materials in order to preserve its didactic, and often subversive, 
thrust.   
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Conclusion 
  
 As we saw in the introduction and first chapter, the concept of providence took 
two major strains in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages, namely, the exegetical and the 
philosophical.  Boethius partially bridged the gap between the two with his poetic, 
philosophical, and theological work De Consolatio Philosophiae.  It is clear that the two 
strains were never antithetical, and often fed into each other.  But it is my contention that 
this was never so much the case as in the thirteenth century, where the growing number 
of summae attested to such syncretic methodology.   The slow and cautious incorporation 
of Aristotle into the university curriculum seems now to owe mostly to the fear of 
controverting the Christian doctrine of providence.  The theological romances that I have 
examined here, the Queste del Saint Graal and Jean de Meun’s Roman de la Rose, both  
rely on this concept for their internal narrative logic, despite little other generic affinity.       
At first glance, the Queste pertains almost entirely to the exegetical strand of 
providence, that is to say in the historical allegoria in factis.   The ‘élus’ reveal the 
concept of predestination, with Galahad depicted explicitly as a Christ-like redeemer.  
The ‘écu merveilleux’ and ‘siège périlleux’ offer examples of etiological transmission of 
substance and meaning.  Finally, the Tree of Life sequence inserts the narrative into a 
more universal Christian history.  The glossing hermits even give lessons in the 
correspondence between Old and New Testaments.  These are but commonplaces of 
providential narratives.  Given the sway that Providence holds in the narrative, the 
question of free will is never explicitly evoked, though it is clearly taken for granted.                                                                                                                                 
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 The hermits’ didacticism often spills into discussions of substance as if this notion 
were integral to understanding providential signification.   The exegetical thrust of the 
work is clear as it logically demonstrates its principles of correspondence between divine 
and material orders.   Its vocabulary is simple but apt and precise for its purposes, and the 
discernment of providential signification is based on correspondence of predicates, as 
well as similarities in qualities and attributes of distinct substances.  Augustine’s 
ontology is thereby preserved entirely.  In fact, in the work’s clear Augustinian realism, 
the term ‘senefiance’ is elevated to a transcendent substance, itself a “chose”, from which 
the material adventures derive their existence, and not vice versa.  While this order is 
necessarily reversed in the logic of narrative, where gloss follows adventure, the Queste 
is clear in asserting the ontological primacy of the former.                        
The corresponding adventures and glosses derive from both integumental and 
parabolic allegory.  On a macrostructural level, we see the extended integument of 
preparation for the Eucharistic sacrament.  The reality of transubstantiation is entirely 
analogous to that of the Holy Grail, as both fully contain the divine substance.  Galahad’s 
contact with the divine realities of the grail leads to his final apotheosis.  The ending is 
nothing short of euphoric: one senses the author’s faith and fervor in a restored Christian 
community.  Orthodoxy is vindicated as austere trials, chastity, and reliance on intuition 
lead the way to success in the quest.  Based on this theological perspective alone, the 
attribution of a single author to the Queste and Mort can be discarded.  If Jean Frappier’s 
notion of a single “architect” for the entire Vulgate is retained, it likewise cannot be made 
to account for anything more than continuity of plot and action.  In its theological depth 
and coherence, the Queste surely stands alone, separated even from its more militant 
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predecessor, the Perlesvaus.                                                                                              
 Though certainly more comical, audacious, and even heretical than the Queste, 
the Jean de Meun’s Rose continuation is no less prone to moralism.  Jean de Meun, unlike 
the nameless writer of the Queste, has chosen the format of the theological romance to 
prolong the courtly allegorical romance of Guillaume de Lorris.  This continuation is just 
as ethically charged as the more orthodox Queste, as Jean de Meun even incorporates 
vitriolic satire into poem.  In recent years, there has been a tendency to interpret Jean’s 
continuation more literally, especially as regards the Nature/Genius section.  This 
impetus is noticeable even in the works of C.S. Lewis (Allegory of Love, 1936)  and Alan 
Gunn (Mirror of Love, 1952), but has been further bolstered by the work of Alastair 
Minnis (Magister Amoris, 2001) and Winthrop Wetherbee (“The literal and the 
allegorical”, 1971).  This seems to be more in keeping with the direct style of Jean’s 
poetry and preserves the emphatic force of his moral and theological disquisitions.                                          
 Indeed, critical discussions of providence in the Rose were somewhat stagnated 
by a common tendency (e.g., Robertson, Dahlberg, Fleming) to reduce the work’s 
theology to Augustinianism.  Critics who took the Rose as a work of Christian 
apologetics had to concede that the dominant form of allegory in the work is extended 
narrative irony, i.e., a depiction of the effects of the fall.  This interpretation should now 
be as obsolete as Fleming’s cursory dismissal of Paré’s findings.348   Unlike in the 
Queste, the survival of the individual soul is moot in the Averroistic scheme of Nature 
and Genius.  However unorthodox this duo may be, they manage to resolve 
(allegorically) the previous stalemate between the vices and virtues. Genius even suggests 
that we are reading a salvation narrative, for in procreative coitus of the work’s 
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conclusion, the immortality of the species is safeguarded.                                                                   
 Like the ending of the Queste, then, that of the Rose exemplifies a similar 
euphoric tone, as both have made divine providence manifest in the terrestrial realm, the 
former through the symbolic fulfillment of the sacrament, and the latter through the 
eternally radiating intellects and the generation of sublunary things.  Since the deity 
depicted by Jean de Meun shows little trace of anthropomorphism, but rather, in typical 
and orthodox Scholastic formulation, is an utterly simple entity which “sees” everything 
as an eternal present, one may puzzle that he even keeps the term providence in the first 
place. Even Aquinas, the bitter enemy of the Averroists, had mentioned that the term 
‘knowledge’ and, by extension, ‘providence’, were always analogous, since the divine 
and human realities never corresponded entirely.  We should not be surprised then, that 
Jean de Meun is expounding his vision of man with the terms that describe reality most 
universally.                                                                                                                                          
 It is the materialism undergirding the Nature/Genius section that makes it so 
radical.  This is not to say that Jean de Meun did not believe in immaterial substances, 
which is patently false, but rather that man is subject to a determinism that is entirely 
material and natural (reproductive libido, astrology, being animal).  Aristotle’s 
discussions of substance therefore abound in the Rose, beginning with Reason’s first 
disputatio on the use of proper terms for the generative organs.  Indeed, without the 
emergent Aristotelian metaphysics and naturalistic documents, it would be hard to 
distinguish clearly between the ideology/theology of the Jean’s Rose and Alain’s De 
Planctu, despite their thematic similarity. We can now see more clearly how Jean de 
Meun revises the ideology of the Queste just as much as that of Guillaume’s Rose.  The 
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anti-sacramental verve of Jean de Meun’s Rose is not simply a matter of iconoclasm, or 
even the clash with the mendicant friars.  Rather, it seems to be sacramental ideology 
more generally that seems to be his principal target.  If Alain de Lille had suggested that 
man’s fall from his true nature was due to his propensity to sin, in Jean de Meun, it is the 
constraint of the sacraments that is posited as the source of the Fall.                                                                                             
 It is fitting that the most celebrated heir of the theological romance tradition 
should attempt to reconcile partially such conflicting takes on the concept of providence 
in his precursors.  In Paradiso, canto X, Dante the poet finds himself in the solar sphere, 
surrounded concentrically by beatified spirits, who have advanced the wisdom of the 
faithful with their writings.  Saint Thomas Aquinas (v. 99) steps forward to reveal himself 
and his master Albert the Great.   Other notable members of the circle include Boethius, 
Peter Lombard, Isidore, Bede and Richard of Saint Victor.  The most noteworthy of all, 
however, is the last to be introduced. It is none other than Thomas Aquinas’s secular 
adversary, Siger of Brabant:    
 Questi onde a me ritorna il tuo riguardo, 
 è ’l lume d’uno spirto che ’n pensieri 
 gravi a morir li parve venir tardo: 
 essa è la luce etterna di Sigieri, 
 che, leggendo nel Vico de li Strami, 
 silogizzò invidïosi veri. (133-8) 
[This light from which your eyes return to me/ shines from a soul once given to 
grave thoughts, who mourned that death should be so slow to come:/ this is the 
endless radiance of Siger,/ who lectured on the Street of Straw, exposing 
invidiously logical beliefs.]349 
 
In the less than fifty years after the publication of the Rose, Dante providentially re-writes 
(to nullification) the crux of the controversy expounded by Jean de Meun.  Thomas is not 
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just sympathetic to Siger in this moment; in the celestial realm, Siger’s light is the 
conduit of the shared vision of the poet and theologian.   As both souls have drawn closer 
to the realm of divine providence, Thomas recognizes the similarity of his fellow 
philosopher’s endeavor.  The beatified Siger had merely “syllogized” his “disreputable 
truths” (silogizzò invidïosi veri, v. 138).  Dante’s endlessly evocative juxtaposition of 
these Scholastic adversaries lacks any foundation in real history, but we can see that 
divine providence can unite that which is thought to be reconcilable.  In this fictional 
world, the thirteenth-century disputes over divine providence which led to the great 
condemnations are recast as falling under the domain of providence as well.  This is the 
privileged perspective of the poet who has been granted a glance at human history from 
the perspective of eternity, and one which is said to bring eternal beatitude at the end of 
this same canto.                                                                                                           
 Dante’s elucidation of providence is more esoteric and less rationalistic in 
methodology in method than Jean de Meun’s, although both authors accord in their 
notion of providence as a transcendent reality that subsumes all others, and this seems to 
be shared by both exegetical and philosophical explanations.  Despite the staggering 
commonality implicit in this rendering, the works in this corpus depict a providence that 
is hardly monolithic.  Few works of art attempt to explain the totality of existence, and 
these providential narratives distinguish themselves in such an endeavor.  As I have 
argued throughout this dissertation dissertation, a faulty or incomplete gloss of 
providence may alter one’s perspective on the entire romance.  And if we think again of 
Jameson’s vague periodization in the political unconscious, we see clearly that these 
works are not “magical narratives”, effecting fanciful resolutions to narrative problems, 
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but rather belong to a qualitatively different “providential” narrative.  In other words, 
their utopian visions are depicted as real possibilities in a currently imperfect world.   
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